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 Charged with facilitating the transition of former slaves from bondage to freedom, 
the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (known colloquially as the 
Freedmen’s Bureau) played a crucial role in shaping the experiences of black and African 
Americans in the years following the Civil War. Many historians have explored the 
agency’s administrative policies and assessed its pragmatic effectiveness within the social, 
political, and economic milieu of the emancipation era. However, scholars have not 
adequately grappled with the lasting implications of its arguments and professed efforts 
to support freedmen. 
 Therefore, this dissertation seeks to analyze and unpack the rhetorical textures of 
the Bureau’s early discourse and, in particular, its negotiation of freedom as an 
exclusionary, rather than inclusionary, idea. By closely examining a wealth of archival 
documents— including letters, memos, circular announcements, receipts, congressional 
 
proceedings, and newspaper articles—I interrogate how the Bureau extended antebellum 
freedom legacies to not merely explain but police the boundaries of American belonging 
and black inclusion. Ultimately, I contend that arguments by and about the Bureau 
contributed significantly to the reconstruction of a post-bellum racial order that affirmed 
the racist underpinnings of the social contract, further contributed to the dehumanization 
of former slaves, and prompted black people to resist the ongoing assault on their 
freedom.  
 This project thus provides a compelling case study that underscores how 
rhetorical analysis can help us better understand the ways in which seemingly progressive 
ideas can be used to justify exercises of power and domination. Additionally, this 
interpretation of the Bureau’s primary role as a mechanism of supervision, rather than 
support, sheds light on the history of unjust practices that persist today in American race 
relations. Finally, this study affirms how black people have persevered in inventive and 
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In 1619, a “frightening ship, a ship of mystery,” flying a Dutch flag made port at 
Jamestown, in the English colony of Virginia.1 Nearly two and a half centuries later, a 
man named Oliver Otis Howard embarked on a two-month journey through the southern 
states on those same waters.2 Howard later contemplated the symbolic magnitude of the 
James River in a lecture reflecting on his experiences. He attributed the river’s historical 
significance to that fateful seventeenth-century ship, which carried “on its broad bosom 
the first load of African slaves ever brought to this country.”3 
Howard concluded that the river’s tides ferried even greater meaning in the wake 
of the Civil War. Four years of “carnage at Big Bethel, Yorktown, Williamsburg, 
Malvern Hill, and on numerous other fields,” he observed, was “recorded along her 
banks.” Howard decided that the river’s embattled history was the inevitable legacy of its 
infamous slave freight. The bodies that fell upon the shores of the James River and the 
blood that stained its waters were the river’s penance, “the terrible expiation of her sin.”4 
Despite this traumatic past, Howard was optimistic that the Civil War had 
delivered slavery’s final absolution—freedom for black slaves. As he declared, “the 
blood of the oppressed patriot is certainly the seed of liberty.” When Howard reflected 
upon the “curse” of slavery and the fated arrival of the Dutch vessel, he concluded “that 
the shades of those slaves—a ghostly crew upon a ghostly vessel—may have looked 
upon the carnage … and been fully satisfied.”5 By Howard’s estimation, their blood had 
been repaid, freedom was justly restored, and the ghosts of slavery had been put to rest. 
 Howard’s mission was to protect and nurture the seeds of liberty as Head 
Commissioner of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands.6 
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Established in 1865 and colloquially known as the Freedmen’s Bureau, this provisional 
agency served to facilitate the transition of emancipated slaves from bondage to 
freedom.7 The Bureau was charged with “the supervision and management of all 
abandoned lands, and the control of all subjects relating to refugees and freedmen from 
rebel states.”8 This meant that the agency was authorized to provide rations, clothing, 
supplies, and temporary shelter to loyal refugees and emancipated slaves. Randall Miller 
has referred to their task as undertaking “an extraordinary crisis,” due to the complex 
political terrain of the period.9 The Bureau was caught in the crosshairs of conflict 
between white and black people, North and South, and Congress and the presidency. Yet, 
as Paul A. Cimbala argued, the Bureau drew motivation from the controversies that gave 
“balance and direction to [its] work.”10 The Bureau’s agents considered themselves to be 
the “guardians” of emancipated slaves, charged to “protect them in their freedom.”11 
Howard recognized the challenges facing the Bureau but was confident about 
freedom’s promise. Throughout his journey, he conversed with “citizens of every class,” 
visited several state legislatures, attended Republican and Democratic gatherings, and 
“addressed upward of twenty public assemblages, colored, white, and mixed.”12 He 
encountered first-hand evidence of the obstacles facing the Bureau, including racial 
prejudice, anti-Union sentiment, and media bias.13 However, he also saw signs of success 
in healthy farms, African American schools, and “white men and colored men sitting 
together in deliberative bodies.” Howard observed that “overwhelming public sentiment” 
confirmed the Bureau’s mission would slowly but surely bring progress. In the meantime, 
the Bureau would continue to “defend the freedom which [had] been purchased for 
[emancipated slaves] in blood and treasure.”14 
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This project revisits the rhetorical work of the Bureau, contests Howard’s 
optimism, and challenges the assumption that the Civil War had delivered freedom and 
quieted slavery’s ghosts. I propose that the Bureau’s “extraordinary crisis” was not 
“guiding the South’s slaves from bondage to freedom.”15 Its primary problem was the 
contentious and, ultimately, unjust legacy of freedom itself. The ways in which freedom 
had been defined had long excluded black people, especially slaves, from social, 
economic, and political inclusion. Yet, during his southern journey, Howard quickly 
dismissed many expressions of doubt and anger regarding freedmen’s entrance into 
American society as remnants of old prejudices, mere “ventilators for the hidden fires of 
pent-up hate.”16 This study confronts Howard’s nonchalance and highlights how those 
antebellum fires forged the idea of freedom and shaped the Bureau’s policies and 
practices in the emancipation era. 
 To introduce this project, I provide an overview of the scholarship and rhetorical 
history that ground my research. I begin by proposing a rhetorical approach to freedom as 
a means of extending existing scholarship about the Freedmen’s Bureau.17 Drawing from 
eighteenth and nineteenth century discourse by and about African Americans, I illustrate 
how a presumed natural right to freedom was clarified and constrained by commitments 
to republican character, formal education, “free” labor, and legal citizenship. Then, I 
consider this ideational history alongside antebellum racial politics, which 
overwhelmingly denied both the capacities and essential humanity of black people, in 
order to demonstrate how freedom provided a vocabulary for rationalizing the exclusion 
of black people from antebellum society. I ultimately propose that this legacy framed the 
scope and magnitude of the Bureau’s rhetorical task. The emancipation era presented an 
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opportunity for its agents to renegotiate a cherished American idea and advocate for the 
unconditional embrace of black people as fully free and fully human. 
The Rhetoric of Freedom 
 
Existing scholarship largely approaches the Freedmen’s Bureau as a pragmatic, 
administrative task force, but Head Commissioner Howard grasped the rhetorical 
significance of the agency’s role in the post-war moment. The Bureau was established as 
a response to a crisis, and Howard admitted that the agency had been tasked with a “very 
difficult problem to solve.”18 In an August 1865 speech, he explained that the purpose of 
the Bureau was to pursue, institute, and protect the “pledge” made by President Abraham 
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation. Howard conceded the task at hand would require 
“keep[ing] a steady rein,” because freedmen were largely “ignorant of the rights and 
duties of liberty,” and whether or not former slaves “would forever remain free” was still 
uncertain.19 Within just five months of the Bureau’s conception, Howard had realized that 
indoctrinating emancipated slaves into American society was a matter of “defining and 
defending freedom.”20 As such, Howard envisioned the Bureau’s mission in rhetorical 
terms. 
Accordingly, I adopt a rhetorical approach to the Bureau’s work and call attention 
to the Bureau’s persuasive, meaning-making practices. According to David Zarefsky, 
adopting a rhetorical perspective to the Bureau’s work compels us to ask how its agents 
engaged in persuasive argument to pursue their mission. It also demands that we explore 
what was significant about their arguments in the social, political, and historical contexts 
in which they circulated. In order to address these questions, we must recognize that the 
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Bureau’s rhetoric functioned instrumentally and constitutively to “forg[e] common bonds” 
and reinforce “the glue holding together a society.”21 
The Bureau’s rhetoric was instrumental because its leaders worked purposefully 
toward specific solutions. Historically, rhetoric has been defined as the strategic use of 
persuasion to achieve desired ends.22 In other words, rhetoric is used as an instrument to 
pursue specific goals or solutions in specific contexts—and the Bureau’s solutions to the 
emancipation crisis were numerous.23 Randall Miller has pointed out how Bureau agents 
devoted their energy to “setting up schools for freedpeople, negotiating or overseeing 
labor contracts, [and] arguing for blacks’ rights in law.”24 Rhetorical practice was integral 
to these efforts because the Bureau faced entrenched opposition. As Howard attested, 
“even good men, are so imbued with a life-long prejudice, that they cannot act justly 
toward [former slaves]. Still others will not.” In the face of such prejudice, Howard knew 
that he would have to argue passionately for “the gradual elevation and education of the 
[black] race.” If the Bureau failed to defend African Americans’ rights to freedom, 
former slaves would never “be in a position to demand the full rights of citizens, and 
compete with whites for a fair chance.”25 Defending the freedom of emancipated slaves 
required an instrumental and sustained effort to persuade the general public that African 
Americans deserved to exercise their natural rights. 
The Bureau’s rhetoric was also constitutive because its leaders needed to 
conceptualize freedom, as well as defend it. Understanding rhetoric within a constitutive 
framework posits that arguments call identities, ideas, and institutions into being where 
they did not previously exist or are being reconceived for new exigencies.26 As Howard 
noted, the government had finally promised emancipated slaves the “fruits of their 
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freedom” but provided little direction or specificity about the meaning of freedom for 
those formerly shackled by slavery and prejudice. When Howard became Head 
Commissioner, he reportedly received numerous letters, documents, recommendations, 
and all manner of “plans from all parts of the country.”27 People were wondering how the 
Bureau would secure the freedom of emancipated slaves. Howard’s account supports a 
constitutive understanding of the Bureau’s work. The meanings of freedom were 
contested, especially for individuals who had lived a life of bondage. The Freedmen’s 
Bureau consequently had to defend freedom, as it was simultaneously defining the idea 
for a group of individuals previously denied their rights.28 
 Constitutively and instrumentally, the Bureau’s mission was rhetorical: to define 
and defend freedom for former slaves in the era of emancipation.29 Therefore, I position 
the idea of freedom, the “main principle” of the Bureau’s mission, at the center of my 
analysis.30  In this section, I assert the critical potential of ideas, drawing heavily on 
Ernest Wrage’s ideational perspective on rhetoric. Then, I turn my attention to 
antebellum conversations about slaves and African Americans. I chart constructions of 
freedom to demonstrate how an ideational approach gives rise to a nuanced 
understanding of the Bureau agents’ task as rhetors. I seek to show that the Bureau 
inherited a rhetorical legacy marked by a troubling paradox: freedom defined as both a 
natural and earned right. 
A rhetorical approach to ideas 
 
This project approaches freedom as an idea constituted by rhetoric and rich in 
complexity and utility. This perspective is heavily indebted to Ernest Wrage who, in 1947, 
prompted rhetorical scholars to reorient their traditional focus from speakers to speeches. 
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He directed attention in particular to ideas. In “Public Address: A Study in Social and 
Intellectual History,” Wrage argued that public speech serves as the “vehicle for the 
conveyance of ideas.”31 He implored scholars to attend to “ideas communicated[,] the 
ascertainable sources of those ideas, the historical vitality and force of the ideas, and of 
demonstrable refractions, modifications, or substitutions.”32 
 Wrage’s emphasis on ideas demands careful attention to the dynamics of 
speech.33 
He argued that ideas are dynamic “formulations of thought.” Their construction depends 
on the “configurations of language” that craft them in situated moments of rhetorical 
practice. Discourse, therefore, cannot be simply mined for an objective, pre-formed idea. 
Rather, we must approach rhetorical texts as “bod[ies] of intricate tissues, of 
differentiated yet related thought” in order to explore how an idea is (re)constituted.  
Moreover, in order to appreciate an idea’s “nuances of meaning,” we must pay attention 
to a constellation of texts. Wrage is careful to point out that ideas can be expressed in “a 
mosaic of documents,” including “constitutions and laws, literature and song, scientific 
treatises and folklore, in lectures, sermons, and speeches.”34 He thus invited scholars to 
resist privileging “monumental works,” because the full “marketplace” of ideas is 
populated by both great thinkers and everyday conversationalists.35 Simply put, ideas are 
not “entities which enjoy independent existence.”36 Ideas are messy, and they are not 
neatly nor consistently defined. 
 Wrage also emphasized that ideas circulate beyond specific historical moments 
and, in the process, “attain history.” Attending to bodies of discourse, rather than single 
texts, is of paramount importance because an idea’s meaning is “widely scattered” and 
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(re)defined over time. Wrage consequently placed more importance on discursive 
histories than isolated moments of utterance. Quoting Merle Curti, Wrage recognized that 
each expression of an idea is “touched… in a more or less casual fashion” by countless 
expressions that came before. As such, the expression of an idea in any singular moment 
is the dynamic invention of prior iterations, by elite, institutional, and vernacular voices.37 
 Consequently, the reward for critically engaging with ideas is a deeper, more 
nuanced understanding of rhetoric’s instrumental and ideological “force in history.”38 
Wrage argued that humans express ideas to accomplish goals and clarify relationships 
with one another and, in the process, demonstrated an appreciation for traditional 
approaches to rhetoric as reliant on a speaker’s agency to achieve instrumental ends. 
Rhetorical agents wield ideas as “instrument[s] of utility,” making strategic choices to 
“promote social conflict[,] contribute to resolution of differences,” and “injec[t] ideas 
into the public consciousness.”39 At the same time, Wrage’s emphasis on discursive 
history invites us to consider how ideas form legacies and vocabularies that can transcend 
individual speakers and their strategic choices.40 As humans articulate ideas they 
construct rationales to explain “overt act[s] of human behavior” and “promote [men’s] 
interests and justify their activities.”41 If ideas can serve as “guides, warrants, reasons, 
and excuses for behavior and belief,” they can exert an ideological “control over 
consciousness, the a priori influence that learned predispositions hold over human 
agents.”42 Simply, an ideational approach to rhetoric demands attention to both speaker-
centered paradigms of rhetorical analysis as well as ideologically-centered paradigms that 
negotiate power and morality. 
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An ideational approach accordingly provides an opportunity to extend existing 
scholarship about the Bureau and its role in the emancipation era. By examining how the 
agency grappled with notions of freedom, we can move beyond its logistical struggles to 
better understand its ideological complexities and constraints. First, we must appreciate 
how the Bureau’s attempts to articulate freedom clashed with prevailing ideologies in 
what Wrage refers to as the “popular mind.”43 Indeed, some histories of the Bureau do 
recognize that the Bureau’s radical message was decisively undermined and rendered 
ineffectual by racism and sectionalism.44 This interpretation privileges the power 
dynamics of the post-war era and reminds us to understand the ways in which the Bureau 
was, in some measure, constrained by ideology. Second, we must also recognize how the 
agency’s mission contributed to vocabularies that “promote[d] and displace[d] power.”45 
As the Bureau articulated an idea of freedom for emancipated slaves, it “shaped… 
sociopolitical relations” in the emancipation era.46 Therefore, we must investigate how its 
agents’ rhetoric was “amplified, reworked, redirected, and deployed to produce 
concentrated collective action or change.”47 
This project hereafter proceeds with an understanding of the Freedmen’s Bureau 
as a rhetorical agent, presented with an opportunity to (re)constitute freedom and argue 
for a post-war community that would embrace the unconditional belonging of both white 
and black Americans. To better understand the complexities of this rhetorical task, I tack 
back and forth between the arguments of white and black speakers grappling with 
competing views over slavery and freedom in the antebellum years. Freedom was a 
popular and hotly contested topic in this body of nineteenth-century discourse. These 
conversations were most often grounded, first and foremost, in the notion of freedom as 
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an a priori truth, universal to all humans. Yet, the idea was also expressed in a variety of 
different ways that restricted the meanings of freedom allowed in the emancipation era. 
My tracing therefore begins with speakers’ arguments for understanding freedom as a 
foundational, natural right. Then, I show how the idea was expressed through a 
constellation of constraints and conditions that transformed freedom into an earned right. 
In accordance with an ideational approach, I conclude that this paradox was integral to 
freedom’s discursive legacy and complicated the Bureau’s mission in the emancipation 
era. 
Foundations of freedom in nineteenth-century America 
 
 In order to fully understand the Bureau’s rhetorical practices, I begin with what 
historian Howard Zinn has referred to as “the great manifesto of freedom of the American 
Revolution.”48 Nearly a century before the Bureau was established, colonists rebelled 
against English rule. They justified their actions by appealing to an ideal of freedom—a 
natural right that endowed humans with the right to liberty and self-governance.49 
This articulation of freedom as a natural right animated America’s arguments for 
revolution. In 1764, the British parliament imposed a New Colonial Policy, accompanied 
by a series of tariffs, on its American colonies. The next year, in the first intercolonial 
meeting in over a decade, the Stamp Act Congress called for a boycott of English goods. 
The colonists defended their actions as the reasonable protection of their “most essential 
rights and liberties.”50 They framed British rule as a violation of their “inherent” rights as 
“natural born subjects,” and responded with a vehement call for the “freedom of a 
people.”51 Simply put, America’s founding revolution was justified by and predicated on 
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the notion that all humans are born free, and have a natural right to exercise such freedom 
in self-governance.52 
This freedom ideal continued to justify arguments of rebellion and protest in the 
years leading up to America’s formal declaration of independence. In a 1767 series of 
“letters from a farmer in Pennsylvania,” John Dickinson argued that colonists possess an 
inherent right to be “free,” even when involved in a co-dependent relationship with their 
mother country. He insisted that parliament’s actions were particularly “pernicious to 
freedom,” because they rendered colonists’ natural right to liberty “vox et praeterea nihil. 
A sound and nothing else.”53 Later, in a 1774 oration commemorating the Boston 
Massacre, John Hancock affirmed that freedom was a unifying ideal, the “one common 
cause” motivating Americans in rebellion against British rule.54 Together, these 
arguments upheld freedom as a natural right that transcended the realities of English 
government, trade laws, and tariffs. As Thomas Paine famously attested in 1776, the 
colonies were united as “thirteen clocks ticking as one,” in pursuit of the “natural rights 
of all mankind.”55 Paine concluded, “the sun never shined on a cause of greater worth.”56 
By 1776, these conversations crystallized in arguably one of the most 
recognizable passages in the history of American public discourse. In the preamble to the 
Declaration of Independence, the framers proclaimed, “We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.”57 With these words, America formally declared a commitment to a universal, 
human right to “be free and independent.”58 
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However, Americans were quick to scrutinize these ideal articulations of freedom. 
Many Americans questioned the extent to which freedom applied to all Americans 
beyond propertied white men of means. More specifically, some challenged the extent to 
which freedom applied to slaves living in America. Among them was John Wesley, an 
Anglican cleric later-turned abolitionist. In Thoughts On Slavery, published in 1774, 
Wesley upheld freedom as a natural right. He said, “Freedom is unquestionably the birth 
right of all mankind.” With its universality unequivocally established, he argued that any 
effort to “keep [humans] in a state of slavery is a constant violation of that right.” In short, 
America was failing to live up to the foundational promises on which it was envisioned. 
Wesley implored everyday citizens, rather than governments or legislators, to recognize 
the wicked injustices of slavery. The urgency of abolition was rooted in his belief that 
“there cannot be in nature” or “not in all history, an influence in which every right of man 
is more flagrantly violated.” With these words, Wesley recognized the fraudulent tenets 
of American freedom. Until slavery was abolished, Wesley and others reasoned, the 
natural right of freedom would not be universal for “every child of man" or "every 
partaker of human nature.”59 
Other abolitionists blazed similar rhetorical trails. David Walker, a legally free 
black man, penned his infamous Appeal in 1829, in which he articulated freedom as a 
divine right afforded to all humans, all “inhabitants of the earth.” Walker contended, 
however, that slavery continued to assail that right. He asked, “Can our condition be any 
worse? Can it be more mean and abject?... Can they get us any lower?” No, he argued, 
because slavery had committed the greatest sin of all—denying African Americans their 
freedom and, with it, their humanity. Walker made the case for blacks as human, saying, 
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“we are men, notwithstanding our improminent noses and woolly heads, and believe that 
we feel for our fathers, mothers, wives, and children, as well as the whites do for 
theirs.”60 By doing so, he relied on the presumption that freedom and humanity were 
inseparable. If he could persuade his audiences that blacks were human, he could 
rationalize his position that blacks, like whites, deserved freedom.61 
These examples demonstrate the extent to which eighteenth and nineteenth-
century rhetors, both black and white, drew on the discursive threads of revolution-era 
freedom rhetoric. They maintained that freedom was a natural right, and that the 
government was duty-bound to recognize and protect that right for slaves and African 
Americans. Though the revolutionary ideal was established in America predominantly by 
white voices, historian Winthrop B. Jordan has recognized that, in the abstract, “freedom 
wore a cap which fitted the negro and white man alike.”62 From this foundational premise, 
countless rhetors launched argumentative assaults against the realities of slavery. Lerone 
Bennett Jr. attributes the enduring struggle of black America to eighteenth-century 
discourse and, specifically, the “revolutionary seeds” of natural rights arguments.63 He 
claimed, “the Declaration of Independence enclosed the white colonists in a net of their 
own making and made black freedom an inevitable corollary of white freedom.”64 The 
ongoing evolution of freedom rhetoric, particularly as it pertained to arguments by and 
about African Americans, relied on expressions of natural rights espoused in the nation’s 
founding. 
However, this natural rights conception and its accompanying critiques were 
confronted head-on in 1861, with the commencement of the Civil War. For some, the war 
was a decisive fight for freedom.65 In 1862, Frederick Douglass declared, “Slavery stands 
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confessed as the grand cause of the war… No other interest, commercial, manufacturing, 
or political, could have wrought such a social earthquake among us.”66 The only 
acceptable outcome of the war was the abolition of slavery, which would finally allow 
“rational, law abiding Liberty [to] fill the whole land with peace, joy, and permanent 
safety.”67 For Douglass, and many other abolitionists, the Civil War was a battle for the 
recognition and restoration of natural freedom for millions of African Americans. 
When President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 
1863, declaring millions of slaves to be “forever free,” the contested meanings of 
freedom were brought to the fore of public debate.68 As Ira Berlin et al. have argued, “the 
war for Union had indeed become a war for liberty,” but the rhetorical battle had hardly 
begun.69 Two days after Lincoln’s historic announcement, an editorial in the New York 
World lambasted its merit. In addition to pointing out the pragmatic military parameters 
of the order, the editorial insisted that the proclamation promised only “dormant” 
freedom: “if free at all, [slaves] are not actually but only legally free.” The editor stressed 
the inadequacy and, perhaps, practical irrelevancy of the natural rights argument: “Mr. 
Lincoln’s paper proclamation is of no more force than the imprescriptable title to 
freedom born with every human being who has courage and vigor of character to assert 
it.”70 With these words, the editor cast doubt on the idea of freedom as a natural right, 
implying that such arguments were inconsequential when applied to emancipated slaves. 
Ultimately, reducing freedom to its conception of natural rights overlooks the 
myriad ways in which freedom was challenged and constituted throughout the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. The ideal certainly proved central to countless arguments 
circulating in American discourse. However, freedom had also been rhetorically linked to 
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other ideas and behaviors besides an inherent right to human existence and self-
governance. 
Rhetorical moves from natural rights to earned rights 
 
 Antebellum discourse clarified that freedom was not free for everyone; it was 
reserved as a privilege for those who could demonstrate ideal characteristics and 
behaviors. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, rhetors specifically 
contested blacks’ capacity to fulfill these expectations.71 In arguments by and about 
African Americans—both free and enslaved—the rhetoric of freedom converged in four 
primary nodes: upholding republican character, achieving formal education, contributing 
to a productive labor force, and exercising legal citizenship.72 These prerequisites shifted 
the conversation from natural rights to earned rights, validating the inherent freedom of 
only those who could prove that they deserved it. 
Republican character. A major caveat to freedom’s natural rights was the 
presumption that only certain Americans were capable of exercising it. Rogers M. Smith 
has argued that this clarification undergirds the various—and, often competing—
philosophies that animate American political discourse: a fundamental belief that “a 
certain group is a distinctive and especially ‘worthy’ people” with the capacity to justly 
govern others.73 So, while all humans might be inherently free, only those with 
extraordinary abilities and characteristics have the wisdom to understand freedom’s 
accompanying privileges and responsibilities. Antebellum American discourse articulated 
a strict code of republican character as the bedrock of a free and prosperous nation. When 
brought into conversation with presumed differences between whites and blacks, 
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standards of republican character questioned the legitimacy of black people’s claims to 
their own natural rights. 
Emancipated slaves had to earn their entrance into a society firmly rooted, after 
years of constitutional uncertainty, in “the principles of republican freedom.”74 After 
overthrowing British rule, America was gripped by contentious debate, as different 
leaders and parties offered opposing views on the best way to govern the new nation 
while simultaneously fulfilling its revolutionary promise of freedom. When Thomas 
Jefferson assumed the presidency and delivered his inaugural address in 1801, he 
responded to the “venomous civil discord” with what Stephen Howard Browne referred 
to as “a veritable manifesto of the Republican creed.”75 In his speech, Jefferson exalted a 
comprehensive slate of standard practices and principles, including: “common efforts for 
the common good,” national unity of “one heart and one mind,” and reverence for 
“honesty, truth, temperance, gratitude, and the love of man.” For Jefferson, an individual 
and collective commitment to these ideals transcended discord and bound the nation as a 
true republic of “fellow-citizens, resulting not from birth, but from [their] actions and 
their sense of them.” In other words, instead of birthright, behaviors and beliefs 
determined belonging in American society. Jefferson identified republicanism, not 
humans’ inherent rights, as having “form[ed] the bright constellation” guiding American 
society on “the road… to peace, liberty, and safety.” A natural right to freedom might be 
a given, Jefferson reasoned, but “freedom of religion; freedom of the press; and freedom 




Jefferson’s rhetoric clarified freedom by installing republican character as a 
prerequisite. In order for the nation to flourish and blossom as free, its citizenry had to 
conduct themselves with morality, reason, humility, and a selfless concern for the 
brotherhood of man.77 It was not enough to simply have been born free; one must also 
behave in a manner befitting freedom. Primary discourse demonstrates that this 
allegiance to republican principles was a major constraint for African Americans’ 
attainment of freedom, because of the presumption that black people lacked the proper 
character for citizenship and, by extension, the essential qualities of humanness. 
In a 1789 message, titled “To the Public,” Benjamin Franklin raised doubts about 
whether emancipated slaves were capable of the “luminous and benign spirit of liberty.” 
Franklin argued that their humanity had been essentially broken because slavery rendered 
African Americans “unhappy,” “fetter[ed] his intellectual faculties, and impair[ed] the 
social affections of his heart.” Franklin portrayed African Americans as non-human 
characters, more “like mere machine[s]” tilling the fields.78 Jefferson echoed his concerns 
in the infamous Notes on the State of Virginia from 1781. Describing America’s slaves to 
his friends in Europe, Jefferson attributed the illusion of their bravery and 
“adventuresome” demeanor to a “want of forethought, which prevents them from seeing 
danger.”79 He deemed them “in reason much inferior… in imagination they are dull, 
tasteless, and anomalous.”80 And, in terms of emotional capacity, Jefferson noted that 
African Americans’ afflictions were “less felt, and sooner forgotten with them.”81 
Decades of abolition fervor did little to suppress this criticism. An 1862 editorial from the 
Atlanta Southern Confederacy summarized, succinctly, “the negro… has not enough of 
intelligence with high moral development, to leave him among us without absolute 
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control.”82 With this judgment, the editors swiftly affirmed the character deficiencies of 
African Americans. Presuming African Americans to be without reason, emotion, and 
morality, whites pronounced their character generally unfit for freedom. 
 Even African Americans who were born legally free were not exempt from these 
standards. In his study of African American oratory in anti-slavery societies, Robert C. 
Dick argued that the mere opportunity to publicly advocate for abolition was predicated 
on black orators’ ability to embody “good moral character; sincerity, and 
trustworthiness.”83 Dick explained that “prospective agents were sometimes investigated 
for more than a month” in order to ensure that they were “living examples of what 
members of their race were capable of doing.”84 Demonstrating good character was 
considered an essential “qualification[n] for the work” of not only exercising freedom, 
but even arguing for it.85 
African American voices populated the conversation with their own views about 
character. Benjamin Banneker, for example, penned a letter to Jefferson in 1791, 
imploring him to reconsider how his critiques were perpetuating the “train of absurd and 
false ideas and opinions” about African Americans. He referenced the “state of servitude” 
imposed by “the tyranny of the British Crown” to invoke the natural rights ideal, which 
he also reinforced by quoting the language of the Declaration itself. In Banneker’s view, 
the “Father of Mankind” conferred freedom on all human beings in an “impartial and 
distribution of rights and privileges.” The “Creator” also endowed, “without partiality,” 
all members of the human family with “the same sensations, and… the same faculties.” If 
all humans were born free, they were also all born with the character required to assert 
their natural rights to freedom.86 
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Later, in the early 1830s, Maria W. Stewart took a slightly different tack. She did 
not deny that African Americans possessed the strength of character needed for 
productivity and success in free society; like Banneker, she believed that the negative 
characteristics ascribed to African Americans were untrue.87 However, she did argue that 
emancipated slaves and free blacks alike could not assume that whites would take their 
worth for granted. Instead, African Americans had to “convince [whites] that they 
possess the spirit of men.”88 Doing so would require unequivocal commitment to the 
same republican ideals—particularly, the ideal of freedom. She believed that the first step 
toward achieving freedom would be to demonstrate an undeniable desire for it, because 
“[whites] admire a noble and patriotic spirit in others—and should they not admire it in 
us?”89 The second step, however, was to recognize African Americans’ own complicity 
in the struggle for freedom. She insisted that African Americans would remain in chains 
so long as they did not abandon frivolity for “honor and respectability.”90 In other words, 
freedom would remain a long way off for African Americans if they did not cultivate the 
character to pursue and exercise it. 
While African American speakers like Stewart seemed to, at least in part, affirm 
stereotypes of deficient character, it is important to note that they attributed those 
deficiencies to slavery’s destructive forces. Stewart argued that “continual fear and 
laborious servitude” was to blame for any “lessened… natural force and energy which 
belong to man.”91 Frederick Douglass echoed her arguments in 1865. Reflecting on 
slavery and its abolition, Douglass remarked, “wherever men oppress their fellows… 
they will endeavor to find the needed apology for such enslavement and oppression in the 
character of the people oppressed and enslaved.”92 The greatest sin of slavery, therefore, 
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was not its physical chains. Douglass recognized that slavery’s assault on African 
Americans’ character could continue to keep freedom out of their reach even after their 
emancipation. 
These examples demonstrate the extent to which natural rights to freedom were 
defined in terms of republican character. Early American orators argued that the nation’s 
growth depended squarely on the character of its citizens. Without morality, reason, 
humility, and a commitment to a common good, the republic would fracture and its 
experiment in freedom would fail.93 In discussing the restoration of freedom’s natural 
rights to emancipated slaves, both white and African American speakers and writers 
upheld that these principles were a prerequisite for any meaningful exercise of freedom in 
American society. Historian Philip Gleason once argued that to be an American is to 
commit to “the abstract ideals of liberty, equality, and republicanism.”94 For millions of 
slaves whose emancipation suggested even marginal access to American society, those 
abstract ideals were co-dependent: African Americans had to prove their capacity for 
republican character, equal to the presumed devotion of free whites, in order to validate 
their inherent right to liberty.95 
	 Formal education. Natural rights claims to freedom were also constrained by 
heavy emphasis on formal education and literacy. Freedom had to be meticulously taught 
and diligently learned, rather than merely recognized in all human beings. This 
clarification held African Americans to standards of reading, writing, and speaking. 
According to both white and black voices, formal education and literacy was required to 
both understand freedom’s meaning in America and, ultimately, argue for the deliverance 
of freedom for emancipated slaves. 
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White Americans charged themselves with the urgent task of educating 
emancipated slaves in preparation for freedom. The commanding role of whites as 
guardians and teachers was made explicit during America’s nascent years, when 
revolution-era leaders confronted the realities of slavery. Benjamin Franklin’s 1789 
message commended the nation on its thoughtful “design” but insisted on “an important 
addition to our original plan”: the renunciation and eradication of slavery. For Franklin, 
slavery was an “atrocious debasement of human nature,” because it robbed humans of 
“the power of choice,” supplanted reason and conscience, and demanded slaves be 
governed instead “by the passion of fear.” In other words, Franklin argued that slavery 
had summarily destroyed slaves’ inherent ability to self-govern and had rendered them 
ignorant.  The first step, then, in amending America’s commitment to freedom was to 
abolish slavery. It was not, however, the final solution. Instead, Franklin insisted that 
emancipation would likely be the genesis for more problems to follow, because slavery 
had so violently infringed on African Americans’ natural rights. He feared that the mere 
restoration of “freedom may often prove a misfortune” to emancipated slaves. He 
therefore hoped that “attention to emancipated black people… [would] become a branch 
of our national policy.” Franklin argued that it was whites’ “serious duty… to instruct, to 
advise, to qualify those, who have been restored to freedom.”96 Simply put, abolition 
might be a first step, but education must be the second.  
Franklin clarified that an a priori right to freedom would be useless—or, even 
problematic—without remedial education to accompany it. He intimated that freedom’s 
meaning was derived from American society rather than from humanity itself. Of course, 
African Americans had been systematically excluded from that society for generations. 
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As a result, simply recognizing slaves’ natural rights was insufficient. Instead, freedom 
had to be taught to them, by those who knew and understood it best. Franklin implored 
whites to undertake the burden of educating emancipated slaves with “solicitous care,” so 
as not to allow African Americans’ ignorance to become “prejudicial to society.”97 
Simply put, uneducated slaves were viewed as a serious threat to the country and the 
American people.  
African Americans also held education in high regard, as it pertained to freedom. 
As historian Ronald E. Butchart has argued, slavery had not succeeded in “crush[ing] the 
black longing to read and write.”98 This failure was not for lack of trying. According to 
an act passed by North Carolina’s General Assembly in 1831, for example, slaveowners 
believed that education would “excite dissatisfaction in [slaves’] minds, and… produce 
insurrection and rebellion.” Other slave states passed similar legislation, and where 
“black literacy was not banned by law, it was effectively banned by custom.”99 By 
forbidding literacy, however, the law only invigorated African Americans’ fervor for 
education. As slavery and forced illiteracy seemed to go hand in hand, their opposites—
freedom and education—likewise became inextricably bound. 
Consequently, many African Americans took the initiative to pursue education for 
themselves. Jacqueline Bacon has argued that African Americans understood the 
significance of education as it related to free life; as such, they both prized and pursued 
literacy despite attempts by whites to prevent them from doing so. Bacon identified 
African American efforts to teach themselves how to read and write as acts of resistance 
and empowerment. In “taking literacy,” they were taking their freedom as well.100 
Primary evidence supports Bacon’s argument. In excerpts from speeches and letters to 
 
 23 
follow, African Americans suggested that pursuing literacy would allow them to better 
understand and argue for freedom. In doing so, their rhetoric reified the inextricable 
connection between freedom and education. 
African Americans proposed that literacy was a necessary first step toward 
understanding freedom. For example, in a late eighteenth century essay, an unnamed 
black man reflected on the revolutionary sentiment of the times. Identified only as “A 
Free Negro,” the author claimed that he was moved to write by a long-held desire to 
understand “the true principles on which the liberties of mankind are founded.” He 
insisted that proficiency in “the language of this country” was a prerequisite to 
understanding the meaning of freedom, which had “long been conceived and long been 
the principal subject of [his] thoughts.”101 Given that the ideal of freedom had literally 
been written into American history, in its founding documents and early rhetoric, basic 
literacy was required to understand its significance and value in everyday life. 
Acquiring an education was not only a means of understanding, but also of 
advocacy. The anonymous author explained that he had “labored” to “possess” literacy 
“in order to plead the cause of those who were once [his] fellow slaves, and if possible to 
make [his] freedom, in some degree, the instrument of their deliverance.”102 Such 
instruments were desperately needed because other rhetors continued to raise concerns 
about the ignorance of African Americans in the mid-nineteenth century. For example, 
when Virginia debated abolishing slavery in 1831, pro-slavery spokesman Thomas Dew 
argued passionately that emancipation would be dangerous because slaves were “wholly 
unacquainted with the world… and inexperienced in all its affairs.”103 Facing such 
presumptions of ignorance and inexperience, it became increasingly important for 
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African Americans to demonstrate their fitness for education. Maria Stewart underscored 
his point later in 1833. She worried that, without education, African Americans had 
“made [them]selves appear altogether unqualified to speak in [their] own defense, and 
[were] therefore looked on as objects of pity and commiseration.”104 These examples 
demonstrate that education was a vital prerequisite in the fight for freedom. As Douglass 
confirmed in 1846, to be able to speak and write about slavery was “to kill it… All the 
slaveholder asks of [slaves] is silence.”105 Spoken and written language skills were 
considered the primary, and most effective, vehicle through which arguments for freedom 
could be articulated. 
 As previously discussed, African American speakers were particularly well 
received when they spoke as “living examples of what members of their race were 
capable of doing.”106 Accused of intellectual inferiority, African Americans used their 
literacy to launch persuasive counterclaims. One of Douglass’s most famous speeches is 
remembered simultaneously for its commanding use of language and its persuasive 
power. When invited to address the Fourth of July in 1852, Douglass openly berated 
America and mocked the validity of anti-abolition arguments. Using the “severest 
language [he could] command,” Douglass identified slavery as “the deadly foe of 
education” that ultimately renders American freedom “a sham.”107 On a day typically 
marked by celebration, Douglass delivered “a “fiery stream of biting ridicule.”108 
However, his capacity for language was admired as both “outspoken and eloquent.”109 In 
delivering an argument of “blasting reproach, withering sarcasm, and stern rebuke,” 




Ironically, as free black people like Douglass and Stewart continued to uphold the 
importance of education, they inadvertently highlighted the relative lack of schooling 
among their enslaved brethren.111 This juxtaposition animated emancipation-era debates 
as political and social leaders continued to question whether emancipated slaves were 
capable of learning freedom’s lessons. For example, in an 1865 essay published in the 
North American Review, William Gannett and Edward Everett Hale cast doubt on 
emancipated slaves’ intellectual capacity. After observing early efforts to educate African 
Americans in the South, Gannett and Hale argued that their “mental faculties… in close 
connection with the outward senses” were sufficiently developed, but they remained 
“deficient in the more ideal operations, which require reflection and reasoning.”112 
Without these crucial skills of comprehension, synthesis, and analysis, these authors 
reasoned, African Americans would remain unprepared for freedom and life in American 
society. 
Thus, the era of emancipation coincided with the expansion of education.113 As 
Ronald E. Butchart noted, “African Americans responded to freedom with an 
unprecedented expectation to gain literacy and prove unequivocally that they could 
master an alien curriculum.”114 Simply put, as soon as slaves’ natural rights to freedom 
were restored, the first step taken by both whites and freed African Americans was the 
active pursuit of education.115 The 1863 annual report of the National Freedmen’s Relief 
Association of New York confirmed that with emancipation, “a way [had been] opened.” 
Yet the fulfillment of natural rights would be incomplete until they could satisfy their 
“deep determination” to “master all the difficulties that lie in the way of gaining 
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knowledge.”116 Succinctly, there could be no meaningful freedom without education to 
accompany it. 
	 “Free” labor. The natural right to freedom was further refracted by commitments 
to labor, land, and property. Antebellum rhetoric implored African Americans and former 
slaves to earn legitimacy by contributing productively to the nation’s labor force. Such 
contributions were ideally exemplified by the subsequent acquisition of land and home. 
Drawing on popular discourse that upheld economic success as the tangible, observable 
marker of free life, African American rhetors argued for a pursuit of freedom that was 
simultaneously a pursuit of wealth. 
These economic constraints can be traced to the widespread prevalence of free 
labor ideology, which first gained traction in the antebellum industrial North. According 
to James Schmidt, “free labor implied the ownership of productive property, either in the 
form of land or in the form of a small shop or other petty proprietorship.” It was also 
understood as “simple self-ownership, which implied freedom from the will of another 
and the ability to sell one’s labor power freely in the marketplace.”117 The ability to work 
and purchase property, therefore, became a practical marker of freedom. 
The free labor economic system in the North clashed with the slave labor 
economic system in the South. South Carolina Senator John C. Calhoun argued, on 
multiple occasions, that free labor ideology was threatening the economic system and 
core southern values. Calhoun offered a rigorous defense of slavery when addressing the 
receipt of abolition petitions by the U.S. Senate. He contrasted the free labor “experiment” 
with the slave system, arguing that slavery gave rise to an economy that was more 
“stable,” “quiet,” and able to avoid the “disorders and dangers” of free labor turmoil. 
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Calhoun defended slavery as a mutually beneficial practice, for both slave and 
slaveholder. He marshaled proof in history, saying, “There never has yet existed a 
wealthy and civilized society in which one portion of the community did not… live on 
the labor of the other.”118 Calhoun’s defense of slavery rested squarely on the stark 
economic contrast between North and South.119 By insisting on such tremendous distance 
between the slave economy and free labor, he further reinforced free labor’s association 
with freedom. 
African Americans’ arguments for freedom drew on this discourse and often 
highlighted economic dimensions, like the value of labor. Henry Highland Garnet, for 
instance, issued a fervent call to resist slavery. In 1874, he reminded slaves of their 
natural rights, saying, “you are justly entitled to all the rights that are granted to the 
freest… [G]o to your lordly enslavers and tell them plain, that you are determined to be 
free… Inform them that all you desire is freedom, and that nothing else will suffice.” He 
instructed slaves to seek fulfillment of their inherent freedom by engaging in a labor 
strike; he encouraged slaves to ask their masters for remuneration. He then advised them 
directly: “Promise them renewed diligence in the cultivation of the soil, if they will 
render to you an equivalent for their services.”120 While other abolitionists impugned 
slavery for its physical bondage, Garnet stressed slavery’s restrictions on African 
Americans’ economic growth. For him, freedom could be realized in compensation—in 
slaves’ ownership of their labor and contributions to the land. 
Other rhetors also reiterated links between freedom and economic production. 
Martin Delany, for example, encouraged free African Americans to pursue professions 
that would contribute actively to America’s growth. In 1852, Delany argued that 
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economics formed the crucial difference between blacks and whites; whites typically 
produced and blacks typically consumed. He pushed fellow African Americans to match 
whites’ “attainments” and insisted, “a people must be a business people.” Delany 
espoused progress and racial uplift from within the black race, and argued that African 
Americans could achieve freedom for themselves through economic advancement. As 
such, the road to freedom was through practical and useful work in business, 
manufacturing, “mechanics and common trades.” According to Delany, these 
opportunities were uniquely available within the free labor economy and were the reason 
so many African Americans “came to the North in search of more freedom.” In the “free 
North,” they might one day be able to grow their wealth and, in doing so, control their 
own affairs.121 Only then would they be truly free. 
In 1858, John S. Rock also called for economic uplift from within the black race. 
He referenced the struggle for freedom beyond America’s borders, and concluded that 
blacks have “fought nobly for freedom, but they were not victorious.” Freedom remained 
out of reach for even free African Americans, because prejudice and poverty persisted. 
He said, “In this country, where money is the great sympathetic nerve… a man is 
respected in proportion to his success in business.” Rock insisted on the attainment of 
land and labor equal to that of whites, arguing that racial prejudice would be eradicated if 
and when “the avenues to wealth” were opened to blacks.122 Until then, the freedom of 
African Americans would never be respected. 
By the era of emancipation, free labor’s influence had firmly sutured freedom to 
labor. In fact, when the Civil War ended in 1865, Frederick Douglass asked, “What is 
freedom? It is the right to choose one’s own employment. Certainly it means that, if it 
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means anything.”123 Through argument, both white and African American rhetors had 
clarified freedom’s meaning: economic markers proved integral to humans’ inherent right 
to freedom. Andrew Johnson’s presidency further strengthened the free labor link. Prior 
to the war’s end, while acting as the military governor of Tennessee, Johnson had 
promised to be black America’s “Moses.” He agreed to lead them toward “a fairer future 
of liberty,” which he said could be pursued through “honest labor.”124 Later, in 1866, he 
argued that no further legislation or government action was needed to secure the position 
of black people in society, because they had become respected as “valuable labor supply” 
in the wake of their emancipation.125 Together, these arguments confirmed that freedom 
was ultimately achieved not through inherent human existence, but through economic 
advancement. 
The convergence of freedom and free labor rhetoric constrained the notion of 
natural rights and, perhaps most clearly, demonstrated how African Americans were 
expected to earn their freedom. Free labor ideology anchored numerous arguments, 
articulated by both white and African Americans, that encouraged free and enslaved 
black people to endure economic struggle to prove their worth to free society. Historian 
Winthrop D. Jordan has pointed out that slave rhetoric relied on the “role” of African 
Americans “as a laboring machine” as confirmation of the racial distinction between 
blacks and whites.126 In freedom rhetoric, however, that same capacity for labor was 
considered evidence of African Americans’ legitimacy in free society. 
Legal citizenship. Perhaps the most formidable of all was the fourth clarification 
imposed on the scope of natural rights—legal citizenship. Freedom rhetoric did not rely 
solely on social and economic qualifiers. Both white and African American rhetors also 
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argued that freedom would be egregiously incomplete if it were not accompanied by legal 
recognition of American citizenship and suffrage rights. A natural right to freedom was 
meaningless, many abolitionists reasoned, if it could not be demonstrated by political 
power of affirmation: the right to vote. 
In his extensive study of American citizenship laws, Rogers M. Smith has noted 
that America was “by rights a white nation… a nation in which true Americans were 
native-born men with Anglo-Saxon ancestors.”127 Smith’s argument is decisively 
corroborated by the Federal Convention of 1787. On June 11, the delegates debated 
Article 1, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which is now known as the Three-Fifths 
Clause. The section apportioned representatives and taxes among the states by calculating 
the number of persons residing in each state. The original text clarified that the census 
was to include the “whole number of white and other free citizens… [and] three fifths of 
all other persons.”128 The measure was reportedly an effort to maintain equal 
representation among Northern and Southern states in the federal government. However, 
it decisively excluded African Americans from the political community. This exclusion 
was further reinforced by the Naturalization Act of 1790. The act extended the possibility 
of citizenship only to “any alien, being a free white person” who had been residing in the 
United States for at least two years.129 Together, these laws blocked African Americans’ 
access to legal citizenship for generations. 
Perhaps the most influential assault against black citizenship in the nineteenth 
century was Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s judicial opinion on Scott v. Sandford, 
decided in 1857. Taney first recognized that Scott was “a negro of African descent, 
whose ancestors were of pure African blood and who were brought into this country and 
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sold as slaves.” Taney concluded that Scott’s slave status rendered him ineligible to sue 
in American courts; any decision previously made in his favor was, therefore, rendered 
invalid. However, Taney further railed against the mere possibility of African American 
citizenship more generally. Taney argued that “citizens” was synonymous with “people 
of the United States,” and both terms referred only to “the political body who, according 
to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty and hold the power and conduct the 
Government through their representatives.”  When asked if slaves and their descendants 
fall under such a description, Taney decided, “We think they are not, and that they are not 
included, and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’… and can 
therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which [the Constitution] provides for 
and secures to citizens of the United States.” Taney’s judicial opinion, therefore, 
decisively discounted the possibility of legal citizenship for African Americans. Insisting 
that “citizen” must be understood within its original constitutional context, he argued that 
any descendant of slaves, emancipated or otherwise, was not included within the purview 
of citizenship and suffrage. For Taney, being a human did not coincide with being a 
citizen, nor a member of the American “people.”130 
Immediately, however, Taney’s decision drew ire from two dissenting justices, 
John McLean and Benjamin Curtis. Both confronted Taney’s insistence on a revolution-
era reading of “citizen,” citing the fact that free African American men exercised the 
right to vote in five of the thirteen states when the Constitution was ratified. As such, they 
argued, paths to political equality existed for blacks in the eighteenth century. Curtis 
maintained that it was “not true, in point of fact, that the Constitution was made 
exclusively by the white race.” Rather, African Americans were “in every sense part of 
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the people of the United States [as] they were among those from whom and whose 
posterity the Constitution was ordained and established.”131 By identifying voting 
behavior among free African American men, specifically, both Curtis and McLean 
coupled freedom with both suffrage and legal citizenship. 
The Scott v. Sanford decision prompted African American speakers to speak out 
about freedom’s reliance on political participation. Douglass, who became arguably the 
most vocal advocate for African American men’s suffrage, renounced Taney’s ruling. 
Douglass referred to the decision as a “vile and shocking abomination,” because it defied 
the “essential nature” of freedom. He affirmed that the Founding Fathers “have said that 
man’s right to liberty is self-evident,” implying that African American legal citizenship 
was a necessary part of that liberty. Echoing the dissenting judges’ arguments in more 
general terms, Douglass insisted that “the sentiments of the founders of the Republic, 
[gave] us a platform broad enough, and strong enough, to support the most 
comprehensive plans for freedom and elevation of all the people of this country.” He 
considered Taney’s exclusion of African Americans from political participation such “an 
open, glaring, and scandalous tissue of lies,” that he concluded it would serve no purpose 
other than to flame the fires of abolition.132 In spite of the Three-Fifths Clause, Douglass 
insisted that the U.S. Constitution had designed freedom such that acceptance of African 
Americans as political persons was a requirement, if not an inevitability. 
Other free African Americans asserted their citizenship with similar confidence 
and command. In 1861, the “free blacks of New Bedford, Massachusetts” declared their 
commitment to fight in the Civil War. They referred to themselves as “true and loyal 
citizens” responding to the “defense of our common country.” Because African American 
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men were barred from fighting in the Union Army over fears that their participation 
would further antagonize Southerners, the New Bedford declaration can be construed as a 
rebellious assertion of African American citizenship and an integral link between 
citizenship and the “fight for liberty.”133 
When the Thirteenth Amendment formally abolished slavery in 1865, calls for 
freedom emphasized legal citizenship and suffrage rights with even greater fervor. For 
those who relied on the Constitution for guidance in all matters of state, a rhetorical 
opportunity presented itself. Randall Miller has argued that the ambiguity of the 
Thirteenth Amendment provided an opportunity for rhetors to extend natural rights 
claims and demand full citizenship. Since the amendment failed to identify the specific 
details of the state’s administration of freedom, the realities of post-bellum life 
challenged Congress to “protect [freed slaves] ‘rights’ as ‘citizens,’ even to extend the 
franchise to them.”134 Accordingly, post-emancipation arguments argued that the natural 
rights restored by abolition must be cemented with the right to vote. 
Douglass spoke again in 1865 and reaffirmed his earlier claims. He argued for the 
“immediate, unconditional, and universal enfranchisement of the black man.” Without it, 
he said, “liberty is a mockery.” He explained, “if he is not the slave of the individual 
master, he is the slave of society, and holds his liberty as a privilege, not as a right.” 
Douglass underscored a connection between freedom and suffrage when he insisted that 
the moment of emancipation was “the hour… to press this right.” Without a legally 
recognized voice in the political community, Douglass feared that African Americans 
would be unable to guard against the “rank undergrowth of treason” and fully secure their 
new free status. Without the legal right to vote, freedom was not secure.135 
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Recognizing that many arguments, like Douglass’s, did not argue for women’s 
right to vote, speakers like Sojourner Truth also advocated for suffrage. She insisted that 
the extension of the franchise to African American men would essentially re-enslave 
African American women. When she was invited to address the Anniversary Convention 
of the American Equal Rights Association in 1867, Truth reportedly said, “If colored men 
get their rights, and not colored women theirs, you see the colored men will be masters 
over the women, and it will be just as bad as it was before.”136 In the absence of suffrage, 
Truth feared the re-enslavement of African American women to African American men. 
These arguments superseded the natural right to freedom and confirmed, instead, that 
freedom was not universal in the era of emancipation. Legal citizenship was upheld as the 
only way to guarantee freedom for all. 
Hannah Rosen has stipulated that emancipated slaves “believed that to be free was 
to not only not be enslaved, but also to be a citizen.”137 The preceding arguments 
demonstrated the nuances of that argument and clarified that an a priori right to freedom 
carried no weight without the political right to defend it. Though natural law conceded 
liberty to the whole human family, both white and African American rhetors clarified that 
such freedom was incomplete without the protection of legal citizenship. 
Freedom’s paradox 
 
Ultimately, white and African American rhetors articulated freedom in 
paradoxical ways. The conclusions drawn about freedom defied its foundational premise: 
that freedom was a natural right, innate to human existence. In the shift from natural 
rights to earned rights, rhetors clarified that freedom could only be fulfilled, exercised, or 
legitimized under certain conditions. African Americans, in particular, were encouraged 
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to earn their freedom by demonstrating their republican character, pursuing a formal 
education, supporting a “free labor” economy, and voting as a legal citizen. Thus, 
freedom ultimately was not free. 
In accordance with a rhetorical approach to ideas, I submit that this paradox 
greatly influenced the Bureau’s work in the post-Civil War era. In its efforts to define and 
defend freedom for former slaves, the agency could not separate itself from this rhetorical 
legacy. The Bureau inherited a vocabulary that could be leveraged to either include or 
exclude black people from social, economic, and political participation. Their task was 
further complicated, however, by the ideological dynamics of the nineteenth century. In 
the next section, I turn my attention to unpacking the implications of the freedom paradox. 
I draw on theoretical conversations in the humanities and social sciences to show how 
both natural rights and earned rights approaches presented challenges to black inclusion 
in the era of emancipation. 
The Problem of Freedom in the Era of Emancipation 
 
 Echoes of freedom’s paradox are clearly heard in the Freedmen’s Bureau’s 
rhetoric. Rufus Saxton, the Bureau’s assistant commissioner in Georgia, invoked 
character and labor specifically in his advice to emancipated slaves. He told them, “Try to 
show by your good conduct, that you are worthy of all… Let it be seen that where in 
slavery there was raised a blade of corn or a pound of cotton, in freedom there will be 
two.”138 Saxton underscored that emancipated slaves’ freedom might be more readily 
affirmed if they could prove that they deserved it. His advice confirms that earlier 
iterations of freedom inflected the Bureau’s discourse. 
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 Therefore, it is necessary to explore the implications of freedom’s discursive 
legacy. In this section, I explain the theoretical lens through which I interpret antebellum 
freedom rhetoric as an exclusionary, rather than inclusionary, conversation. I begin by 
recognizing the shift from natural rights to earned rights as evidence of an American 
social contract in flux. Then, I historicize the social contract within antebellum racial 
politics of ascriptive citizenship and humanity to suggest that freedom’s paradox 
presented a staggering rhetorical problem for the Bureau. The agency inherited a 
discursive legacy that rejected former slaves’ claims to freedom and inclusion on two 
counts: the earned rights approach provided a vocabulary for questioning black people’s 
compliance with societal expectations, while the natural rights argument was cast in 
doubt by pervasive perceptions of slaves as non- or sub-human. Abolition alone could not 
resolve these injustices. In order for the Bureau to be successful, its agents faced a 
daunting and urgent rhetorical task of trying to make freedom free. 
Freedom and the social contract 
 
Freedom’s paradox can be interpreted as a vocabulary by which Americans could 
negotiate the terms of America’s social contract. According to Mark Hulliung, multiple 
theories of a social contract—as an agreement forged between people, or between people 
and their government—animated some of the nation’s “greatest debates” and “most 
meaningful struggles” during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.139 For many years, 
Americans invoked various, even competing notions of social contract theory to frame 
arguments for political policy and action. While some perspectives emphasized humans’ 
natural rights, others presumed some measure of earned rights as the basis of civil society 
and government.  
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For many renowned thinkers, the social contract provided a mechanism through 
which humans band together in mutual agreement to recognize and protect their natural 
rights. In 1651’s Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes positioned government as a necessary 
response to a “war-like” state of nature, where right and wrong were unenforceable and 
humans acted selfishly for themselves. Hobbes argued that humans’ innate desire for 
peace and security prompted them to enter into a social contract with one another, 
surrendering their liberty, at least in part, to a sovereign power. In exchange, the 
government promised to safeguard and protect its people.140 In 1690, John Locke offered 
a more optimistic view of the state of nature. He suggested that natural law afforded 
rights of life and property to all humans. Humans’ contractual obligation to obey their 
government is conditioned upon the government’s protection of their natural rights.141 
Finally, in 1762, Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that humans willfully enter into a 
contract with one another and with the state. The contract represented a mutual 
investment; each “associate” surrendered “every last one of his rights”142 to the 
government, empowering the “sovereign” to govern in accordance with the general will 
of the people.143 These perspectives outlined a justification for government, and the 
relationship between governments and those that they govern, predicated on 
commitments to humans’ natural rights and their desire to defend them.  
Others, however, have theorized the social contract with greater emphasis on 
earned rights. Samuel von Pufendorf, for instance, proposed that the contract of 
“association” among humans must be followed by a political one, known as the contract 
of “submission.” The latter demanded that humans perform certain duties and obligations, 
exhibiting their submission to government in exchange for rights and protection.144 While 
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Pufendorf did not deny the reality of natural rights, he diminished their importance in 
favor of emphasizing the ways in which the people’s rights and privileges must be 
recognized, upheld, and secured by the state’s power. 
Despite their differences, these political theorists’ views of the social contract 
collectively confirmed several general principles about society and governance. First, a 
social contract presupposed an exchange of rights and responsibilities among humans. 
Recognizing the potential impact of their own insecurities or conflicts, humans submitted 
to a governing power by handing over some of their natural rights. In return, the state 
offered civil protections and civil rights. In his contribution to the Federalist Papers, 
John Jay confirmed that America’s governing philosophies were anchored by this 
principle. Jay explicitly declared, “whenever and however it is instituted, the people must 
cede to [government] some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite 
powers.”145 
Second, the social contract was predicated upon notions of mutual consent. 
Whether in terms of a “covenant”146 or the negotiation of “terms of association,”147 
theories of the social contract insisted that humans enter into agreement with one another 
and with their government. Rousseau went as far as to say that the government’s 
sovereign power was “purely and simply the exercise of the general will” of the 
people.148 In other words, the government relied on its own people for its power. The 
principle of consent animated revolution-era discourse, when American political 
philosophies were beginning to take shape. For example, John Dickinson’s 1767 
condemnation of English rule accused Parliament of levying taxes without the colonies’ 
knowledge or approval. When he argued that the Stamp Act was “pernicious to freedom,” 
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he emphatically repeated the phrase, “without our consent.”149 His frustration reflected 
the notion that governance required mutual obligation. Without a commitment to 
reciprocity or shared investment throughout the political community, government—and, 
more broadly, civil society—would become unstable.150 
Third, the social contract confirmed that governance is always conditional. By 
entering into association with one another, humans created “a moral and collective 
body.”151 Therefore, the values and commitments of the general will determine their 
relationship with one another, and with their government. When the contract’s conditions 
are violated, Locke argued, humans were justified in overthrowing the state. This 
principle was foundational to American government. As the Declaration of Independence 
affirmed, “it is the right of the people to alter or abolish” their government if it “becomes 
destructive” of the people’s rights.152 The conditional relationship between the state and 
its people, as well as among the people as a community, required constant consideration. 
Humans were bound to examine the conditions of the social contract that joined them 
together. 
With these principles in mind, we can better understand how freedom discourse 
provided a vocabulary for defining and practicing the social contract. The movement 
from natural rights to earned rights evinced the myriad ways in which Americans 
conceived of the social contract as an exchange of rights to establish a mutually 
beneficial relationship between people, and between the people and their government. In 
arguments against slavery, they questioned whether humans’ natural rights were being 
violated by the state. In debating character, education, and labor, they negotiated the 
values, commitments, and duties of the people. And, in clamoring for suffrage, they 
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demanded the full protection of civil rights. These conversations helped negotiate and 
crystallize the terms by which the American people were willing to associate with one 
another, and entrust a government to protect their rights and interests as a unified society.  
Understanding antebellum freedom rhetoric from this perspective establishes its 
foundational importance in the moment of emancipation, during which the government’s 
relationship to its people was tenuous at best. In addition to the release of millions of 
slaves, the nation was grappling with the bitter consequences of being “set on fire by civil 
war.” In the moment of emancipation, the social contract could be “born again, so to 
speak, from its ashes” and adopt new conditions, dynamics, and dimensions.153 Thus, 
abolition was “a beginning more than an end.”154 It marked the explicit occasion to 
review and possibly even revise Americans’ relationship to one another, and to their own 
government. These relationships were, in Alexander Hamilton’s words, both dependent 
upon and “essential to the security of liberty.”155 We can presume that freedom’s 
discursive history did not stall with the arrival of emancipation; instead, the vigor of 
“civic impulse” likely reinvigorated freedom rhetoric with even greater fervor.156 
I position the Bureau at the center of these conversations. Its establishment as a 
federal agency is evidence of a crucial link between notions of freedom and systems of 
society and governance. Through emancipation, the state entertained notions of former 
slaves’ natural right to freedom. Yet, the exchange for civil privileges and protection 
would remain uncertain and incomplete until they could demonstrate their submission to 
America’s social contract by earning their rights.157 The Bureau was founded to facilitate 
this process and supervise freedmen’s transition into American society. In this mission, 
the Bureau would have to engage freedom’s preconditions and grapple with the 
 
 41 
antebellum racial politics that questioned both the capacities and humanity of black 
people. 
The problem of earned rights 
 
We must situate the social contract within the racial politics of antebellum 
America in order to appreciate the ideological implications of freedom’s legacy. Though 
the social contract theoretically governs the relationship between the state and all of its 
citizens, it disproportionately and differently affected—and continues to affect—the 
rights and privileges of black people and other people of color. As Lerone Bennett has 
decisively argued, the nation’s “white founding” actively and purposefully “exclude[d] 
black Americans from the national social contract.”158 Martin Dann has further clarified, 
“The contract that bound white citizens to the government never existed for black people. 
The basic rights of participation in political power, civil rights, a share in the benefits of 
the system, and the protection of government [would be] extended to black people only 
under duress, if at all.”159 
In other words, the social contract that governs Americans’ relationships to one 
another and to their government might be better understood as a racial contract. Charles 
W. Mills has argued that attempts to posit the social contract as race-neutral obfuscate 
“ugly realities of group power and domination” in which white people are bound to 
enforce boundaries of social, political, and economic belonging in ways that sustain white 
supremacy.160 Those who set the terms of the contract are empowered to police the 
compliance of racial Others and normalize their exclusion from society. Former slaves 
would have to argue for their rights—whether natural or earned—in ways that white 
Americans simply did not. 
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Black people’s struggle would be made even more difficult by the legal 
fortification of the racial contract. Scholars have observed that the foundational ideals 
upon which the American government was theoretically established were not universal. 
Liberty and equality did not apply to “blacks or Indians [and] other racial and cultural 
groups [including women]” at the nation’s founding, and various safeguards have since 
been put in place to codify systemic discrimination.161 In Civic Ideals, Rogers M. Smith 
offered an extensive study in American citizenship laws and ultimately argued that 
American political discourse helped preserve America “as a state-centric, commercial, 
white republic” in which “white Christian male dominance must prevail.” Accordingly, 
voting, naturalization, and immigration laws have “declared most people in the world 
legally ineligible to become full U.S. citizens” on the basis of “ascriptive characteristics 
[such] as race, gender… nationality and religion.” Smith argued that these exclusionary 
practices rely on “illiberal and undemocratic” hierarchies that are “rooted in basic, 
enduring imperatives of political life.”162 
I contend that freedom is one such imperative that helped to uphold the racial 
contract in a historical moment during which questions of black inclusion and citizenship 
were being openly debated. Though rhetors trumpeted freedom as a universal ideal, they 
also clarified that freedom was not equally available to everyone. Throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, countless writers and speakers constructed a 
vocabulary of freedom that set the terms by which those excluded from the social 
contract might remain marginalized and dismissed. In the Federalist Papers, John Jay 
clarified that American liberty had been established by the efforts of “one united 
people—a people descended from the same ancestors… attached to the same principles 
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of government, [and] very similar in their manner and customs.”163 Therefore, freedom 
belonged only to those who conformed to a racial code of ancestry, behaviors, and values. 
Accordingly, African Americans were encouraged to demonstrate certain skills 
and behaviors deemed valuable to a free and productive society in order to establish their 
capacity for freedom. Yet, black behaviors were evaluated differently than white 
behaviors. Kirt Wilson has argued that both white and African Americans engage in 
“mimetic” or “imitative” acts and, in nineteenth-century America, mimesis was 
understood to be a fundamental pedagogical tool. The repetitive “copying of forms” was 
used among whites to teach “the virtues of republicanism, and the responsibilities of 
citizenship.” Black people engaged in imitation for similar reasons and also to “establish 
grounds for their inclusion in the body politic.” Wilson argued that mimesis “enabled 
political activism,” because it allowed African Americans to counteract claims that they 
were not prepared or capable of “occupy[ing] the same physical space and enjoying the 
same values, beliefs, culture, and civil rights” as whites.164 However, Wilson also 
clarified that mimetic practice was embroiled in nineteenth-century racial tensions. 
Imitation was widely accepted as a necessary pedagogical method among whites, but 
often condemned among black people. Those who believed that the races were distinct 
were quick to criticize mimesis as deceitful, arguing that “black imitation was a primitive 
instinct that did not signify the individual’s intellect or promote the race’s 
development.”165 In other words, when black people engaged in behaviors or practices 
that seemed similar to whites—humility, eloquence, literacy, even mimesis itself—they 
were accused of masking their inferiority with a deceptive façade. Former slaves could 
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thus be dismissed as unworthy regardless of whether they fulfilled freedom’s 
prerequisites or not. 
Consequently, the rhetoric of freedom posed an inevitable problem for the Bureau, 
insofar as it demanded that black people earn their rights and position within a society 
that had drawn its boundaries in racial terms. Racism, both in the design and enforcement 
of the social contract, cultivated the sentiment that African Americans were “incapable of 
voluntary submission to the obligations [and] norms” of free society.166 The idea of 
freedom contributed significantly to this perception. On the surface, antebellum discourse 
appeared to invite African Americans into the American community, based on a shared 
belief in the natural, inherent right to freedom, and the government’s promise to protect 
it.167 But, such rights were restricted by a series of contractual preconditions that black 
people could rarely, if ever, meet. Even when slaves’ natural rights were restored, there 
was the looming threat that their attempts to conform to society’s norms might be 
dismissed as illegitimate or incomplete. Thus, the idea of freedom—and, specifically, the 
shift to earned rights—provided a rationale by which former slaves’ entrance into 
American society could be denied or, at least, questioned. 
The problem of natural rights 
 
It is tempting to assume that a natural rights argument, as opposed to an earned 
rights approach, would sidestep the obstacles presented by the racial contract. After all, 
the basis of many social contract theories is the presumption that all human beings exist 
first “in a ‘state of nature’… then decide to establish civil society and a government” 
together.168 Therefore, it could be inferred that black people were inherently implicated in 
the social contract and thus deserving of at least basic rights and privileges, regardless of 
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whether or not nineteenth-century Americans were eager to embrace them as worthy 
equals. However, the antebellum social contract was “not a contract between everybody 
(‘we the people’), but between just the people who count, the people who really are 
people.”169 Any assertion of natural rights was subject to the pervasive notion that former 
slaves were not people; their humanity was dismissed, if not destroyed, by the brutal 
practices of enslavement. 
The rise of slavery in America was accompanied by doubts about black people’s 
humanity, as compared to their white counterparts. Slavery in the early American 
colonies was not immediately predicated on an unwavering commitment to systematic, 
racist oppression. However, it did arguably begin with “colonists’ initial sense of 
difference from the Negro… founded not on one characteristic but on a congeries of 
qualities which, taken as a whole, seemed to set the Negro apart.”170 Black people were 
perceived to be a different type of person, “uniquely and biologically suited to do just the 
sort of work that slaveholders needed them to do.”171 According to Winthrop B. Jordan, 
these initial differences were assessed within the context of the economic “necessities of 
a new world,” and later spawned the peculiar institution in which black people “were 
treated as somehow deserving a life and status radically different from English and other 
European settlers.”172 By the eighteenth century, “slavery and racial discrimination were 
completely linked together” in American chattel slavery, and black people had “become a 
counter image” for white Americans—“the living embodiment of what they must never 
allow themselves to become.”173 
Thus, the growth of American slavery was contingent upon the implicit argument 
that black people were less human than their white counterparts, and therefore deserving 
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of non- or sub-human treatment. The brutalities of slavery, in terms of physical and 
sexual violence are well documented.174 Moreover, as Daina Ramey Berry’s recent work 
suggests, the valuation of black bodies in economic terms repeatedly enforced this 
reasoning throughout a slave’s entire lifetime—from preconception through adulthood—
and even after death.175 These practices “literally and figuratively sought to strip [black 
people] of humanity,” thereby furthering the cycle of degradation that distinguished 
American slavery’s position at the “extreme end of a continuum in slave systems of 
coercion, dehumanization, and violence.”176 Notably, these practices did not cease upon 
abolition and emancipation, as assaults against black people’s lives and bodies continued 
in the post-war era with the rise of brutal lynchings, mob violence, and targeted 
assassinations of emerging black leaders.177  
Contemporary scholarship in Black Studies argues that the sustained violence 
perpetrated against black people can be attributed to, but also transcends, the corporal 
abuse of slavery. Christina Sharpe has insisted that the cruel and violent practices of 
enslavement “produce[d] blackness as abjection” in ways that persisted in the wake of 
slavery.178 The bodies of black women, in particular, had been transformed; they 
“became the principal point of passage between the human and the non-human world.”179 
As such, the enduring effect of slavery was one in which “the middle passage, the coffle, 
and… the birth canal… functioned separately and collectively over time… to turn the 
womb into a factory” that birthed black children into an immediate and irreparable 
condition of “non-status[,] non-being-ness.”180 Therefore, as Saidiya Hartman argued, 
both the “time of slavery” and the “afterlife of slavery” were marked by the same 
precariousness, “vulnerability to premature death [and] gratuitous acts of violence” that 
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dehumanized black people.181 In short, the racialization that accompanied and sustained 
the growth of chattel slavery had “discipline[d] humanity into full humans, not-quite 
humans, and non-humans.”182 These categories threatened to replicate themselves time 
and time again, as blackness had been identified as a mechanism by which “unequal 
power structures [could] apportion and delimit which humans can lay claim to full human 
status and which humans cannot.”183 
From this perspective, the natural rights approach to freedom hardly offered an 
easy path toward black inclusion. In antebellum America, generations of enslavement had 
positioned black people squarely “outside the democratic master plan,” forcing “a process 
of institutional dehumanization” and all but guaranteeing a “complete loss of liberty.”184 
Consequently, the notion that former slaves could suddenly assert their essential rights as 
human beings could not be taken for granted. In the era of emancipation, black humanity 
was “still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a political arithmetic that were 
entrenched centuries [before].”185 
The Bureau’s task 
 
 Through this lens, I have magnified the significance of the Bureau’s rhetorical 
mission. I have considered the ways in which freedom was utilized as an idea by which 
both white and black people negotiated the American social contract. However, by 
historicizing theories of the social contract within the landscape of antebellum racial 
politics, I contend that freedom was ultimately defined as an exclusionary, rather than 
inclusionary, principle. The shift to earned rights provided multiple rationales for 
marginalizing black people, as their exclusion was predicated not only on their status as 
slaves, but also on their perceived shortcomings in character, education, labor, and voting 
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power. Freedom’s foundations in natural rights arguments also presented problems, as 
slavery had rhetorically and physically assaulted black humanity. The Bureau’s efforts to 
define and defend freedom for emancipated slaves cannot be separated from this 
ideational history. As such, we can interpret the Bureau’s founding as an effort to police, 
as well as support, former slaves’ entrance into American society.  
In introducing this project, I have destabilized dominant narratives of the 
Freedmen’s Bureau as the administrative “guardians” of freedom and, instead, positioned 
them as rhetorical agents charged with stewardship of the fledgling relationship between 
government, the American people, and emancipated slaves. In this role, the Bureau had 
an opportunity to intervene in freedom’s rhetorical history and re-envision notions of 
freedom. Antebellum legacies demanded nothing less than the Bureau’s unconditional 
advocacy of black people’s capacities for free life, as well as their unassailable status as 
fully human people. The agency needed to open up the social contract to African 
Americans for the first time in the nation’s history. While the Bureau certainly faced 
insurmountable logistical, financial, and political challenges, its true “extraordinary crisis” 
was its ongoing confrontation with freedom’s legacy and freedom’s potential new 
meanings in a post-emancipation world.186 
An Outline of Chapters 
 
 With this understanding of the Freedmen’s Bureau’s momentous task, this project 
asks two fundamental questions. First, how did the Bureau define freedom in the era of 
emancipation? Second, how did discourse within and about the Bureau deepen or disrupt 
freedom’s legacy as an exclusionary, rather than inclusionary, principle? I examine a 
wealth of archival documents—including letters, memos, circular announcements, 
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receipts, congressional proceedings, and newspaper articles—and find that the Bureau 
emerged as a key rhetorical player not only in the emancipation era, but also in 
perpetuating the enduring legacy of freedom itself. As agents grappled with the paradox 
that freedom was not free, they relied upon the idea to dictate the terms by which former 
slaves would relate to their government and their fellow Americans. Ultimately, this 
study contends that arguments by and about the Bureau contributed significantly to the 
reconstruction of a post-bellum racial order that affirmed the racist underpinnings of the 
social contract, further contributed to the dehumanization of former slaves, and prompted 
black people to resist the ongoing assault on their freedom. This case unfolds in four 
chapters.  
 Chapter 1 examines how the Bureau defined its own mission during its inaugural 
year. I first consider Head Commissioner Oliver Otis Howard’s August 1865 address, in 
which he introduced the Freedmen’s Bureau and its mission to the Freedmen’s Relief 
Society in his home state of Maine. I also examine the Bureau’s first year of circular 
announcements, in which Howard and other Bureau officials declared the policies and 
principles guiding the agency’s work throughout the former Confederate South. Together, 
these texts provide a comprehensive overview of the agency’s agenda. An analysis of this 
discourse illustrates how the Bureau defined freedom in terms of prized attainments—
land, labor, education, relief, and justice—that suggested temporary, if not permanent, 
barriers to black inclusion. I argue that Howard’s pursuit of compromise led the Bureau 
to undermine its own progressive agenda by privileging an earned rights approach, and 
further suggesting that former slaves’ fitness for freedom would be assessed in terms of 
non-negotiable social, economic, and political preconditions. 
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 Chapter 2 investigates the Bureau’s everyday communication and conduct with 
former slaves in the “model community” of Freedmen’s Village, Virginia. Established in 
Arlington, Virginia, in May 1863, the Village became a semi-permanent settlement and 
was taken over by the Bureau in 1865. There, thousands of black residents were subject 
to the agency’s strict control. To better understand how the Bureau implemented its 
agenda on a local level, I analyze the Freedmen’s Village papers, which include hundreds 
of letters, memos, circular announcements, receipts, and other records preserved by the 
National Archives and Records Administration. I argue, first, that Head Commissioner 
Howard’s rhetoric provided the direction by which local agents interacted with freedmen, 
thereby affirming the Bureau’s commitment to an earned rights approach to freedom. I 
further posit that the rules and regulations that governed Freedmen’s Village revived 
antebellum practices of classification, confinement, and control. Thus, the village was 
transformed into a site of examination, where the state’s power over freedmen mimicked 
the slave-master relationship that had been characteristic of antebellum America.  
 Chapter 3 directs attention to the controversies surrounding the Bureau’s work by 
examining the contentious debates that animated the first session of the 39th Congress. 
During this session, senators and representatives discussed the Bureau’s future as they 
considered a bill to extend the agency’s operations. Their arguments provide an 
opportunity to explore the extent to which the Bureau’s rhetoric prompted broader 
consideration of the relationship between state and former slave. I analyze the ways in 
which Congress strategically leveraged both natural and earned rights assumptions as 
they defined crisis, negotiated time, and delineated racial differences to devalue and 
abandon black people in the allocation of state support and protection. I contend that they 
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activated freedom’s paradox to diminish the government’s responsibility to freedmen, 
demonstrating the limits of legal inclusion and affirming the ways in which freedom 
rhetoric could be leveraged to discount, rather than ensure, the state’s concern for black 
people.  
 Chapter 4 accounts for the voices of free and formerly enslaved black people who 
extended antebellum traditions of black resistance to defy the state’s attempts to control 
the post-bellum conversation about freedom. Focusing on the years of peak Bureau 
activity, 1865-1867, I analyze numerous articles and editorials from the archives of the 
New Orleans Tribune. The Tribune’s owner and editors believed that New Orleans’s high 
concentration of born-free black people imbued both its writers and readers with critical 
knowledge of freedom’s meanings in America. As such, they presented the newspaper as 
a medium of radical propaganda and sent daily copies directly to the U.S. Congress. I 
argue, first, that the Tribune showcased black people’s commitments to land, labor, 
education, justice, and suffrage in ways that undermined the Bureau’s earned rights 
approach and defied, more broadly, the racist assumption that black people needed to be 
taught to value the expectations and privileges of freedom. Then, I assert that the Tribune 
engaged in numerous rhetorical strategies to actively counter notions of black inferiority, 
exclusion, and dehumanization, thereby working to restore the potential of a natural 
rights approach and simultaneously disrupting the barriers that questioned black people’s 
compliance with the American social contract.  
 I conclude this study with a brief summary of its findings and major contributions. 
I propose that this project provides a compelling case study that underscores how 
rhetorical analysis can help us better understand the force of ideas, especially in exercises 
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of power and domination. Additionally, my interpretation of the Bureau’s primary role as 
a mechanism of supervision, rather than support, extends existing scholarship about the 
Bureau and highlights its enduring relevance to contemporary race relations in the United 
States. Finally, I end with a call for further appreciation and critical investigation of the 
ways in which black people have persevered to disrupt the pervasive, dominant discourse 
that seeks to destroy them.  
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NEW FREEDOMS, OLD TERMS: THE BUREAU’S RHETORIC OF EARNED 
RIGHTS 
 
 Emancipation was a beginning, not an end. With his historic proclamation, 
President Lincoln declared the “actual freedom” of millions of slaves. However, it was 
simultaneously a victory and a new obstacle. According to historian John G. Sproat, even 
radical Republican leaders understood that “emancipation, though it would eliminate the 
problem of slavery, would at the same moment create the problem of the freed Negroes.” 
The problem could not wait until the war’s end. As refugee slaves, dubbed “contrabands” 
by some, made their way north, Union armies began to confront the complicated 
uncertainties of a post-slavery order.1  
 On March 16, 1863, a concerted effort to tackle the “long-range problems” of 
emancipation began. An executive order charged the American Freedmen’s Inquiry 
Commission with exploring the conditions of contrabands behind Union lines and 
determining how best to help them adjust to life as freedmen. The commission traveled as 
an investigative body for over a year, surveying lands and lives throughout the United 
States. Based on “personal observations of the accomplishments and difficulties of 
former slaves in freedom,” the commission recommended the creation of a federal 
agency to protect freedmen and help them “mak[e] a living independent of their masters.” 
With this suggestion and others, the commission’s work laid the ambitious foundation 
upon which a radical Republican agenda was built.2 
 The commission’s recommendation also sparked a controversial turf war, as 
people wondered who should commandeer the new federal agency. Two departments 
claimed jurisdiction over the problem of the freedmen. The Treasury Department took the 
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term “contrabands” literally, arguing that the freedmen were spoils of war just like “other 
forms of seized property” and should therefore be under its supervision. Meanwhile, the 
War Department countered that it should maintain control, because its own armies “met 
and were impeded by the slaves” on a regular basis. 3 At the heart of the conflict was an 
implicit but crucial question regarding the post-bellum relationship between former 
slaves, the state, and the American people. In the wake of emancipation, would the 
government regard former slaves as free humans or state property?  
 When power ultimately fell to the War Department—and, more specifically, War 
Secretary Edwin McMasters Stanton—the answer to the question remained ambiguous. 
On the one hand, historians have characterized Stanton as “genuinely sympathetic with 
the plight of the Negroes.”4 His insistence that freedmen would require an army to 
safeguard their newfound freedom suggested that the state regarded former slaves as 
humans, deserving protection and care. On the other hand, it was clear that Stanton 
understood the Emancipation Proclamation to be a strategic measure. The War 
Department’s jurisdiction over former slaves would make it easy to encourage freedmen 
to join their ranks and fight for the Union. Under the guise of “advanc[ing] the Negroes 
toward the goal of freedom,” Stanton ultimately deployed former slaves as tactical 
“weapons of war.”5 Thus, the War Department’s victory signaled an uncertain 
relationship between former slaves and the U.S. government. While insisting upon the 
“protection and improvement” of freedmen, the state simultaneously began its 
preparations for post-bellum life by carefully strategizing how former slaves might be 
“most usefully employed in the service of their government.”6 
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In this period of uncertainty, the Freedmen’s Bureau was born. On March 3, 1865, 
a bill to establish the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands passed both 
houses of Congress. By all accounts, the Freedmen’s Bureau was supposed to be a 
temporary agency, born of pragmatic necessity and military strategy. According to 
historian Randall Miller, the Bureau was conceived and explicitly established as an 
interim provision intended to address the immediate exigences of the post-war situation. 
Many embraced the formation of the agency as the “extraordinary means” necessary to 
meet an “extraordinary crisis… until ‘southern’ reconstruction was safely under way.”7 
Others, however, were concerned about the potentially far-reaching scope of the agents’ 
work. Despite being billed as a temporary agency, the Bureau attracted tremendous 
scrutiny from both ends of the political spectrum. The agency’s radical Republican 
supporters “wrangled among themselves as to what powers the Bureau should have and 
how far the government should reach into local affairs.”8 Meanwhile, many Southerners 
and powerful politicians perceived the Bureau as a symbol of Northern overreach and 
continued aggression against the embattled South. Miller argued that early 
Reconstruction-era Democrats, including President Andrew Johnson, considered the 
Bureau to be an embodiment of tyranny and federal corruption. Many people ultimately 
believed that the Bureau need not exist at all.9 
Thus, when the time came to choose the Bureau’s head commissioner, Secretary 
Stanton faced a hard decision. Historian William S. McFeely has noted that Stanton 
surveyed the possibilities among the era’s foremost leaders and public figures, many of 
whom had argued passionately for emancipation and unconditional abolition for decades. 
According to McFeely, Stanton could have selected a head commissioner from the 
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private sector or a public organization; an abolitionist, a religious leader, or even a 
prominent humanitarian or medical aid worker could have commandeered the Bureau.10 
Instead, Stanton hired from within, choosing a decorated military officer: General Oliver 
Otis Howard.11 
Those who knew Oliver Otis Howard as a young man would not have been 
surprised to learn that he later rose to such an important, lofty position. In 1830, Howard 
was born into a prominent and ambitious family in Leeds, Maine. His great-grandfather 
founded the town fifty years prior, and his grandfather fought nobly in the Revolutionary 
War. From a young age, Howard’s only concern was getting a respectable job and 
making a name for himself—as his forefathers had. After graduating from Bowdoin 
University, Howard enrolled at West Point in 1850 with only this goal in mind. His uncle, 
a United States representative, had convinced him that a military career could offer 
limitless opportunities for advancement.12 The outbreak of the Civil War all but sealed 
his fate. 
Through dedicated service, General Howard had become widely known as a loyal 
patriot, “an army man,” with a wartime record that “promised success in a peacetime 
assignment.”13 As head commissioner of the Bureau, Howard maintained his unwavering 
and ambitious commitment to victory. Doing so, however, required negotiating 
contentious terrain, upon which battle lines were blurred and victories were increasingly 
less decisive. Howard endeavored to find a delicate balance. He felt a general concern 
and compassion for the freedmen’s welfare, but he also prioritized his duties as a 
strategic military officer. He was eager to cultivate national unity and forge the most 
efficient path toward certain triumph. 
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Ultimately, in an attempt to appease these warring factions, Head Commissioner 
Howard engaged in rhetorical practice to frame the Bureau’s efforts in ways that affirmed 
a need for ongoing state control over black people. I argue that the Bureau extended 
freedom’s paradox into the post-war era, emphasizing an earned rights approach that 
portrayed freedmen as ill-equipped for freedom and questioned their ability to comply 
with the social contract. In service of this thesis, this chapter proceeds in three parts. First, 
I discuss the contentious arguments that deliberated and debated the role of the Bureau at 
its founding. I highlight, in particular, how Howard’s appointment was strategic, largely 
based on his reputation as a compassionate, yet conservative compromiser. Second, I 
explore Howard’s rhetorical leadership by analyzing a public speech and numerous 
announcements, instructions, and letters that circulated among agents and public 
audiences during the first year of the agency’s operations. Considered together, these 
texts illustrate how the Bureau tempered the radical work of freedom with familiar 
prerequisites of land, labor, education, relief, and justice. Finally, I discuss the 
implications of the agency’s arguments. By defining freedom in restrictive terms, 
Howard and his agents undermined their own progressive agenda. They laid the 
groundwork for the continued marginalization of black people, under the guise of 
facilitating their inclusion in American society, and constituted freedmen not as free, but 
as abject wards of the state.  
Head Commissioner Howard: “A gentleman, faithful and cooperative” 
 
The vagaries plaguing post-war politics were intensified by the long history of 
arguments that preceded them. In other words, the controversy surrounding the agency 
began decades before its founding. In the mid-nineteenth century, as emancipation and 
 
 72 
abolition became increasingly viable realities, public debate focused on the potential 
future of freedmen. From the start, the Bureau’s path forward was drawn in terms of 
freedom and citizenship, two ideas that had long animated conversations about what 
could and should be done with former slaves. Through countless arguments about the 
possible inclusion of freedmen in the American social contract, two general approaches 
to the nascent agency had already emerged.  
For instance, many felt that emancipation would decisively acknowledge the 
inherent humanity of slaves as people, not property. Thus, post-war efforts arguably 
needed to concentrate on the state’s role in fulfilling their humanity in equal terms, by 
teaching freedmen the normative codes, rights, and privileges of freedom. This approach 
was most clearly demonstrated by General Rufus Saxton’s early efforts on the Sea 
Islands. Abandoned by planters as the Union armies advanced, the islands became a 
popular landing spot for former and refugee slaves during the war. More than a relatively 
safe haven, the Sea Islands offered a glimpse of the possible challenges and opportunities 
of post-bellum life for former slaves. Saxton “was not under the illusion that freedom 
alone solved the problems of slavery.”14 Instead, he insisted that state efforts in education, 
industry, and military service was needed to “give substance” to their emancipation.15 
Reportedly embracing the input of early freedmen themselves, Saxton sought to begin 
their transition before the war’s end. 
Together with Secretary Stanton, General Howard visited Saxton’s Sea Islands in 
January 1865. It was generally understood that the Sea Islands could offer an “informal 
training camp for future staff members of the Freedmen’s Bureau.”16 Months before 
General Howard’s official appointment, he toured the Sea Islands, visited its various 
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schools and churches, and generally approved of Saxton’s early efforts to actively teach 
former slaves the expectations and obligations of free life. The alliance Howard 
established with both Saxton and Stanton on his visit was later perceived as evidence that 
the Port Royal Experiment would be formative to the Bureau’s post-war efforts, such that 
the main work of the agency would presume the natural and just humanity of freedmen 
and focus most actively on “defining and defending freedom” to fulfill it.17 
Still, Howard would not be able to dismiss the concerns of prominent figures at 
the other end of the spectrum, who insisted that emancipation alone would definitively 
accomplish the deliverance of freedom for freedmen. Their emphasis, instead, shifted to 
the extent to which the humanity of former slaves should be appropriately fostered. For 
many, like Henry Ward Beecher, a hands-off approach was the most suitable way for the 
state to facilitate the post-war transition. In a letter to Secretary Stanton, Beecher warned 
against “too much northern management of the Negro.” He insisted that freedmen 
“should be left [and] obliged to take care of [themselves] and suffer and enjoy” as any 
other human would. Beecher argued that the Bureau should provide nothing beyond “a 
small start,” as any further efforts might “pauperize” black people and further reduce 
their human capacity to develop their own means of growth and advancement.18 In other 
words, this approach insisted that freedmen should be left to make their own way, with 
the hopes that they might someday be deemed fit for assimilation into the American 
community. This perspective essentially relieved the state of the burden of managing 




At its core, this approach implied that freedmen might not necessarily be fit for 
immediate inclusion in free society. Other notable figures, like General Sherman, were 
concerned about the path the Bureau might pursue. In a private letter, Sherman suggested 
that encouraging freedmen to think of themselves as anything more than humans now 
entitled to “have [their] own labor” would amount to “forc[ing] the Negro on the South.” 
He was particularly wary of the ways in which the Bureau might provoke another war, 
but he was also resistant to any appearance of “a new revolution” in the post-bellum 
order.19 For Sherman and many others, the most appealing approach to the agency’s 
potential work presumed that the state had fulfilled its obligations by simply issuing the 
Emancipation Proclamation. They argued that the ultimate work of the Bureau, the state, 
and the nation as a whole, was to wait and see what kind of humanity freedmen truly 
possessed when left to their own devices, even if that complicated or delayed their 
inclusion in the American social contract.  
Between these two extremes, countless variations further textured the debate 
about freedmen and the Freedmen’s Bureau. A diversity of perspectives notably 
motivated the men, primarily culled from General Howard’s own army, who would later 
serve as the agency’s assistant commissioners at the state and local levels. According to 
McFeely, General Edgar Gregory was the only explicit abolitionist among them; the 
other assistant commissioners’ views were decidedly less clear.20 For instance, 
Mississippi’s Samuel Thomas sympathized with Southern planters while also 
championing freedmen’s rights to land acquisition and ownership as a necessary 
prerequisite in fulfilling their freedom.21 In Louisiana, Thomas Conway vaguely insisted 
that he was forever “true to liberty” but also acknowledged the pressure to “give way to 
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‘conservatives.’”22 The assistant commissioners’ differing perspectives threatened the 
cohesion and efficacy of the new agency’s work throughout the South.  
Thus, it was clear that the Bureau would need a strong leader at its helm. In 
considering his options, Secretary Stanton was sensitive to the range of arguments that 
would complicate the agency’s work. He had long been known as a man of delicate 
compromise; as such, he sought a leader who would be able to articulate a vision for the 
agency that might transcend social, political, religious, and even economic lines.23 
Howard was an attractive choice for two key reasons. First, Howard did not have a 
history of political engagement or activism, particularly with regards to slavery and 
abolition. Stanton perceived Howard’s apathy as a tremendous asset. In letters exchanged 
with General Rufus Saxton, Stanton suggested that those with more experience were 
often bogged down and even overwhelmed by the freedmen’s many dilemmas. Stanton 
hoped that Howard would approach the problems of emancipation with impartiality. As 
an added incentive, his relative inexperience could give the new Johnson administration 
the impression of a truly fresh start in developing policies toward the freedmen.24 Second, 
Stanton needed a head commissioner who was willing to compromise and find coherence 
among the many varied opinions about the Bureau’s future. He had received a letter from 
Henry Beecher on May 3, 1865, in which Beecher described Howard as “a gentleman, 
faithful and cooperative.” He reassured Stanton that Howard, “of all men… would 
command entire confidence of [the] Christian public.” In addition, Beecher proclaimed, 
“I do not know who would also, to such a degree, unite the secular public.”25 Such a 
description was appealing to the secretary, who hoped that Howard’s leadership could 
“men[d] the broken nation.” According to McFeely, Stanton saw Howard as someone 
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who might be able to reach both religious leaders and secular aid men in such a way that 
“the government might be relieved of much of its responsibility to the freedmen” 
altogether and therefore “appeal to any President faced with the problems of 
Reconstruction.”26 From the start, Howard was seen as a perfect, strategic choice to 
negotiate the rhetorical and political tensions that textured ongoing debates about 
freedmen and threatened to constrain the Bureau’s work. 
Thus, less than two weeks after receiving Beecher’s letter, Secretary Stanton 
formally offered the head commissionership to General Howard. He accepted the 
secretary’s offer on May 12, 1865, after just one night of contemplation. Stanton, though 
pleased, did not stand on ceremony. Stanton immediately “sent for the papers, chiefly 
letters from correspondents… touching upon matters which pertained to refugees and 
freedmen” that had been haphazardly collected in a large bushel basket. As Howard 
recalled nearly five decades later, “Mr. Stanton, with both hands holding the handles at 
each end, took the basket and extended it to me and with a smile said: ‘Here, general, 
here’s your Bureau!’”27 It was an intimidating moment for Howard, who immediately 
wondered if he had made the correct choice. He had been uncertain and anxious about his 
post-war future when the Bureau appointment simply emerged as a convenient 
opportunity. Howard worried about what brand of effective leadership and “rhetorical 
abstraction” he could offer, when “the freedmen’s troubles were as solid and old as the 
land.”28  
Despite Howard’s own doubts, his appointment was met with enthusiasm and 
praise from his contemporaries. He had already gained undeniable recognition and 
respect as an officer in the Union army. Affectionately known as “the Christian General,” 
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Howard served as the commander of the Army of the Tennessee and fought in decisive 
battles at Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, and Atlanta, “march[ing] with relentless success to 
the sea.”29 At the war’s end, he was awarded a place of honor. He rode alongside General 
William Tecumseh Sherman—at Sherman’s request—in the victory parades in 
Washington, D.C., before taking his spot by General Ulysses Grant and Secretary Stanton 
at the Grand Review.30 
As he set his sights upon his next battle as leader of the Freedmen’s Bureau, his 
impressive reputation preceded him. General Sherman proclaimed his “entire confidence” 
in Howard, reassuring him, “I cannot imagine that matters that involve the future of 
4,000,000 souls could be put in more charitable and more conscientious hands. So far as 
man can do, I believe you will.”31 It seemed unfathomable that the decorated general 
could fail. After all, as Captain Samuel Willard Saxton had observed, “it seem[ed] as if 
success would always follow the ‘Christian Howard.’”32 
In assuming leadership of the Bureau, General Howard undertook an immense 
rhetorical challenge—what Sherman referred to as “Hercules’ task.”33 Fittingly, Howard 
approached his new job from a tactical perspective honed by years of military experience. 
Howard noticed that “a moral purpose” had helped the Union garner support during the 
Civil War.34 Howard was not an abolitionist.35 While others might have seen the conflict 
as a concerted effort to dismantle slavery, his commitment to the war was guided by “the 
joint redemption of his men and his country.”36 Bolstered by his religiosity, Howard 
believed that a “perfect faith in God would… manifest itself in the creation of a perfect 
society.”37 Thus, he had framed the war as a test and a crucial opportunity to demonstrate 
his Christian faith. As he confronted the horrors of battle, he saw “the sacrifice of 
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fighting and dying” as the means necessary to deliver the salvation of his nation.38 
Simply put, Howard utilized his faith as a means of justifying and grappling with the 
difficulties he faced every day as a military officer.  
 Looking ahead to his post-war assignment, Howard looked once again for a 
similarly strong justification by which he could defend the Bureau’s work. He knew that 
the agency’s success depended on an inclusive vision that would inspire confidence and 
quell Americans’ various fears and resentments about freedmen. Upon his appointment as 
head commissioner, Howard began to devise a post-war message that, he hoped, would 
promote sympathy and cooperation. Put another way, Howard undertook not merely an 
administrative nor logistical task, but a rhetorical one. As a military leader and public 
official, Howard had been vested with both “the power and responsibility to define his 
own and the nation’s commitment to the ex-slaves.”39 In order to fulfill his marching 
orders and lead the Bureau effectively, Howard sought to persuade both supporters and 
critics that the agency’s work was justified and necessary. His success depended on “an 
unprecedented effort to define a new social, economic, and political order.”40 Yet, 
Howard’s attempts to negotiate “the terms of freedom” for freedmen bore a striking 
resemblance to those that had long since articulated the boundaries of the American 
social contract.41  
The Bureau’s Terms 
 
 Emancipation appeared to present an opportunity for radical change. The notion 
of black people as free inspired curiosity, doubt, and controversy among Americans. As 
previously mentioned, Howard was welcomed to his new post with a bushel basket full of 
correspondence—letters, documents, and recommendations demanding clarity and a clear 
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vision for the Bureau’s work. Howard attested, “Nearly every man is more or less 
interested in this great work of the freedmen. Each one questions me—wants to know 
what the government proposes to do, and how it intends to go to work to accomplish the 
results so much desired.”42 Thus, Howard immediately assumed the responsibility of 
offering “a statement of the purposes of the government.”43 His overarching strategy was 
to appease all parties by invoking seemingly universal values of compassion and charity. 
Howard referred to the Bureau’s work as the “benevolent object” and, according to 
McFeely, sought to position the agency as an official arbiter of “helpful acts.”44 We can 
better understand the nuances and implications of this strategy by carefully analyzing 
specific moments of rhetorical practice, including both public speech and official 
documentation of the Bureau’s early operations.  
 First, this analysis considers numerous circulars—official announcements, 
instructions, reports, and orders—from the first year of the agency’s tenure.45 In addition 
to being officially recorded as War Department documents, these “circulars” were 
referred to as such because they were disseminated widely. They circulated among 
different levels of the Bureau’s organizational structure, as well as throughout public 
spaces and publications by “all practicable means.”46 In some instances, for example, 
agents were instructed to post them openly in post offices and other public spaces, or 
directly on private properties and tracts of land.47 Alternatively, agents were instructed to 
convene “meetings of colored people, at which the circular[s] may be read and 
explained”; to place copies “in the hands of intelligent preachers or other colored men”; 
and, to utilize the “aid of teachers and other friends.”48 As Head Commissioner, Howard 
relied on these extensive networks of communication to define and pursue his vision for 
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the Bureau. The most important among these early missives was Circular No. 5, 
published on May 30, 1865, in which Howard announced the agency’s commitment to 
“declare and protect” the freedom of former slaves.49 He also outlined the extensive 
“rules and regulations for assistant commissioners” that, he hoped, would bring about 
success.50 According to Howard, it was “upon that circular the transactions of the bureau 
thus far [were] founded.”51 Not only was Circular No. 5 reproduced and republished by 
every state under the Bureau’s purview, but it was also followed by countless others. 
Through a robust record of additional orders, instructions, and clarifications, the agency’s 
circulars ensured that Howard’s rhetorical leadership guided the agency’s work at all 
levels. In philosophy and in everyday practice, Howard’s definition of freedom 
prescribed the Bureau agents’ interactions with each other, with freedmen, and with the 
wider American public.   
Second, the Bureau’s circulars are analyzed in conversation with Howard’s oral 
defense of the agency’s work, which he offered in a speech to the Maine Freedmen’s 
Relief Society on August 11, 1865. Held during a Sunday afternoon at Meonian Hall, the 
meeting offered Howard a direct opportunity to speak directly to American citizens—
particularly those interested in the affairs and future of freedmen—in his home state.52 
According to reports, the meeting began with the harmonizing voices of “three little 
children, formerly slaves in Louisiana,” who accompanied a reverend in song: “Mine 
eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord.”53 Throughout his speech, Howard 
reinforced this initial tone of Christian duty, benevolence, and salvation—promised, but 
not yet delivered. He argued that the work of the Bureau was the work of all Americans, 
insofar as the Emancipation Proclamation had “pledged the faith of the entire nation.”54 
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According to Howard, all Americans had a duty to understand the role of the Bureau and 
“to aid the government in keeping that pledge.”55 It was Howard’s particular 
responsibility to thoroughly educate them on the scope and purpose of the new, 
controversial agency. Thus, Howard embraced the occasion to further expand on the 
meanings of freedom and the freedmen’s transition, which he referred to as “the entire 
question.”56 He systematically explained the laws that had established the Bureau, the 
varying opinions being considered, and the efforts undertaken to establish procedures and 
provisions to secure freedom for former slaves. Simply put, Howard used the speech to 
frame, explain, and clarify the operations laid out by the agency’s circulars. This speech, 
therefore, can be considered an additional cornerstone of the rhetorical foundation upon 
which the agency was ultimately conceived and developed.   
These texts, considered together, offer a comprehensive glimpse of Howard’s 
effort to define freedom for freedmen in both pragmatic and palatable ways. In the 
analysis that follows, I trace the ways in which Howard and his agents framed the 
Bureau’s mission. While clear primary and secondary priorities emerged in their rhetoric, 
terms of land, labor, education, relief, and justice altogether constructed an earned rights 
rationale for the Bureau’s work. Whether through public speech, written announcements, 
or intra-agency orders, agents cast freedom as a promise, the full satisfaction of which 
would be withheld until freedmen were able to prove—to the state and to society—that 
they deserved it.  
Primary priorities: land and labor 
 
At the helm of a seemingly radical Republican agency, Howard relied extensively 
on a rhetoric of free labor to negotiate the bounds of freedom for freedmen. Free labor 
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ideology was familiar to Americans in the North, where it had “gained forceful traction,” 
but for the South, it was perceived as strange or threatening.57 According to James 
Schmidt, free labor ideology prized “simple self-ownership,” or “freedom from the will 
of another and the ability to sell one’s labor power freely in the marketplace.”58 
Additionally, “the ownership of productive property, either in the form of land or in the 
form of a small shop or other petty proprietorship” was also perceived to be a defining 
marker of free life.59 These commitments to individual land and labor ownership were a 
direct counter to slave labor in the antebellum South, where “those who produced 
commodities… were themselves commodities owned by others.”60 As historian Bruce 
Levine has argued, antebellum conflicts—both political and physical—between North 
and South were often animated by the contrast between the two economic orders.61 Thus, 
when the Civil War broke out, many perceived it as the inevitable clash of free labor and 
slave labor—or, what New York Senator William Seward famously called the 
“antagonistic systems.”62  
With the North’s victory came the emancipation and, theoretically, an opportunity 
to finally resolve the “irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces.”63 
The Southern slave economy had ruptured. In antebellum America, slaves worked 
without compensation on land that did not belong to them. Upon emancipation, however, 
freedmen theoretically had the opportunity to sell their labor to another, purchase the 
labor of another for themselves, and reap the benefits of their own harvests. Thus, the 
emancipation marked a potentially distinct and visible shift from slave labor to free 
labor—for freedmen in the South, and for the country as a whole.  
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Thus, Howard seized upon this monumental change as an essential obstacle in 
both the freedmen’s transition and the Bureau’s work. He noted the vigor with which he 
was immediately questioned about freedmen’s capacities to participate in the free labor 
market. In his August speech, Howard recounted the varying opinions presented to him, 
saying that some “wanted Northern men to emigrate to the South, and employ the 
freedmen in cultivating the soil. Another wished to have them set at work on the Pacific 
Railroad. Still another thought they could be most profitably employed in constructing 
dykes all along the Mississippi River.”64 Whether from free labor loyalists eager to 
further spread their message or from suspicious secessionists worried about the 
destruction of their way of life, the letters were animated by the same primary concern. 
Americans wondered whether and how freedmen would contribute productively to the 
nation once the compulsory structure of slavery was dismantled. Ultimately, Howard 
responded to their anxieties by reaffirming land and labor ownership as central tenets of 
freedom and free life. 
His first priority was setting freedmen on a path toward independent production as 
workers. Accordingly, Howard granted full authority to his agents to “introduce practical 
systems of compensated labor.”65 At all levels, Bureau agents in various sub-districts 
were imbued with a range of powers to form, negotiate, and enforce labor contracts. 
Oftentimes, this included mediating interactions between freedmen and their former 
owners, as Howard believed the most efficient way to encourage freedmen toward 
independent labor was to have “former [slave] owners, as far as practicable… employ 
each of the men who had been his slaves.”66 Throughout this process, Bureau agents were 
further invested with the authority to “determin[e] the rate of wages to be paid,” 
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“examine and record all contracts made with the freedmen,” and “report such as are 
injurious and unfair.”67 Moreover, assistant commissioners, in particular, were instructed 
to “use the privileges and authority [they] already [had]” to influence “provost courts, 
military commissions, [and] local courts” in the matter of labor contracts.68 Howard was 
confident that the Bureau’s agents and, particularly, the “arbitrament” of its assistant 
commissioners would be “sufficient” to settle “the great majority of cases.”69 Simply put, 
Howard reaffirmed that the Bureau’s charge—to supervise the freedmen’s transition—
necessarily granted them oversight and near-absolute authority regarding all issues 
related to labor.  
Howard framed these efforts to secure and safeguard labor as a vital part of 
freedmen’s transition to freedom. He explained to his audiences and his agents that the 
compensation former slaves received for their work would be a definitive marker of their 
free status; even if the labor and master remained unchanged, the freedman’s wages 
would be sufficient enough to distinguish freedom from slavery.70 This view echoed 
throughout the agency’s ranks and extended their reach throughout all levels of the 
Bureau’s administration. For example, as assistant commissioner of South Carolina, 
Rufus Saxton emphasized former slaves’ entry into the free labor market as a distinct 
marker of their transition to free life. When providing instructions to lower-level agents, 
Saxton insisted that slave owners’ recognition of former slaves as “free men” coincided 
with their efforts to “make suitable agreement with them whereby a just and equitable 
compensation will be secured for their labor.”71 Perhaps no declaration was clearer, 
however, than that of Orlando Brown, assistant commissioner of Virginia. In a letter 
addressed directly to freedmen themselves, Brown defined the arrival of former slaves’ 
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freedom in blunt terms. He said, “The difference between your former and your present 
condition is this: formerly your labor was directed, and the proceeds of it taken by your 
masters, and you were cared for by them; now you are to direct and receive the proceeds 
of your own labor, and care for yourselves.”72 Accordingly, he framed the Bureau’s 
“principal function” as “mak[ing] the freedmen a self-supporting class of free laborers, 
who shall understand the necessity of steady employment, and the responsibility of 
providing for themselves and families.”73 
Howard’s rhetoric necessarily implicated land procurement, distribution, and 
supervision as well. From its inception, the Bureau had been put in charge of land that 
had been abandoned by former Confederate planters or seized by advancing Union 
armies throughout the war. The law that had established the Bureau simultaneously 
granted it the authority to distribute forty-acre plots to freedmen and Union loyalists in 
the South.74 Although President Johnson soon reversed this initiative in the fall of 1865, 
Howard’s vision demonstrated the prominent role that land would continue to play in 
preparing former slaves for full freedom. As head commissioner, he used Circular No. 5 
to plainly direct all Bureau agents to “aid refugees and freedmen in securing titles to 
land.”75  Moreover, Howard prescribed the extensive terms by which abandoned lands 
needed to be surveyed and supervised. In Circular No. 10, he demanded, “as soon as 
practicable, reports of all lands in the possession or under the control of the assistant 
commissioners or their agents.”76 Those reports would be extensive, including 
“statements as to whether such lands have been abandoned or confiscated; [and] a brief or 
general description of each separate piece or tract, with its situation, and the names of the 
former owner or possessor.”77 Finally, after furnishing those reports, assistant 
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commissioners were further instructed to provide monthly updates with amended 
descriptions, changes in title or possessor, lost acreage, and the “number of refugees or 
freedmen on each farm or tract of land.”78 With these instructions, Howard confirmed 
that a significant portion of the Bureau’s time, energy, and manpower should be devoted 
to land management.  
Land, too, was integral to the Bureau’s effort to ensure freedom. As Howard 
explained in his August 1865 speech, “the rental of land furnishe[d] another means of 
employing the freedmen.”79 Simply put, Howard believed that granting freedmen access 
to rented or leased land tracts would be an efficient way to ensure that they could 
immediately begin working, particularly when former owners refused to enter into 
contracts with them. In fact, when compensation could not be negotiated, land seizure 
was encouraged as an appropriate means to an end. In Mississippi, for instance, assistant 
commissioner Samuel Thomas clarified, “If the officers of the bureau cannot secure 
employment for all [freedmen] under their charge… they will take possession of 
abandoned lands and set them to work.”80 Orders like these emphasized the symbolic and 
practical importance of land, insofar as it could deliver labor. However, Howard’s 
rationale further cast land itself as an observable source of freedom—even or especially if 
other markers remained unattainable. In official circulars, Howard “ordered that all 
abandoned lands… now under cultivation by the freedmen be retained in their possession 
until the crops now growing shall be secured for their benefit.”81 In Howard’s plan, 
freedmen would only have to give up their harvests in exchange for “full and just 
compensation.”82 In other words, if fair labor contracts could not be arranged, freedmen 
would still reap the benefits of their labor in ways that they did not during slavery. Using 
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areas near Norfolk, Richmond, and Washington, DC, as examples, Howard insisted that 
lands that had been “rented by colored people” had already begun to provide “the 
practical fruits of freedom.”83 Thus, whether through employment, compensation, or 
harvest, land was framed as the source from which former slaves’ freedom would spring 
eternal.84  
Clearly, free labor principles of land and labor ownership animated much of 
Howard’s vision—and, with it, the Bureau’s guiding rhetoric. According to Evelyn 
Nakano Glenn, the extent to which normative ideals of free labor have become 
intertwined with freedom and citizenship has often determined by “political, economic, 
and social transformations over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.”85 The era of emancipation was one such transformation, as the Bureau 
negotiated the terms of its task in accordance with free labor ideology. Land, labor, and 
freedom were inseparable. All three had been denied to slaves in antebellum America, 
but were promised to freedmen in the era of emancipation. Therefore, the Bureau’s work, 
in simplest terms, was to help freedmen find gainful employment and procure land so that 
they might be able to, one day, assert their freedom and “look others squarely in the eye 
as a social equal.”86 Thus, the transition from slavery to freedom was conflated with a 
transition from slave labor to free labor. 
Secondary priorities: education, relief, and justice 
 
While the Bureau’s efforts toward land and labor dominated the agency’s records, 
Howard and his agents also defined freedom in other terms. First, the Bureau worked to 
secure access to education. As one assistant commissioner openly declared to former 
slaves, “In your condition as freedmen, education is of the highest importance.”87 Second, 
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the Bureau worked with local organizations to administer relief. However, as Howard 
made clear almost immediately, “great discrimination [was] observed in administering 
relief, so as to include none that [were] not absolutely necessitous and destitute.”88 
Finally, the Bureau sought justice. This broad term was employed to encapsulate the 
agency’s efforts to safeguard freedmen’s physical safety and civil rights in “all 
difficulties arising between negroes themselves, or between negroes and whites or 
Indians.”89 Compared to issues of land and labor, these three initiatives received 
noticeably less explanation in the Bureau’s records. Nonetheless, Howard and his agents 
insisted that freedom could not be fully enjoyed by freedmen if they were not educated, 
healthy, and reasonably secure.  
In his August 1865 speech, Howard declared the “second task of the bureau” to be 
“the encouragement of education.”90 Yet, compared to his public arguments in favor of 
land and labor, his focus on education was less extensive. Howard may have felt 
compelled to launch a full-scale defense of free labor ideology, particularly for suspicious 
Southern audiences and critics. However, he seemed to take for granted that the Bureau’s 
support for education would be widely accepted and understood as necessary to “secure 
the gradual elevation of the race.”91 In fact, Howard perceived that Americans’ greatest 
criticism would be the Bureau’s hesitation to take freedmen’s education “entirely under 
[its] control.”92 Believing that individual states and local organizations already had both 
the infrastructure and motivation necessary to provide education, Howard clarified that 
the Bureau’s role would mainly consist of support, financial aid, and general supervision.  
In early announcements and circulars, Howard deferred to the authorities of state 
and local institutions. He declared the Bureau’s commitment to “the maintenance of good 
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schools… until a system of free schools can be supported by the reorganized local 
governments.”93 While Howard further requested that “fact and attendant circumstances 
be reported” in the event “schools [were] broken up by any authorized agent of the 
government,”94 he hesitated to declare direct Bureau intervention. Instead, he offered 
only broad instructions to his assistant commissioners on the subject:  
The assistant commissioner will designate one or more of his agents to act as the 
general superintendent of schools (one for each State) for refugees and freedmen. 
This officer will work as much as possible in conjunction with State officers who 
may have school matters in charge. If a general system can be adopted for a State, 
it is well; but if not, he will at least take cognizance of all that is being done to 
educate refugees and freedmen; secure proper protection to schools and teachers, 
promote method and efficiency, correspond with the benevolent agencies which 
are supplying his field, and aid the assistant commissioner in making his required 
reports.95 
 
Compared with the nearly limitless authority invested in Bureau agents to manage land 
and labor, these instructions lack explicit detail. Howard does not provide justification for 
the importance of education, nor does he advise specific action in the event that education 
is not being appropriately or effectively provided. Still, here and throughout other orders, 
Howard maintains consistent—albeit vague—encouragement of “self-sustaining schools” 
for freedmen.96  
Thus, it fell to individual states’ assistant commissioners and agents to prescribe 
further direction and clarity. While Howard’s rhetoric did not assert much urgency in this 
area, his agents’ orders often conveyed passionate intentions to actively provide and 
secure education for freed children. Mississippi offers a particularly clear example. There, 
the Acting Assistant Adjutant General Stuart Eldridge declared, “The freed people must 
have schools. If they are not educated they will be at a constant disadvantage with white 
men.”97 He insisted that the Bureau’s duties pertaining to education were “of very great 
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importance, as the education of the people is one of the chief objects aimed at by the 
bureau. Let them have early and close attention.” He further clarified that an unwavering 
commitment to education was vital, insofar as the agency’s efforts were sure to be met 
with hostile opposition. Eldridge issued a stern warning to Mississippi agents: “You will 
find many parties disposed to throw difficulties in the way. They must be met with 
determination and zeal.”98   
Joseph Warren, the appointed State Superintendent of Education in Mississippi, 
was largely responsible for carrying out Eldridge’s orders. Warren authored and 
circulated a letter in July 1865, as he was eager to “have some notion of the number of 
teachers” required for the upcoming school year. He also wanted to “avoid confusion and 
disappointment” by establishing “understanding with the different societies and church 
boards” that would work in concert with the Bureau’s efforts. Therefore, he circulated a 
letter among Northern audiences to clarify his expectations for those migrating South to 
offer their help. He admitted, “It is not known what means will be devised to secure help 
from the people in sustaining schools for their own benefit, nor how extensive that help 
may be.” However, he did provide some specifics. Targeting mainly teachers, Warren 
alerted them that “all schools [were] to open as nearly as possible on the first of October.” 
He also assured them that the Bureau would “probably be able to assign school-houses 
and quarters for teaches,” though “furniture, for the personal use of teachers cannot be 
promised.” These details betray the level of oversight the Bureau had regarding education 
for freedpeople in Mississippi. The agency took control of recruiting teachers, providing 
housing, and supplying schoolhouses with the appropriate resources. Warren offered final 
confirmation of the Bureau’s command when he requested that “no choice of places, nor 
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other local arrangements, for establishing schools in this State, be entered upon without 
consultation with this office.”99 In the absence of specific instructions from Head 
Commissioner Howard, Eldridge and Warren had the latitude to demand cooperation 
from Mississippi communities on all matters related to education.  
The Bureau’s interventions in Mississippi illustrate the complexity of their work. 
At first glance, Howard’s vague instructions implied only minimal oversight, as though 
education was not integral to the agency’s everyday efforts to secure freedom for 
freedmen. However, his overarching support actually provided the justification for agents 
to seize and maintain control to varying degrees. In some areas, the Bureau’s supervision 
was so absolute that it was “recommended that no schools for colored people be 
attempted save in places where officers of the bureau are posted.”100 Clearly, daily 
attention to education was of paramount importance for some assistant commissioners 
and superintendents, even without extensive explanation or clear, consistent mechanisms 
for Bureau intervention. 
Howard also tasked the Bureau with providing general relief and assistance to 
freedmen. He positioned relief as the agency’s third priority in his August 1865 speech 
and further clarified his focus on orphan asylums, homes, and hospitals. He spoke even 
less extensively on relief, once again presuming that human charity and compassion 
served as the underlying justification for this dimension of the Bureau’s work. He 
explained to his audience that some freedmen were “without arms, some without legs; 
others are old and decrepid [sic]; and still others blind or deaf. Most of them have been 
separated from their former homes by the operations of war, or by compulsion of their 
former owners, and we must protect and support them.”101 Unfortunately, the Bureau’s 
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ability to provide material relief in the forms of medical and physical care was severely 
limited. Howard noted that “no governmental appropriations [had] been made for this 
purpose.”102 
Therefore, the Bureau relied extensively on the assistance of religious and 
volunteer groups. Howard clarified, “It is not the intention of government that this bureau 
shall supersede the various benevolent organizations in the work of administering 
relief.”103 Instead, relief was to be primarily provided by local relief societies. Howard 
encouraged their “continuance and co-operation,” and he instructed his agents to “look to 
the associations laboring in their respective districts to provide… for the wants of 
destitute people.”104 The Bureau’s role, however, was not simply a passive one. Howard 
insisted, once again, on extensive oversight. He requested that his assistant 
commissioners continually report on the condition of the relief being provided in their 
communities; agents were to send him the “names, lists of their principal offers, and a 
brief statement of their present work.”105 This careful recordkeeping was not simply a 
matter of ensuring relief was being administered. It was also a means of verifying when 
relief was no longer necessary. Howard affirmed that “relief establishments [would] be 
discontinued as speedily as the cessation of hostilities and the return of industrial pursuits 
[would] permit.”106  
Finally, Howard declared that the Bureau’s fourth and final task was to “secure 
justice for the freed people.”107 In speaking of justice, Howard spoke of the biases and 
bigotries that motivated verbal and physical harm against freedmen. He said, “We find in 
the South some willing to act, and acting justly toward their former slaves. Others, even 
good men, are so imbued with a life-long prejudice that they cannot act justly toward 
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them. Still others will not.”108 Howard feared that these attitudes presented a dangerous 
threat to the Bureau’s work, because they could compel Americans to resist any attempt 
to help freedmen enter the free labor market, acquire land, seek education, and give 
testimony of their experiences. These prejudices, he said, “sometimes make me think it 
impossible that the promise of freedom to the colored race should be sustained.”109 
Howard conceded that hatred for black people would likely not dissipate immediately, if 
at all. He admitted that many people, even among his own ranks, “hate the negro. They 
always have, and they always mean to.”110 So, Howard focused his attention primarily 
not on dismantling these prejudices, but on protecting freedmen from them.  
It was in this area that he felt the agency’s military authority could wield its 
strength most effectively. When asked how the Bureau could secure justice in the face of 
so much hatred, he explained: “The War Department has established military departments 
all over the South, as it has in the North. Officers are stationed in every State and in all 
the important towns to enforce the will of the government.”111 In other words, Howard 
confirmed that his agents—the overwhelming majority of which were military officers 
and soldiers—were obligated to exercise institutional authority as law enforcement 
officials. Therefore, questions and concerns relating to justice consistently permeated the 
Bureau’s records throughout the South. 
In all communities where the Bureau operated, agents were ordered to protect 
freedmen and intervene in their interactions with other citizens. First and foremost, agents 
were required to document all instances of injustice, harm, or abuse. In Virginia, for 
example, “all known causes of outrages… committed by white people upon the blacks 
and by blacks upon the whites” were to be directly reported to the assistant 
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commissioner.112 These reports included identifying information, like “the date and 
locality of the occurrence,” as well as “the circumstances as fully as possible.”113 Beyond 
submitting reports, however, Bureau agents were further instructed to take an active role 
in mediating conflicts and tensions. Similarly to the ways in which they were tasked with 
negotiating labor contracts, agents negotiated everyday interactions. In Texas, Assistant 
Commissioner Gregory issued the following command: “All officers acting under orders 
from these headquarters will adjudicate in all cases arising within their respective districts 
between freedmen themselves, or between freedmen and white persons,” because “civil 
officers, by reason of old codes” may “fail to do [freedmen] impartial justice.”114 In these 
circulars, and countless others, Bureau agents’ observations and instructions echoed 
Howard’s concerns about racial prejudice as a barrier to freedom. 
Like Howard, local agents believed that the presence of the Bureau—as a military 
organization—was freedmen’s best hope against injustice. In Mississippi, Assistant 
Commissioner Thomas wrote, “Great complaints reach this office of the abuse of 
freedmen throughout those districts where military control does not extend.”115 Without a 
strong Bureau presence, Thomas argued, Southern planters had “no fear of civil law for 
any crime [they] may commit.”116 It was in these isolated areas that Mississippi agents 
perceived men eager to “punis[h], abus[e], and kil[l] the negro upon the slightest 
provocation.”117 In light of these fears and observations, Thomas further reinforced his 
agents’ powers, insisting that “every effort must be made to secure to the freedmen the 
protection guaranteed by the orders and circulars of the Freedmen’s Bureau.”118  
Guided by their superiors’ orders, Bureau agents were vigilant in their duties. The 
vigor with which individual agents upheld their responsibilities cannot be accurately 
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determined without closer investigation of personal diaries and records. However, some 
circulars suggest that sub-commissioners, superintendents, and field agents considered 
issues of injustice and abuse to be a serious, omnipresent threat. In fact, some agents were 
even accused of overstepping their authority in their attempts to protect freedmen. In 
Virginia, for instance, Acting Assistant Adjutant General James A. Bates announced, 
“Reports have been received at these headquarters that some of the agents of the bureau 
are in the habit of arresting citizens to answer trivial or groundless charges made against 
them by the freedmen.”119 Simply put, in some areas, the mere accusation of injustice 
warranted immediate—if even ill-advised—action. These accounts confirm the extent to 
which prejudice, and the unjust physical and verbal harm that resulted from it, were 
deemed intolerable impediments to the Bureau’s work. Throughout its ranks, the agency 
argued that securing justice would provide a fair chance for freedmen to safely pursue the 
other markers of freedom.  
A familiar contract 
 
When Howard first accepted his position as head commissioner of the Bureau, he 
was unsure of where to begin the agency’s work. He knew he had been tasked with 
facilitating freedmen’s transition to freedom, but he had been given only “a few words 
about abandoned lands, a few words about refugees, and a few words about relief 
establishments.”120 Speaking candidly to his audience in Maine, he confessed, “I had a 
law to execute, without the specific means to execute it.”121 So, Howard devised his own 
plan. With the help of his agents, Howard’s vision circulated widely. He argued for 
attainments of land, labor, education, relief, and justice that, together, became the 
“fundamental principles” of the Bureau’s work. They also became the prerequisites for 
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black freedom and inclusion in post-bellum America.122 As Howard’s agents echoed his 
orders, they helped to reaffirm the argument that emancipation had not, in fact, delivered 
freedom for freedmen. Thus, the terms of the social contract had been drawn. Howard 
tempered the radical potential of the Bureau’s work by emphasizing freedom as learned, 
earned, and most importantly, not yet realized. 
In this path forward, Howard was both strategic and compromising. The radical 
notion of emancipation for black people was made more palatable for public audiences—
North and South alike—because Howard ultimately relied on a familiar rhetorical 
maneuver: qualifying freedom in terms that would restrict freedmen from fully asserting 
their new status. This strategy straddled a middle ground in the debates surrounding both 
the emancipation and the Bureau’s inception. However, the implications of this 
compromise were hardly neutral.  
The Consequences of Compromise 
 
Head Commissioner Howard argued that his strategy represented the Bureau’s 
best, most agreeable, course of action. With an eye ever-focused on “the signs of the 
times,” he proclaimed that the agency’s work would deliver “absolute justice to blacks 
and whites.”123 By clarifying the unforgiving terms by which freedmen might one day be 
welcomed into American society, Howard believed that he had offered a compromise 
beyond question; it was, as he put it, already “settled by the people.”124 In a way, it was, 
because he had extended freedom’s paradoxical legacy, which had been negotiated by 
Americans—both black and white alike—for decades. In this section, I discuss the 
implications of the Bureau’s founding rhetoric. I acknowledge the progressive features of 
their discourse, but I ultimately contend that agents’ reliance on an earned rights 
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approach to freedom undermined the radical potential of their work, reaffirmed 
antebellum commitments to both black exclusion and dehumanization, and cast freedmen 
as abject wards of the state.  
In some ways, the Bureau’s agenda proposed ambitious, extreme change. First 
and foremost, Howard and many of his agents openly declared black people’s undeniable 
right to freedom. For example, Assistant Commissioner Eldridge chastised former 
planters in a circular furnished to every white citizen in Mississippi. He cautioned: “going 
back… to re-argue the question of freedom, and to dispute that fact… All this is folly.” In 
Eldridge’s view, “the argument was finished when the war began,” and “the question was 
forever settled when it closed.”125 With this declaration, Eldridge asserted a complete 
reversal of the antebellum order, in which black bodies had been considered property and, 
by definition, not free. The Bureau’s insistence upon irrefutable freedom for freedmen 
was a radical concept in a nation that had grown and thrived by means of slave labor. 
Second, Howard and his agents argued for the extension of rights and privileges that had 
been previously denied to black people in antebellum America. The mere possibility that 
freedmen could attain land, labor, education, relief, and justice at all was a significant 
departure from the conditions of slavery. While the Bureau’s rhetoric did ensure that 
freedom would remain a promise, it also articulated paths toward success and inclusion 
that had not previously existed. Finally, as the nation’s first regulatory and social welfare 
agency, the Bureau embodied a bold argument: the need for a government organization to 
support former slaves. In pursuit of all of its priorities, the agency exercised state 
authority to intervene in the everyday interactions of its citizens, with the explicit aim of 
ensuring freedmen’s access to resources, tools, and protection. The Bureau’s insistence 
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on institutional defense of black people’s rights and safety emerged in stark contrast to 
the realities of antebellum life, in which codified laws subjected slaves to the absolute 
authority of their owners. Together, these three commitments illustrate the Bureau’s 
integral role in attempting to shift the nation from “the old things of slavery” to “the new 
things of equal liberty for all.”126  
However, the agency undermined its own radical efforts by deploying an earned 
rights approach that had necessarily excluded slaves from the social contract in the past—
and had the potential to similarly exclude freedmen in America’s post-bellum future. 
Through public speech and numerous circular announcements, instructions, and orders, 
Howard and his agents confirmed that freedom would remain a mere promise until 
freedmen satisfied the prerequisites that had been forcibly denied to them for centuries. 
As the Bureau’s rhetoric also made abundantly clear, freedmen faced numerous, severe 
obstacles in their early pursuits to meet strict expectations of land, labor, education, relief, 
and justice. Thus, the criteria by which the agency embraced freedmen were the same 
ones by which society could quickly reject them. 
The Bureau also failed to counter pervasive notions that black people, especially 
former slaves, were less human than others. In fact, they affirmed this belief in subtle 
ways. The earned rights approach to freedom provided an opportunity for agents to assert 
that freedmen were equipped with fewer capacities, questionable character, and poor 
instincts for self-determination and survival. For instance, regarding the Bureau’s labor 
policies, Howard warned his agents that many freedmen were afflicted with “false pride,” 
rendering them “more willing to be supported in idleness than to support themselves.”127 
Mississippi Assistant Commissioner Eldridge echoed these assumptions, arguing that 
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labor contracts were a necessity, because it would be easier for planters and former 
owners to hold “lazy or dishonest” freedmen “to a contract intelligently made, than to 
enforce on them their duty in any other way.”128 If appropriate measures, like contracts, 
were not taken, the Bureau worried that black people’s fundamental character flaws 
might trigger a slippery slope that would endanger the wider public. Howard surmised, 
“if unemployed, they accumulate in villages, and their idleness leads to corruption and 
crime.”129 In issuing this warning, Howard reinforced a prevailing stereotype of black 
inferiority, while further suggesting that the congregation of freedmen in black 
communities would further amplify their human deficiencies. Overall, Howard and his 
agents maintained that black people had been left in such an abject state, ravaged by 
slavery, that their success and survival would be utterly impossible without the 
benevolent charity and strict supervision of the government. They were described as 
“extravagant and thoughtless,” without concern or “care of their own persons,” and 
afflicted by “habits in many cases which, if not corrected, will degrade and ruin them.”130 
In other words, the Bureau suggested that not only were freedmen wholly unfit for 
freedom, but they might also be ill equipped for life itself.  
I consequently propose that the Bureau’s apparent support for freedmen be 
critically interrogated in accordance with the racial politics that both preceded and 
pervaded its discourse. Acting as government agents, Bureau officials oversaw the 
fledgling relationship between former slaves and their government. In utilizing a 
vocabulary of land, labor, education, relief, and justice, they also policed the boundaries 
of social, political, and economic belonging. The Bureau sought to induce black people’s 
compliance with normative standards of American life by arguing that freedmen could 
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not, and would not, be fully embraced by society until they satisfied the agency’s 
expectations. Until that time, black people’s freedom was to be considered conditional, 
and they were to be treated as wards of the state. 
Thus, freedom’s legacy as an exclusionary, rather than inclusionary, principle was 
revived. As Virginia Assistant Commissioner Orlando Brown succinctly clarified, “the 
freedmen must and will be protected in their rights, [but] they must be required to meet 
these first and most essential conditions of a state of freedom.”131 Without extensive state 
oversight, black people could not be trusted to participate successfully in American 
society. The Bureau espoused a rhetoric of freedom that could once again be used to 
delay, if not deny outright, the embrace of black people as fully free and fully human. 
The agency claimed to deliver freedom to freedmen, but it simultaneously worked to 
safeguard freedom from them. 
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FORTIFYING FREEDOM’S BORDERS: CLASSIFICATION, CONFINEMENT, 
AND CONTROL IN FREEDMEN’S VILLAGE 
 
 The Freedmen’s Bureau’s emphasis on earned rights suggested that state 
supervision was necessitated to examine, assess, and ultimately judge black people’s 
fitness for freedom. In Washington, DC, this work had already begun several years before 
the agency’s inception. Congress passed the Confiscation Acts and abolished slavery in 
1862 in the nation’s capital, and the complex politics and practices of emancipation were 
tested in the midst of the Civil War.1 According to historian Joseph Reidy, Washington 
became a popular destination due to military activity headquartered in its borders, 
congressional abolition of slavery, and federal efforts to provide shelter and employment 
to fugitive slaves.2 In the wake of successful military victories, “a steady flow of 
contrabands” fled their masters and the fighting in the South. They traveled stealthily 
from southern Maryland and northern Virginia, especially, and “emerged from the 
shadows” in the nation’s capital.3 By the summer of 1862, former slaves were inundating 
the district at a staggering rate. At one point, as many as four hundred arrived within the 
span of two days.4 Upon their arrival, “blacks in the capital area began the transition from 
dependence to independence, from slavery to freedom.”5 However, change would not 
come swiftly or easily, and former slaves soon learned that antebellum sentiments 
remained “deeply rooted” in the North, and “freedom held as many pitfalls as 
opportunities.”6 
 The harsh realities of transition were made apparent in the numerous contraband 
camps that sprung up throughout the region. As the number of former slaves swelled, 
both the government and community philanthropists “saw the need for remedial action.”7 
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By 1873, camps and government-sponsored farms had been established on both sides of 
the Potomac River, providing refuge for nearly ten thousand fugitive and emancipated 
slaves.8 With the added help of private charities and freedmen’s aid associations, these 
camps provided practical necessities, like food, medical support, shelter, and an 
opportunity to procure paid employment. These early efforts to address the urgent needs 
of former slaves forced both the Union military and the federal government to reckon 
with the impending issues of emancipation. As Reidy put it, the state had no other choice 
than to “deal squarely with [former slaves’] future, if not yet with the future of slavery in 
the abstract.”9 Thus, in many ways, contraband camps laid the groundwork for the 
eventual establishment of the Bureau, and provided an incubator space for the agency’s 
work. In one such camp, Freedmen’s Village, Virginia, the Bureau fortified its message.  
 In this chapter, I investigate how agents translated Head Commissioner Howard’s 
vision into a program of strict policies and practices at the local level by examining the 
Bureau’s extensive Freedmen’s Village records. This archive includes hundreds of 
memos, letters, announcements, special orders, receipts, and tables that documented the 
agency’s everyday operations. I contend that the Bureau’s notions of freedom 
transformed the village into a site of examination, within which the agents exerted the 
state’s power to assess, and often deny, black people’s fitness for freedom. To support 
this thesis, I first analyze the implementation of the Bureau’s rhetoric, marshaling 
primary source evidence to confirm how an earned rights approach shaped the agency’s 
interactions with and expectations of former slaves. Then, I further probe how the 
Bureau’s agenda gave rise to administrative practices that classified, confined, and 
controlled former slaves. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of how the revival of these 
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practices upheld logics of slavery and cultivated a post-war relationship in which the 
state’s agents forced black people to submit to their power, mimicking the antebellum 
master-slave relationship. 
The Establishment of Freedmen’s Village 
 
 Before the Bureau took command in Virginia, government control had already 
been established. Union army commanders and quartermaster officers ruled the capital 
area’s contraband camps, where they held residents to strict expectations. Former and 
fugitive slaves’ livelihood was dependent on their ability to work in service of the 
government. Employment opportunities were plentiful, and all of them contributed to the 
“mobilization for war.”10 According to Reidy, “The Union military machine required 
unprecedented numbers of laborers precisely when the disintegration of slavery produced 
a sizable number of potential workers anxious for employment and particularly eager to 
aid the Yankees.”11 Such aid took on a range of forms, including carpentry, masonry, 
blacksmithing, nursing, farming, road construction, and garbage collection.12 In addition 
to satisfying the pragmatic needs of the Union army, these expectations confirmed that 
black labor—especially labor commanded and demanded by the state—would be an 
integral part of former slaves’ transition to freedom.  
 As former slaves toiled tirelessly to contribute to the war effort, they faced 
numerous other challenges. First, living conditions and personal health steadily declined 
as the camps became overcrowded. At Camp Barker, the site of the present-day U Street 
neighborhood, an average of twenty-five former slaves died per week during the summer 
of 1863.13 Confronted with rampant illness and depleted resources, many residents left to 
provide for themselves elsewhere, leaving behind only “the fresh arrivals, the sick, the 
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disabled and the dependent—those most vulnerable to disease.”14 Second, the camps 
were becoming increasingly expensive to maintain. To help defray the costs, military 
authorities often instituted a tax on former slaves’ wages. At some camps, approximately 
five dollars of blacks’ monthly wage (which ranged from ten to thirty dollars) was 
deposited into a “Contraband Fund.”15 Third, the government’s support began to spur 
growing controversy among Americans. Despite former slaves’ immense contributions to 
the war, as well as their compliance with self-supporting taxes, the public demonstrated 
ambivalence toward the camps. They perceived a need for sympathy and “public 
responsibility” to “alleviate suffering,” but many worried about the consequences.16 In a 
letter to the Freedmen’s Relief Association, a Virginia surgeon in charge of contrabands 
reiterated that the public expected the government to “induc[e] these people to care for 
themselves,” rather than provide for them indefinitely.17 Simply put, as former slaves 
struggled to both work and survive in the midst of war, the public began to criticize the 
state’s efforts to provide for even their most basic necessities.      
  These growing problems only mounted in the wake of the Emancipation 
Proclamation, after which a “flood of arrivals” further strained the camps and demanded 
even more space and resources.18 By the summer of 1863, demands for a new site beyond 
the district’s borders grew louder.19 On December 4, Freedmen’s Village was formally 
established under the leadership of Danforth B. Nichols, of the American Missionary 
Association, and Lieutenant Colonel Elias M. Greene, chief quartermaster of the 
Department of Washington. The camp was located on the confiscated property of 
Confederate General Robert E. Lee and his wife, Mary Custis Lee. The estate was 
reportedly “perfectly suited… to improve the health of the freedmen by settling them 
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outside the city and putting them to work in the open air.”20 Freedmen’s Village was 
large enough to accommodate 50 multi-story dwellings, neatly arranged in formation and 
housing two families each. The village also included a hospital, school, chapel, shops, 
and “a home for the indigent.”21   
Within the confines of Freedmen’s Village, hundreds of former slaves found work, 
shelter, and their first, bittersweet taste of free life. Not unlike any other contraband camp, 
the village held its residents to strict work standards; able-bodied blacks labored for 
measly wages, half of which were seized by rent and a contraband tax. According to 
Felix James, the system was designed not only to offer former slaves employment, but 
also to “make such employment profitable, both to the government and to the workers.”22 
Despite growing resentment toward the taxes, a presumed deference to state authority 
loomed ever-present, as “the streets and parks all bore the names of prominent 
government officials or generals.”23 Under military leadership, the village’s residents 
were additionally subject to an education in “order, sobriety, and industry,” in response to 
public distrust and a pervasive Northern fear that “slavery had inculcated habits of 
laziness and improvidence in both masters and slaves.”24 The camp’s commanding 
officers aimed to maintain the Freedmen’s Village only as a temporary “stepping stone to 
self-sufficiency.”25  
 Despite their efforts, however, Freedmen’s Village would go on to become one of 
the most famous and longest-surviving contraband camps of the era. Given the ample 
opportunities for employment in the capital region, the area’s black population swelled 
throughout the war and many residents were determined to stay. The village was also 
protected by its fame and symbolic importance. While other contraband camps were 
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disbanded toward the end of the Civil War, Freedmen’s Village remained intact, because 
it had become “a national showcase… [as] a setting for celebrating the progress of 
freedom.”26 The fanfare did not necessarily indicate an outpouring of public support for 
former slaves and freedmen. Rather, veneration of Freedmen’s Village was inspired 
instead by satisfying irony. As Reidy has noted, “the government had considered it not 
only wise but also political to settle contrabands on the abandoned estate of Robert E. 
Lee.”27 In other words, Freedmen’s Village was not only an emblematic “nurturing 
ground for free men and women,” but also a powerful symbol of the Union’s triumph 
over the Confederate South.28   
 Thus, under the omnipresent shadow of public controversy, state power, and 
political wrangling, Freedmen’s Village emerged as an early site of free black life. 
Within its strategically drawn boundaries, former slaves, former masters, government 
officials, and military officers collided in their efforts to navigate the tumultuous 
landscape of the war and its aftermath. As a community created for the sole purpose of 
assembling former slaves on the cusp of freedom, Freedmen’s Village “provides a unique 
perspective on the emancipation process.”29 When the Freedmen’s Bureau assumed 
leadership over the village and its residents in 1865, the agency began to document their 
efforts and interactions with former slaves. Their records detail the reach, as well as the 
implications, of freedom’s antebellum legacies in the post-war era. Not only did Head 
Commissioner Howard’s message of earned rights guide the village’s everyday 
operations, but it also further clarified the fragile relationship between the state and 
former slaves—a relationship marked by the systematic classification, confinement, and 
control of black people.  
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The Bureau Takes Command 
 
 When the Freedmen’s Bureau arrived in Freedmen’s Village in 1865, it imposed 
strict control over the camp. At multiple levels of administration, the Bureau’s agents 
reinforced existing orders and operations designed to “aid [freedmen] in becoming useful 
citizens instead of burdens on the community.”30 As it did so, the agency kept extensive 
records. These archives constitute “one of the [Bureau’s] greatest legacies” and “arguably 
some of the most important documents available for the study of the federal 
government’s policies” regarding freedmen and early Reconstruction.31 The records are 
comprised of over three hundred documents, including letters between federal and local 
Bureau staff, special orders and circular announcements from the agency’s leadership, 
reports compiled and issued by the village’s supervisors, and receipts for supplies, rent, 
and expenditures. Analysis of this rich archive demonstrates, first and foremost, that 
Bureau agents attempted to implement Head Commissioner Howard’s vision at the local 
level. In their communication and conduct in Freedmen’s Village, agents remained 
focused on fulfilling pragmatic markers of freedom.   
 As discussed in Chapter 1, Head Commissioner Howard defined freedom in terms 
of five attainments: land, labor, education, relief, and justice. These attainments served as 
a sort of litmus test to assess black people’s fitness for freedom and acceptable inclusion 
within the American social contract. Simply put, former slaves’ transition from bondage 
to freedom would be complete when all five prerequisites were satisfied. Guided by this 
framework, the Bureau’s agents directed their attention toward helping freedmen earn 
their freedom by acquiring land, finding gainful employment, pursuing education, 
procuring medical aid and rations, and defending themselves in disputes with other 
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Americans—particularly white men. Close attention to the Bureau’s archives affirms that 
the agency was relentless in its pursuit of these attainments.  
 Agents’ attempts to help former slaves become landowners—or, at least, 
renters—were well documented. Acting on instructions from the assistant commissioner 
in Washington, DC, a lieutenant wrote a report regarding the rental of land tenements in 
Freedmen’s Village. In it, he stated that two black men, Austin and Lawrence, and their 
families had taken up residence in “two lots lying on the east side of the Arlington Estate 
between the river and canal (one containing about twenty acres and the other ten).” The 
men were “both very old and both formerly owned by Gen[eral] Lee.”32 The lieutenant 
reported that the freedmen had “agreed to payment, the same as the rest” and expressed 
confidence that they would be able to fulfill their pledge, “even better than many of the 
younger renters.”33 The report is merely one of many in the archive, as agents had been 
instructed to update their superiors regarding the status of land rentals on a regular basis. 
 In addition to written letters, charts and tables were also used to assure the 
Bureau’s leaders that land acquisition was a priority in the village. For example, an 
undated “tabular statement” extends for two full pages, recording simply the names of 
renters, the acreage of land rented, and the amount of rent paid per year for each property. 
Among the renters were Elias Plummer, who had rented ten acres for twenty dollars per 
year; Benjamin Wright, who had rented five acres for ten dollars per year; and John 
Burroughs, who had rented 18 acres for 18 dollars per year.34 Records also show that the 
Bureau attempted to diligently track these rental payments, both in letter and tabular 
forms. In a letter to the Washington, DC, headquarters, it was reported that the agency 
had collected $344.75 in rent payments for properties in Freedmen’s Village.35 In other 
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instances, simple charts were used to indicate, for example, that the rent had been paid for 
only 25 tenements in early 1868, amounting to $67.20, $37.00, and $20.00, for the 
months of January, February, and March, respectively.36 The frequency with which these 
reports appeared, as well as the redundancy of their multiple forms, demonstrate that the 
Bureau’s agents spent a considerable amount of time encouraging, supervising, and 
documenting former slaves’ newfound right to acquire land for themselves and their 
families.  
 The Bureau’s records also confirm that the agents emphasized the significance of 
land ownership explicitly among the residents of Freedmen’s Village. The ability to rent 
and occupy tenements was upheld as a reward for those deemed worthy in the eyes of the 
Bureau. One letter, for example, instructed Freedmen’s Village agents to allow residents 
who could “earn an honest livelihood” to “occupy houses,” even as the agency was 
attempting to decrease the overall population of the camp.37 Despite the number of 
freedmen who could not afford property, the Bureau encouraged agents to arrange rental 
agreements “without delay” for “that class of Freedmen who are of known trustworthy 
and industrious habits.”38 This policy reaffirmed a key tenet of the Bureau’s message that 
freedom, as exemplified by land rental privileges, was reserved for those who 
demonstrated the proper aptitude and character. By doling out land as a reward, the 
Bureau’s agents aimed to cultivate an appreciation for property ownership among 
freedmen, even if they were not yet in a financial position to afford the rental rates 
imposed upon them. 
 Under the Bureau’s leadership, Freedmen’s Village remained a site of labor 
production. All residents were expected to contribute productively to the community. A 
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set of rules and regulations for the village stated, “it is but just that all labor [freedmen] 
are able to perform should be given… and it will be expected and required of all 
dependents at Freedmen’s Village that they cheerfully render all service required of 
them.”39 Consequently, many freedmen were assigned jobs in the hospital, asylum, 
school, or mess halls. For example, according to monthly reports, 1,240 black laborers 
were working in Freedmen’s Village in May 1866, and receiving modest wages often 
within the range of five to ten dollars per month.40 This general policy reinforced the 
Bureau’s commitment to free labor principles, as agents encouraged former slaves to see 
themselves as workers contributing to, and being compensated for, life in a free society.  
 The agency was also determined to help freedmen find employment outside of the 
village. In some instances, Bureau officials wrote personal letters to one another in hopes 
of finding a suitable position for a former slave. For example, a letter to the Assistant 
Commissioner in Washington, DC, reads: “Nicholas R--- (Col’d), a dependent at this 
place, is engaged digging graves. He is industrious and obliging and I respectfully 
recommend that he be hired at a compensation of six ($6.00) dollars per month.”41 The 
letter demonstrates the extent to which the Bureau elevated free labor principles as an 
integral part of free life. Nicholas had already been working at Freedmen’s Village, but 
he had been doing so as a “dependent.” In other words, he was relying on the Bureau for 
support rather than earning his own wages. His freedom—and, by extension, the 
Bureau’s work—would not be complete until he attained both employment and 
compensation. 
 Of the five primary attainments, education received the least attention in the 
Bureau’s records of Freedmen’s Village. Specific instructions for the schooling of 
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freedpeople—including details regarding schedule, activities, or content—are noticeably 
absent from the archive.42 However, the agents were concerned about the community’s 
schoolhouse. The Bureau commandeered a building designed to accommodate “at least 
two hundre[d] scholars.”43 The initial design, a diagram of which is preserved in the 
archive, envisioned a building fifty feet long, and thirty feet wide, and twelve feet high. 
The space was divided into a main instruction room and three recitation rooms. Before 
construction began, government officials took thorough stock of the anticipated costs. A 
list of required supplies (including 16,552 feet of lumber, 14,400 shingles, 150 feet of 
glass measuring 10 inches by 14 inches, 15 pounds of putty, 1 gallon of linseed oil, and 5 
pairs of t-shaped hinges) amounted to a total cost of $953.75.44 After its completion, 
however, the schoolhouse received relatively scant attention in the course of the Bureau’s 
everyday operations. It was not until nearly a year and a half had passed that the agency 
concerned itself again with the schoolhouse. An agent questioned whether its size and 
design were appropriate for the community’s needs: “the reduction of the population of 
Freedmen’s Village in Arlington requires corresponding changes in the schools and 
school building. The aggregate attendance of pupils… is now less than seventy five [and] 
the expense… will not justify its use for the small number of scholars.”45 The agent’s 
recommendation highlighted the only two ways in which the Bureau recorded its efforts 
toward education in Freedmen’s Village: constructing a schoolhouse and tracking 
attendance. Such limited mention of freedmen’s schooling in Freedmen’s Village 
suggests that the Bureau’s main goal was to, first and foremost, provide a physical space 
in which former slaves would begin to receive an education.  
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 In contrast, agents’ focus on relief for freedmen was unwavering—and 
necessarily so. Given the number of black people that were dependent upon the Bureau 
for supplies and resources, the Freedmen’s Village records are replete with requests, 
receipts, and registers for rations issued to former slaves.46 The Bureau relied on its 
agents to verify residents’ needs and inquire on their behalf for a wide range of goods and 
materials. For instance, in a report to the Washington, DC, headquarters, one agency 
official wrote that a “complaint of insufficient healing accommodations at the Home [for 
the indigent] is not without foundation.”47 It was noted that the 231 people residing there 
had formed groups to pool scant resources. Ninety-eight residents had banded together to 
share eighteen stoves in an attempt to keep warm, and other smaller groups of 17, 22, 51, 
and 43 had likewise formed to share one, one, five, and two stoves each, respectively. 
Further inspection revealed that many of the stoves were “broken and worthless,” so the 
agent requested replacements for the freedmen.48 Agents also stepped in to request 
medical relief, especially for those residing at the village’s Abbott Hospital. They penned 
frequent letters requesting prosthetics, like artificial legs, for injured or elderly residents. 
One such request was made on behalf of a 22-year-old black man named James Smith, 
whose leg had been amputated by a Freedmen’s Village surgeon after contracting a case 
of gangrene.49 These records illustrate the range of relief efforts pursued by the Bureau.  
 Agents accounted for various supplies—from stoves to prosthetics, and from food 
to “three hundred and eighty yards of brown denims”—in simple ledgers.50 Bureau 
officials recorded the number of rations provided to residents on a monthly basis. During 
the month of January 1866, for example, 3,813 rations were issued at Freedmen’s Village, 
totaling $1,029.51 in value. From January to September, the agency reportedly spent 
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$10,540.26 on provisions for former slaves.51 These expenses underscore the extent of 
the Bureau’s relief efforts. On a daily basis, agents operated under the assumption that 
freedom meant residents must be able-bodied and, therefore, their basic needs—in terms 
of clothing, food, and medical care—must be met.  
 Finally, the Bureau’s records provide some insight into the agency’s attempts to 
pursue justice for freedmen. Head Commissioner Howard had argued that former slaves 
deserved to have their voices heard in cases of conflict arising between white and black 
people. The Bureau’s agents, therefore, were tasked with adjudicating frequent 
allegations lodged against the residents of Freedmen Village. One letter detailed an 
accusation of assault made by a man named J. W. Reynolds, who claimed that “four 
colored men armed with muskets, with fixed bayonets, came to his home and made 
threats against his life, without any provocation whatsoever.” Reynolds further insisted 
that at least one of the men was residing at Freedmen’s Village. Therefore, the Bureau’s 
officials in Washington, DC, demanded that local agents investigate his claims and “take 
such steps as [they] may deem necessary to present like occurrences in the future.”52 In 
another case, a man identified as Doctor Armstrong reported that “some of his cows had 
been stolen or killed.” Though Armstrong did not accuse anyone outright, Bureau 
officials in Washington, DC, directed local agents to “cause a thorough investigation of 
[the] case… with a view to ascertaining whether any of the freedpeople of the village 
[have] been concerned in this transaction.”53 While these records do not provide details 
regarding the results of these cases, they do affirm that the Bureau agents intervened in, 




 Moreover, the Bureau assumed a measure of responsibility in verifying and 
protecting former slaves’ legal rights, especially in matters relating to land and labor. One 
letter makes reference to a black man named Judson who was residing on a Maryland 
farm known as “Frog’s Nest.” The Bureau had reviewed and confirmed the “proceedings 
at law in the case” and was called upon to defend Judson when the farm’s former owner, 
a white man named John L. Budd, attempted to “recove[r] peaceable possession.”54 Thus, 
local agents were not only tasked with investigating claims made against freedmen, but 
also defending former slaves’ rights against those who sought to exploit or abuse them.  
 Altogether, the Freedmen’s Village records provide insight into the ways in which 
agents attempted to put Head Commissioner Howard’s plans into practice. As they 
interacted with former slaves on a daily basis, agents affirmed Howard’s earned-rights 
approach to the agency’s mission. Numerous letters, memos, announcements, reports, 
and receipts confirmed their unwavering commitment to practical attainments as 
undeniable markers of former slaves’ new status as free people. Their persistent pursuit 
of land, labor, education, relief, and justice for freedmen underlined the argument that 
freedom would remain an unfulfilled promise until black people successfully achieved 
these attainments. Acting as government agents, Bureau officials positioned themselves 
as the guardians not only of freedom, but also of the social contract. Under their 
command, Freedmen’s Village was a site of institutional examination, where thousands 
of black people underwent a test of their fitness for freedom.  
Earned Rights in Practice 
 
 The Freedmen’s Village records provide an opportunity to not only study the 
Bureau’s discourse, but also to consider its consequences. The previous section discussed 
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the ways in which local agents affirmed Head Commissioner Howard’s rhetoric and 
documented their efforts to translate his vision into action. This section analyzes the ways 
in which the Bureau’s rhetoric began to construct an emerging post-war relationship 
between the state and the freedmen that mimicked, in many ways, the relationship 
between former slavemasters and their slaves. Acting as government agents and guided 
by their relentless focus on land, labor, education, justice, and relief, Bureau officials 
documented interactions with black people in ways that bore a striking resemblance to 
practices of enslavement. In pursuit of freedom, agents took on the position and practices 
of freedmen’s former masters, systematically classifying, confining, and controlling the 
residents of Freedmen’s Village. 
Classification 
 
	 Even within the small confines of Freedmen’s Village, thousands of former slaves 
came under the Bureau’s care. By defining freedom in terms of pragmatic markers, Head 
Commissioner Howard instituted a system by which local agents could begin to identify, 
organize, and manage the large population. Simply put, Howard’s prerequisites were 
easily transformed into a checklist, which compelled the Bureau to interact with black 
people not as individual human beings, but as groups or classes. In countless records, 
agents treated black people as objects to be counted and classified, just as former masters 
had catalogued slaves as property. 
 Upon arriving at Freedmen’s Village, former slaves were immediately 
documented in a register used to record arrivals. Agents recorded only limited 
information about each person: date of arrival; name, if known; from where or from 
whom they were “received”; “condition,” in terms of marital status; and occasional 
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miscellaneous notes. For instance, a man named John Nelson reportedly arrived in 
Freedmen’s Village on January 2, 1867, at the age of 65. He was reportedly “received” 
from someone identified as Lieutenant Colonel BeeBee, in Washington, DC, and 
admitted as a single man, “old and infirm.”55 Another entry recorded the arrival of Nelly 
May, age 11, from a Lieutenant Colonel S.P. Lee, described as “healthy.”56 Presumably 
in these first interactions with former slaves, Bureau agents reduced them to only their 
most basic identifying features, their previous owner or guardian, and their perceived 
condition.  
 Once their arrivals were catalogued, freedmen were further classified into groups. 
A set of undated ledgers provides a glimpse into how agents distinguished between 
former slaves based on their varying levels of dependence on the government. Class 1 
was reserved for “dependent freedpeople living at the village without authority.” The 
accompanying list includes over 40 separate entries, showing only names and ages: Peter 
Lewis, 18; Anna White, 30; Frances White, 23; Rosa Robinson, 15; Stephen Deal, 35; 
Washington Kelly, 21; Elias Green, 16; Lucy Roe, 18.57 Class 2 was used to indicate 
when a former slave was independent but also associated with dependent relatives. Their 
names and ages are accompanied by remarks, which indicate the type and number of 
dependent relatives for whom they were responsible: Lucinda Ford, 30, 3 children; 
Mildred Douglass, 35, 1 child; Mary Dixon, 25, 1 child infant; Winnie Diggs, 40, 
husband; Rachel Lewis, 38, 3 children; Mary Bruce, 15, mother.58 Class 3 was defined as 
dependent freedpeople “subject for discharge,” and included only names and ages but 
omitted explanation: David Green, 28; Isabella Jackson, 24; Eliza Sewell, 30; and Lucy 
Jackson, 45.59 Finally, Class 4—easily the largest among them—catalogued the residents 
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who had no visible means of self-support, indicating only names, ages, and occasional 
remarks: John H. Lewis, 24; Eliza Ann Lewis, 20; Mary Ann Lewis, 1; Jillian Sewell, 35; 
Cassius Jackson, 40, “very poor will become a dependent before winter”; Seymour 
Wright, 40; Jon Anderson, 35.60 These ledgers demonstrate the extent to which the 
Bureau approached freedmen not as individual humans facing unique hardships and 
circumstances, but as wards. Agents classified freedmen based on their general level of 
dependence, as determined by Howard’s prerequisites. The extent to which former slaves 
were reliant upon the government—especially for land, labor, and relief—determined 
their relationship with the Bureau.61   
 The Freedmen’s Village records confirm that this practice of counting, 
cataloguing, and classifying black people occupied a significant portion of agents’ time, 
as the larger classes were then further broken down into smaller groups. Seemingly every 
interaction, at every stage of freedmen’s residency, was identified in terms of former 
slaves’ progress toward the Bureau’s ideal expectations. For example, as mentioned 
previously, the agency showed relatively little attention to education in Freedmen’s 
Village, with the exception of the schoolhouse’s design and pupils’ enrollment. 
Attendance was counted daily, with students classified into groups of “boys” and “girls,” 
and “primary” and “higher” grade levels. A “report of schools” sent on June 24, 1865, 
recorded that an average of 242⅕ students attended per day, “on a decrease of nearly 15 
from last week.”62 A similar report was sent on July 1, 1865, accounting for the week of 
June 26, during which average of 257⅖ students attended per day.63 Rather than 
documenting the content taught to black children, or students’ weaknesses and successes 
in the classroom, they merely counted the number of bodies in attendance. These reports 
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underscore the extent to which the Bureau prioritized quantitative information about 
freedmen, so much so that they calculated school attendance in fractions—or parts—of 
black people.64 
 Extensive ledgers used to record the number of black people receiving supplies or 
rations at any given time provide another example of such categorizations. Monthly 
reports, issued between August 1865 and December 1866, thoroughly recorded numeric 
tallies of freedmen to whom rations, clothing, or medicines had been issued. The reports 
were classified in terms of health status: Well Dependents, Sick Dependents, Born 
Dependents, and Died Dependents.65 Each category was further broken down by age and 
gender (men, women, male children, and female children). For example, the September 
1866 report indicated that 13 well dependent men, 70 well dependent women, 28 well 
dependent male children, 39 well dependent female children, 19 sick dependent men, 7 
sick dependent women, and 4 sick dependent male children—180 dependents in total—
received supplies from the Bureau. In addition, zero dependents were born that month, 
though 4 dependents (3 male, 1 female) died and 101 dependents were reportedly 
discharged.66 On the one hand, these reports were crafted with painstaking detail, as exact 
figures were provided for each group. On the other hand, those details omitted any 
substantive information about the freedmen’s lives or the circumstances surrounding their 
needs. The Bureau’s agenda compelled agents to merely count and classify black people, 
always with the aim of measuring their agency’s success and the remaining scope of their 
work.   
 The Bureau’s various accounting schemes were presumably so integral to their 
everyday operations that agents rebuked each another if one failed to abide by the system 
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or report their data correctly. In one case, an October 1867 report submitted to the 
Washington, DC, headquarters was returned for inaccuracies. A Bureau official noted the 
discrepancies between the monthly ledger and the accompanying written account: “a 
‘gain’ of ten (10) is reported by name as ‘received,’ while on the monthly report the gain 
is reported (5) five by births, and fifty one (51) ‘received,’ total (56) fifty-six, leaving 
(46) forty-six not accounted for. A loss of (5) five by death and (1) by discharge, total (6) 
six is reported by name, while on the monthly report a loss of five (5) only is reported.” 
The official ordered a revised version and demanded that “greater care will be exercised 
to forward correct reports” in the future.67 The stern exchange reinforced the agency’s 
systematic approach to its interactions with former slaves at Freedmen’s Village. As 
agents guided freedmen toward fulfilling freedom’s prerequisites, they remained 
primarily concerned with tracking their own progress by counting, cataloguing, and 
classifying black people. 
 The Freedmen’s Village records thus shed light on a command and management 
style that overwhelmingly treated freedmen as objects, rather than fully human beings. 
The breadth and depth of their experiences as emancipated slaves were set aside in favor 
of documenting only the most basic information about their existence. Moreover, the 
scant details recorded in the Bureau’s records were those that related only to the agency’s 
own agenda. Numerous records, strikingly reminiscent of antebellum slave sale and 
auction notices, described black people only in terms of their names, ages, and perceived 
condition. They were ultimately grouped together based on their level of compliance with 
the Bureau’s expectations. As masters had once accounted for slaves as financial assets 
on their southern plantations, the Bureau classified former slaves in terms of their 
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perceived post-war value to American society. The overwhelming majority of them were 
identified as mere wards of the state in Freedmen’s Village.68  
Confinement 
 
	 Under the Bureau’s leadership, Freedmen’s Village was further developed as a 
site with clear boundaries—both geographical and ideological. Just as Howard’s 
vocabulary of freedom provided a schema by which Bureau agents classified former 
slaves, it also provided a justification for them to determine who did or did not belong in 
the community. Upper-level officials were eager to “reduce the number of freedmen… 
who depended on the Bureau for assistance.”69 Thus, much of their recorded 
communication and conduct was focused on deciding who would be permitted to remain 
within the village, with the government’s support, as well as who would be discharged. 
Freedmen’s Village served as a border crossing between slavery and freedom, where 
those deemed unfit for admittance to society were detained by the state. 
 From the village’s inception, it was generally understood that former slaves “were 
not to remain as permanent residents, but were to yield their places to others” as soon as 
their circumstances allowed.70 Under the Bureau’s command, this policy was strictly 
enforced. Agents were eager to usher former slaves into and out of the village as quickly 
and efficiently as possible, fearing that too many former slaves were “dependent upon the 
Government for support, and [were] liable to remain for some time to come.”71 Those 
who demonstrated a capacity for free life, particularly by procuring some form of 
compensated labor, were routinely expelled from the village. One report, for instance, 
found that 67 emancipated slaves were working as employees within the community, 
“whose pay amount[ed] to $393 monthly.” The report further recommended that “at least 
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25 of these employees be discharged” in order to save “at least $250 per month… in 
wages, besides the rations for the families of the employees.”72 In another request, a 
Bureau official directed local agents to “discharge men engaged in whitewashing and at 
least three other laborers engaged in cleaning streets.”73 These records underscore how 
the vocabulary of freedom—especially, the conflation of freedom with free labor 
principles—was used to police belonging in Freedmen’s Village. Former slaves who had 
proven their ability to work and earn their own wages were mustered out of the village, 
and were thus denied further government support.  
 In other instances, former slaves who were simply “able bodied” were also 
considered to be prime candidates for removal. One letter directed Village agents to “give 
due warning to any able bodied persons… that the Bureau will send them where they can 
get work, [but] they must leave… within two weeks.”74 The warning reinforced the 
message that most former slaves, if able to demonstrate any capacity for self-sufficiency, 
would not be permitted to remain in the village “at the expense of the government” for 
any extended period of time.75 Along with labor, relief was also utilized as a key criterion 
in policing the borderland between slavery and freedom. When pressured to reduce 
expenses, agents often forcibly discharged residents who no longer needed physical or 
medical relief, assuming that they would be able to find gainful employment outside of 
the village.76  
 Thus, Bureau agents exercised supreme control over freedmen’s movements, as 
they determined who would be allowed to enter or leave the village. The only black 
people permitted to reside in Freedmen’s Village for any extended period of time were 
those unable to satisfy any of the Bureau’s prerequisites.77 The community was 
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overwhelmingly populated by freedmen who were unable to find sustained work, to 
acquire safe shelter, to subsist without government rations, or “to support themselves 
[due to] some physical or mental infirmity.”78 These former slaves, referred to most often 
as “dependents,” were identified as ill prepared for free life and not yet ready to join their 
fellow Americans in freedom. Therefore, they were contained within the confines of 
Freedmen’s Village until they could demonstrate their capacity to comply with the 
Bureau’s expectations. Simply, as agents of the state, the Bureau maintained Freedmen’s 
Village as a checkpoint in former slaves’ transition from bondage to freedom.  
 Once detained, residents struggled to improve their condition, as the Bureau 
strictly regulated the dispersal of government aid within the village. Some records 
mentioned residents’ direct appeals to local agents and officials, like one in which a 
freedwoman “made complaint regarding her stove and wages to Dr. Howard,” the village 
surgeon. In that same letter, an agent relayed a report made by a freedman named Samuel 
Hall, who “complains of insufficiency of clothing and refusal… to issue him what is 
necessary.”79 In response to these complaints, agents made it clear that state support 
would be allocated at their discretion. The expense incurred by issuing rations was a 
particularly controversial topic, and the Bureau sought to reduce their distribution as 
often as possible. One agent noted that food was being issued to “a large number of 
dependents… for five days at a time.” He perceived, however, that freedmen were 
engaging in “wasteful cooking… and perhaps other improper uses,” such that “the rations 
are exhausted before the time for a new issue.”80 The agent thus concluded that 
complaints of hunger and dissatisfaction might be unfounded, and that government 
rations were being mishandled. Other reports echoed similar concerns until rations 
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became strictly regulated, issued only “when actually necessary.”81 By 1867, Head 
Commissioner Howard insisted that “the necessity for gratuitous issues” of rations—like 
clothing, shoes and hats for winter—“ha[d] in a great measure ceased to exist.”82 Thus, 
he demanded that “provision[s]… only be made for cases of absolute destitution” in 
Freedmen’s Village.83 These policies clarified that the government’s support for black 
people had its limits; aid was provided, but always with “due regard for the interests of 
the government.”84  
 Freedmen who attempted to procure work within the village, in hopes of earning 
their own livelihood and satisfying the agents’ demands, also confronted unforgiving 
obstacles. In keeping with the Bureau’s overarching agenda, agents encouraged former 
slaves to value labor and compelled all able residents to work. However, the Bureau 
severely limited their wages—or withhold them altogether. Agents frequently argued that 
discharged employees should be replaced by dependents “who can perform light duties 
without pay.”85 They argued that freedmen should trade their labor in exchange for 
“receiving rations and clothing” from the government, and that they would “be much 
better off” if they were made to learn the value of work, even if they were not properly 
compensated.86 They also reasoned that the meager wages allotted to them would still be 
inadequate for those hoping to fully support themselves. A freedwoman named Ann 
Gresham, for example, reportedly “complain[ed] that she [did] not receive wages as 
promised.” A Bureau agent noted that she had been “classed as a dependent for three 
years,” and therefore concluded, “she is not capable of earning enough to provide for 
herself and consequently I cannot recommend that wages be paid her.”87 In other words, 
in cases where black people might remain even partially reliant on state resources, 
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compensation was considered a pointless government expense. The Bureau instead 
utilized their labor to keep up the village’s everyday operations.88  
 Together, these policies trapped dependent freedmen within a supposed “model 
community” of post-war freedom, where their relationship to the state bore a striking 
resemblance to their relationships with their former masters. As they had been during the 
days of slavery, black people were bound to a fixed location and made to work in 
exchange for only the most basic provisions. The Bureau refused to transport them out of 
the village unless they could prove that “employment has been provided for them” 
elsewhere, such that “the Government [would] be relieved from further expense on their 
account.”89 The Bureau’s practices ensured that the most vulnerable former slaves, once 
halted at the border, would remain confined to Freedmen’s Village, where they struggled 
to subsist on heavily regulated rations and were unable to earn a fair wage for their work. 
Because these freedmen remained dependent upon the Bureau, they could not 
demonstrate their compliance with the agency’s strict prerequisites and were thus 
detained indefinitely, unable to procure the agency’s stamp of approval in their passage 
from bondage to freedom.  
Control 
 
	 While confined at Freedmen’s Village, former slaves were subject to the 
omnipresent, watchful eye of the government. The Bureau’s village staff was comprised 
of a superintendent, surgeon, hospital steward, quartermasters, commissary, matron, 
watchmen, and multiple guards. The community’s rules and regulations affirmed that 
these supervisors worked together to maintain nearly constant surveillance of the 
residents.90 Their intimate knowledge of freedmen’s activities and movements helped 
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them implement new rules and policies. Under the guise of promoting former slaves’ 
welfare and encouraging them toward fulfillment of ideal expectations, Bureau agents 
wielded strict control over the black people assigned to their care.  
 The Freedmen’s Village records are replete with documents that illustrate agents’ 
attempts to restrict or alter residents’ various behaviors. For instance, acting upon 
“information from Virginia and South Carolina,” the Bureau directed local agents to 
remain vigilant about “intemperance among the freedmen.”91 Officials further asked 
subordinate staff to “take immediate measures to organize associations of colored people,” 
in the hopes of saving those “of dark skin from drunkenness.”92 In another letter from the 
agency’s headquarters in Washington, DC, the issue of intemperance arose again, when 
headquarters noted that a neighbor had “called at this office today and stated that the 
freedmen at the village are accustomed to get liquor at two restaurants” nearby. Bureau 
officials instructed the local agents to “take measures to prevent the sale [of alcohol] to 
those residing at the village,” even if that meant deputizing the restaurant keeper to 
enforce the rule.93 Other “habits of immorality” caught the attention of Bureau agents, 
like “a disregard of lawful marriage.”94 One official had observed residents “living 
together as husband and wife before having the necessary rite performed.”95 He insisted 
that such couples should be made to marry immediately, and further advised that “more 
stringent measures [be] taken to entirely break up the practice.”96 Referring to their 
choices as an “evil,” aligned with a “lame course of life,” the official recommended two 
punishments: confinement in the guard house, where the offending freedmen could be 
watched even more closely, or dismissal from the village.97 These examples illustrate the 
extent to which the Bureau felt empowered to control residents’ behaviors. They argued 
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that their supervision would ensure that the “industrious” black people, as well as the 
“superannuated, crippled, and imbeciled,” would “be orderly and happy.”98 
 The Bureau also went to great lengths to control freedmen’s movements. As 
previously argued, agents relied on Howard’s vocabulary of freedom to determine which 
former slaves should reside in the village. However, “many [discharged residents] grew 
attached to their surroundings and preferred to stay,” especially if they had developed ties 
with their fellow freedmen.99 Those freedmen needed to obtain a special exemption to 
stay in their homes and, therefore, had to rely upon a local agent to acquire permission 
from Bureau officials. One letter, for example, was written on behalf of Thomas Owens 
and Humphrey Coleman, two black men who wished to stay in the village after being 
discharged based on their capacity to secure employment.100 In another example, two 
black women who had been separated from their children during the Civil War were 
forced to “respectfully submit” a request for the Bureau to allow their sons to leave the 
village and be “restored to them.”101 When these requests were denied, the Bureau 
engaged in forcible removal. Agents reportedly evicted residents, compelling them “to 
remain outdoors until morning,” or destroyed tenements altogether to prevent former 
slaves from occupying them.102 These records illustrate the various ways in which the 
Bureau retained final control over former slaves’ movements in the era of emancipation. 
Without the permission and support of local agents, black people were often left without 
the means to travel freely or live in places of their own choosing.  
 When problems arose, or when the Bureau’s efforts to control the residents failed, 
the agency imposed increased surveillance. In a supposed effort to guarantee former 
slaves’ right to justice, for instance, local agents requested more guards and military 
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personnel. Such requests were made when freedmen’s crops were repeatedly stolen from 
their rented lands. Noting that two sergeants, four corporals, and twenty-nine privates 
were already on guard in the village, a Bureau official requested that an additional 
sergeant, two corporals, and twenty-five privates be “ordered to report for duty.”103 
Rather than investigating alleged crimes committed against the freedmen, as the Bureau 
reportedly did for white men lodging complaints against former slaves, agents instead 
demanded more control.  The official’s proposed solution implied former slaves’ 
problems would be most appropriately addressed by increased government supervision. 
 When increased manpower was not available, the Bureau implemented procedural 
changes that would ensure “as constant an oversight” as possible.”104 For example, the 
dispersal of supplies at the village’s Abbott Hospital inspired some concerns among the 
Bureau’s staff, including a surgeon who noted that he had no way of knowing “where any 
of this food goes,” nor “no means of watching or preventing articles from being carried 
off.”105 Soon after, he suggested a change in the arrangement of the hospital itself. He 
requested permission to remove partitions and number the beds, arguing that increased 
visibility throughout the hospital ward would make it “impossible for one of the inmates 
to take away blankets without its being generally known.”106 Even in the hospital, among 
the most vulnerable residents of Freedmen’s Village, the distribution of rations and relief 
were heavily policed. Similarly, in response to concerns that food rations were being 
misused, an official recommended that the existing “system of issuing raw rations to 
separate families [be] abandoned as early as practicable,” in favor of assembling 
freedmen for communal, “cooked meals at regular hours” in large kitchens and dining 
rooms.107 In other words, he proposed eliminating their ability to manage food for 
 
 134 
themselves and demanded that former slaves consume their meals in open view of 
Bureau agents. With these policies, the Freedmen’s Village records confirm that the 
Bureau turned to surveillance as a primary method of problem solving and controlling 
former slaves’ access to invaluable resources. The Bureau’s policies implied that agents 
did not trust freedmen to conduct themselves with integrity unless forced to do so. 
 Thus, the Bureau’s control over the residents of Freedmen’s Village was fortified 
in multiple ways. Through an expansive network of officials, the agency gathered 
information about former slaves and worked to curtail behaviors they deemed improper 
or immoral. The Bureau also exercised immense power over freedmen’s movements, as 
they required them to gain the permission and cooperation of local agents in order to 
establish stable homes or travel beyond the boundaries of the village. In an effort to 
further bolster their control, the Bureau implemented new policies and procedures, 
ensuring that agents could effectively surveil residents’ activities. The Freedmen’s 
Village records therefore confirm Joseph Reidy’s assertion that, “in the eyes of military 
authorities, social order demanded strict oversight.”108 Despite trumpeting a message of 
self-sufficiency and independence, the Bureau relied upon restrictive, controlling policies, 
in an extension of systematic surveillance practices that supported slavery. Simone 
Browne has argued that multiple elements of the slavery—from the design of the slave 
ship to antebellum “lantern laws” and the eighteenth century Book of Negroes—
converged to establish the “violent regulation of blackness” and black people.109 The 
Bureau’s command of Freedmen’s Village confirmed that, in the wake of emancipation, 
such persistent control and surveillance would continue—this time, under the guise of 
promoting freedom.110  
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A New Master 
 
 The present study has analyzed the Freedmen’s Village records in order to 
understand how the Freedmen’s Bureau agents implemented Head Commissioner 
Howard’s rhetoric at a local level. In pursuit of Howard’s agenda, agents enforced the 
legacy of freedom as an earned right. Their records demonstrate an unwavering 
commitment to upholding prerequisite standards of land, labor, education, relief, and 
justice. In countless interactions with former slaves, they sustained the argument that 
their freedom would remain out of reach until all five attainments were achieved. This 
message was relatively progressive in its apparent offer of rights and privileges to black 
people, yet it also undermined the legal freedom bestowed upon former slaves by the 
Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The 
Bureau’s management of Freedmen’s Village suggested that social and economic 
attainments were non-negotiable preconditions of the American social contract.   
 The Bureau’s enforcement of these preconditions were fraught with 
contradictions that highlighted the implications of freedom’s paradox. Black people’s 
natural right to freedom was immediately subject to intense scrutiny, as agents assessed 
the extent to which they could prove their worthiness. Earning agents’ approval, however, 
was nearly impossible. For example, the prerequisite of labor had been used to control the 
Freedmen’s Village population; those capable of supporting themselves were forced to 
leave. The ones who remained were put to work, often without pay or fair compensation, 
in order to demonstrate their commitment to society’s free labor principles. Such 
demands were ironic and, arguably, illogical; slaves had labored for years as the 
backbone of the southern economy. It was their perceived capacity for physical labor that 
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had provided whites with a rationale for enslaving black people in the first place. Yet, 
Bureau agents viewed former slaves through the stereotypical lenses of slavery; they 
presumed that freedmen were could not be trusted to work unless forced to by whites. 
Arguing that the freedmen had not yet demonstrated the capacity to earn their own wages, 
the agents detained them, compelled them to work, and withheld their pay. Former slaves’ 
“dependence” was cited as proof that they were not yet fit for freedom, as well as a 
reason for denying them additional government support. 
 The Bureau’s earned-rights agenda, therefore, trapped the village’s residents in a 
state of conditional freedom that troublingly resembled slavery. In Head Commissioner 
Howard’s own autobiography, he later reflected on these policies and noted the “many 
attacks” and criticisms he received: “the logical result of these views was that… the 
negro had merely changed masters from the Southern slave owners to the United 
States.”111 However, he defended his agenda, saying that others “approved all [his] 
compulsory language” and he had learned that he could not “suit everybody.”112 Thus, 
the Bureau proceeded with the stereotypical assumption that former slaves would not 
contribute productively to American society unless required to do so, and agents forced 
many of them into unpaid labor in exchange for only the most basic necessities that 
would ensure their survival, but never their self-sufficiency.  
 Beyond the specifics of the Bureau’s labor policies, the agency’s rhetoric 
compelled other practices that reified slavery’s legacy. Its relentless pursuit of freedom’s 
attainments compelled agents to classify former slaves into groups based on their 
perceived condition, leaving behind a trail of tables and ledgers that accounted for black 
people as wards, rather than human beings. Once they had organized them into their 
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respective classes, the Bureau assumed authority over former slaves’ movements. They 
determined which freedmen could cross the border from slavery into freedom, passing 
through Freedmen’s Village on the road toward inclusion in American society. At the 
same time, agents detained those deemed unfit for freedom, confining them to the village 
to work in exchange for limited government support. For these dependent freedmen, life 
on the former Lee estate was characterized by strict control and pervasive surveillance. 
Their behaviors, activities, and movements were closely watched, while Bureau agents 
ironically espoused Howard’s rhetoric of independence, self-sufficiency, and freedom. 
 Together, these policies transformed Freedmen’s Village into a site of 
examination, as well as a breeding ground for post-war practices that mimicked some of 
the most glaring and egregious practices of enslavement. Former slaves, held to strict and 
unforgiving standards of earned rights, were corralled and put to work within Freedmen’s 
Village, where the Bureau systematically classified, confined, and controlled them. Put 
another way, the agency assumed the role of freedmen’s former masters. When put into 
practice, Howard’s agenda reminded thousands of former slaves that they had not been 
fully liberated by the emancipation, or their new legal status. Their fate—and their 
freedom—remained in the hands of others. 
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THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM: THE ABANDONMENT OF FREEDMEN IN THE 
1866 CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE 
 
 Preceding chapters have examined the Freedmen’s Bureau’s founding rhetoric 
and the ways in which local agents implemented Head Commissioner Howard’s vision at 
the local level. In some ways, Howard had taken great liberties with his interpretation of 
the agency’s role and purpose. The legislation that established the Bureau did not 
necessarily provide “a clear mandate” for its “proper authority.”1 As such, the Bureau’s 
work began to attract an immense measure of scrutiny and criticism. According to 
Randall Miller, Americans allowed little time to pass before “the extent of [the Bureau’s] 
responsibilities in the face of ever-changing social, economic, and political conditions 
and interests” were called into question.2 Government officials were among the agency’s 
harshest critics, as they considered the Bureau to be a primary mechanism through which 
the federal government’s power and influence was being exercised in the post-war era. In 
Congress, especially, senators and representatives argued about the Bureau’s agenda and 
policies. 
 Congressional debate about the Bureau and its activities peaked when Senator 
Lyman Trumball (R-IL) introduced S. No. 60 on January 5, 1866. The bill was designed 
to extend the agency’s tenure beyond its original one-year limit and, additionally, 
specified various measures “to enlarge the powers of the Freedmen’s Bureau.”3 
Republican control of Congress all but guaranteed the bill’s passage.4 Still, when brought 
to the floor for debate, the bill prompted sustained, passionate arguments that spanned 
weeks in both houses. Senator Thomas Hendricks (D-IN) declared the proposal to be 
“one of the most important bills before the body,”5 and Representative Ignatius Donnelly 
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(R-MN) insisted that the Bureau provided the most promising opportunity for the 
government to “intervene in behalf of justice and liberty.”6 He asked his peers, “through 
what machinery can it better intervene than through this bureau?”7 As senators and 
representatives alike proposed numerous amendments to the bill, they debated the most 
controversial dimensions of the Bureau’s activities. Their arguments ultimately addressed 
the question of whether or not the American government was obligated to extend “a 
shield and a protection over the head of the lowliest and poorest citizen” in America—the 
former slave.8 
 The Bureau’s discourse had cast freedmen as wards of the state, but such framing 
was put to the test in the 1866 congressional debates. In this chapter, I consider 
government officials’ response to the agency’s work in order to better understand how 
the Bureau’s rhetoric prompted broader consideration of the relationship between the 
government and former slaves. Supported by an analysis of both senators’ and 
representatives’ arguments, I contend that they activated freedom’s paradox to diminish 
the government’s responsibility to freedmen, demonstrating the limits of legal inclusion 
and affirming the ways in which freedom rhetoric could be leveraged to discount, rather 
than ensure, the state’s concern for black people. In service of this thesis, this chapter 
progresses in three parts. First, I explain the rhetorical landscape in which the 
congressional debates took place. I highlight, in particular, issues of states’ rights, post-
war resentment, and constitutionality that shaped perceptions of the Bureau. Second, I 
analyze the congressional debate regarding the bill. I show how advocates and opponents 
strategically leveraged both natural and earned rights arguments as they defined the crisis, 
negotiated time, and delineated racial differences to devalue and abandon black people in 
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considerations of state support and protection. Finally, I discuss the lasting implications 
of the congressmen’s arguments, as they reinforced the state’s power to police belonging, 
the injustices of freedom rhetoric, the dehumanization of black people, and the merits of 
racial separation. 
S. No. 60: A “Lightning Rod of Controversy” 
 
 To understand the nuances of the congressional debate, we must attend to the 
major contours of the era’s rhetorical landscape. The Bureau has been aptly described as 
a “lightning rod of controversy” due to the ways in which its activities engaged multiple 
and controversial questions that shaped the post-war moment.9 In other words, 
Congressmen’s views of the agency were necessarily shaped by their politics and their 
approaches to government. In this section, I outline the key issues that influenced 
senators’ and representatives’ initial views of the Bureau’s work: states’ rights, Northern 
and Southern resentment, and constitutional theory.  
 First, the Bureau’s reach across the former Confederate South was hotly contested. 
At the local level, its operations included assistant commissioners, agents, and clerks who 
oversaw land management, labor contracts, educational assistance, medical relief, and 
civil proceedings for freedmen. Southerners often perceived of these activities as an 
unjust “intru[sion] into local affairs,” but other states were similarly irritated by the 
thought of the agency within their borders.10 S. No. 60 proposed that the Bureau’s 
operations should continue “until otherwise provided by law” and extend throughout “all 
parts of the United States” to account for the post-bellum movement and migration of 
former slaves.11 This particular provision forced difficult conversations about the tenuous 
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relationship between the federal government and the states—many of which had not yet 
been formally readmitted to the union.  
 Proponents of the bill insisted that the agency provided invaluable protection and 
support to freedmen who had traveled beyond the boundaries of the former Confederate 
states. Senator Trumbull, for instance, professed that “large numbers of slaves [had] fled 
to the northern States bordering on slaveholding territory.”12 The freedmen had “come 
there without any means at all,” with only the Bureau “to look after them.”13 Senator 
John Creswell (R-MD) also spoke of the added dangers freedmen faced in his own state 
of Maryland, where “combinations of returned rebel soldiers [had] been formed for the 
express purpose of persecuting, beating most cruelly, and in some cases actually 
murdering the returned colored soldiers of the Republic.”14 Creswell supported the 
Bureau’s interventions, citing the failure of civil law to protect freedmen and their new 
freedoms. 
 Opponents, on the other hand, argued that the Bureau’s extended reach 
endangered states’ rights. Led by Senator Thomas Cowan (R-PA), they attempted to pass 
an amendment that would limit the agency’s operations to only those states that were 
“lately in rebellion.”15 Cowan insisted that his own state government would “be able to 
take care of [freedmen] and provide as well for them as any bureau which can be created 
[t]here.”16 Senator James Guthrie (D-KY) agreed, stating plainly, “Kentucky does not 
want and does not ask [for] this relief.”17 He argued that the Bureau’s presence was not 
merely unwelcome, but dangerous, insofar as it imposed “two systems of laws in one 
community” and laid the groundwork for “despotism for all time to come.”18 
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 These debates furthered the Bureau’s reputation as a “most ambitious experiment” 
of federal intervention into states’ governance.19 Even among its most supportive 
politicians, there was no denying that the local agents could potentially wield immense 
power throughout the United States. Under the watchful eye of President Andrew 
Johnson, described by historians as “a constitutional literalist ever distrustful of 
encroaching federal power,” the Bureau’s physical reach was constrained by political 
fears of government tyranny.20  
 Second, Southerners viewed the Bureau as a bitter symbol of the North’s triumph 
in the Civil War—a supposed ideological victory, as much as a military one. From its 
founding, the Bureau was branded as a symbol of Northern power and policy. It was 
housed by the War Department, staffed by Union military officials, and supported by 
Republican politicians. As such, many Southerners viewed the agency’s efforts as 
sustained aggression against not only former Confederate lands and governments, but 
also against Southern culture. So, when S. No. 60 entrusted the Bureau to intervene in 
“all cases affecting negroes, mulattoes, freedmen, refugees, or any other persons who are 
discriminated against” or “depriv[ed] of any civil right secured to white persons,” 
congressional debate revolved around the agency’s power to upset old systems of law and 
custom.21 
 Some congressmen viewed the Bureau’s powers as essential to the protection of 
freedmen’s rights. In their view, it was necessary for the agency to sometimes overturn 
local laws, especially in former slave states that had “legislate[d] in [their] interests, and 
out of deference to slavery.”22  Senator Trumbull insisted, “When slavery goes, all this 
system of legislation, devised in the interest of slavery and for the purpose of degrading 
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the colored race… goes with it.”23 He framed S. No. 60 as a supplement to the Thirteenth 
Amendment and a necessary demonstration of the government’s post-bellum 
commitment to “legislate in the interest of freedom.”24 The “constitutional amendment 
amounts to nothing,” Trumbull claimed, without the Bureau’s congressional authority to 
“destroy all these discriminations in civil rights against the black man.”25 Anticipating 
controversy, proponents additionally argued that the agency’s intervention on the local 
level was particularly imperative in the wake of the South’s rebellion. Senator Henry 
Wilson (R-MA) cautioned Congress against “intrust[ing] power to men who, in the past, 
were false and recreant to the cause of liberty and to the cause of their country.”26 Thus, 
by framing the South as disloyal to the nation and its laws, supporters of the bill 
advocated for the Bureau as an invaluable overseer of former slaves’ freedom in local 
affairs.  
 In response, the bill’s opponents took issue with the agency’s “comprehensive” 
powers, which they perceived to be a direct attack on the South. Senator Garrett Davis 
(D-KY) stated plainly, “the sole object of this provision is to suppress wholly the 
jurisdiction and the action of the courts… that may come into contact with the operations 
of this bureau.”27  In particular, they argued that S. No. 60, if passed, would unjustly 
disrupt local enforcement of state laws—many of which mandated stricter sentencing for 
black criminals than white criminals. For instance, Senator Davis cited his own state’s 
policies regarding rape, saying, “rape committed by a white man is punishable by 
confinement in the penitentiary; when perpetrated by a negro upon a white woman, it is 
punishable by death, and it will be so punishable in that State until the last trump 
blows.”28 Laws regulating marriage were also used frequently as examples. Senator 
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Hendricks argued that mass confusion and judicial turmoil would result if marriage, as a 
civil contract, was upheld as a civil right for former slaves. He posited, “Suppose a State 
shall deny the right of amalgamation, the right of a negro man to intermarry with a white 
woman, then that negro may be taken under the military protection of the Government.”29 
In such circumstances, he asked, “What is then to be done when [the freedman] is thus 
protected?”30 Both Davis’s and Hendricks’s comments reflected a resentment shared by 
many of the bill’s opponents; they feared that the Bureau’s activities would disrupt not 
only the South’s judicial independence and, with it, the laws and customs that had long 
governed social relationships between white and black people.   
 The controversy surrounding Bureau agents’ authority revealed the palpable 
tensions between Republicans and Democrats—and between North and South—that 
animated congressional debate. The agency’s local interventions were perceived as the 
will of “the frenzied people of the North… letting slip the dogs of war and crying havoc” 
in a sustained effort to seize and maintain control over the Southern way of life.31 As 
historians have confirmed, the mere presence of Bureau agents “upset the old ways 
wherein white southerners had ruled blacks as they saw fit.”32 Thus, the debate 
surrounding S. No. 60 illustrated the divisive resentment and anger that inevitably 
complicated notions of black freedom. The Bureau’s relationship to the War Department 
in a time of supposed post-war peace further fueled perceptions that it would operate as 
an uncontrollable “police power,” bent on commandeering state and local courts with a 
radical Republican agenda.33 
Third, the Bureau relied upon congressional support in a period of controversial 
lawmaking that thrust constitutional theory to the fore. The Bureau’s future was 
 
 152 
dependent upon additional legislation; without congressional approval and appropriations, 
the agency could not continue to fund its efforts.34 The legislative landscape, however, 
had grown increasingly contentious. After the war drew to an official close, the federal 
government moved quickly to bring the united nation back under a shared set of laws. 
The Bureau’s first year had been marked by two major legislative landmarks: the 
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery, and an emerging discussion 
of an additional amendment to guarantee former slaves’ rights. The latter was sparked by 
Senator Trumbull, who was simultaneously spearheading efforts to extend the Bureau’s 
tenure in the Senate. Trumbull, like many others, feared that the Thirteenth Amendment 
might not be strong enough to ensure the installation and protection of freedmen. So, on 
January 5, 1866, he introduced legislation intended to define citizenship and its 
accompanying rights and privileges.35 The controversial bill naturalized all persons born 
in the United States and bestowed upon former slaves the “full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens.”36 This surge in legislative activity marked the start of the so-called 
Reconstruction era, but it also complicated debates surrounding the continued work of 
emancipation. Each discussion of the Bureau’s future was inextricably tied to complex 
questions of legal rights, citizenship privileges, and constitutional powers.   
For proponents of S. No. 60, the Bureau’s constitutionality was unquestionable 
because it was carrying out the work of the Thirteenth Amendment, ensuring the 
government’s continued support of former slaves’ inclusion. Senator Trumbull asked the 
Senate, “What was the object of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery? Did 
we not mean that hereafter slavery should not exist?”37 Trumbull invited his fellow 
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congressmen to embrace the Bureau as the custodian of that charge, and the official 
agency through which total abolition would be realized. He said, “If we believe a 
Freedmen’s Bureau necessary, if we believe an act punishing any man who deprives a 
colored person of any civil rights on account of his color necessary… we have the 
constitutional right to adopt it.”38 With these comments, Trumbull expressed an 
understanding of the Constitution as an adaptive, living document—a view that was 
shared by other congressmen, as well. Senator William P. Fessenden (R-ME) specifically 
cited the aftermath of the Civil War as an important factor in the debate. He asked, “Will 
gentlemen undertake to tell me that… the necessary results of that war, if it brings about 
a state of things not found in our written Constitution, are to be avoided, shunned, not 
noticed in any possible way?”39 In the House of Representatives, Donnelly similarly 
argued that the war marked a “new birth” of the nation and the Constitution itself. He 
said, “The Constitution will hereafter be read by the light of the rebellion; by the light of 
the emancipation; by the light of that tremendous uprising of the intellect of the world… 
it will leave its traces upon our government and laws so long as the nation continues to 
exist.”40 These congressmen framed the Bureau as the government’s reasonable response 
to the nation’s changing circumstances. Both the war and the subsequent Thirteenth 
Amendment necessitated the Bureau’s formation, and S. No. 60 was the mechanism 
through which the amended Constitution would rightfully be enforced.  
At the same time, other congressmen relentlessly challenged the constitutionality 
of the Bureau’s work. A frequent point of contention was the government’s power to 
purchase and appropriate lands for freedmen, whether for homes or schools. Senator 
Reverdy Johnson (D-MD) conceded, “the United States are under an obligation to 
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provide for [freedmen]… to the entire extent of their constitutional power.”41 However, 
he insisted that the Constitution “has no power to buy lands except… for purposes 
connected with the administration of the Government,” including military and banking.42 
Similarly, Senator Waitman T. Willey (R-WV) expressed “very great regret” about his 
opposition to the bill on the basis of constitutionality. He agreed that the government 
must “make all necessary provision for the protection and the elevation” of freedmen.43 
Yet, he proclaimed a “higher duty” to “abide by the Constitution” and concluded that 
Congress had neither the constitutional right nor power to grant the provisions found in S. 
No. 60.44  
 Expressed doubts about the Bureau’s constitutionality must be considered within 
the broader landscape of the era’s congressional activity, in which the power and thrust of 
law was under immense scrutiny. While some congressmen sought refuge in lawmaking 
as a means of reshaping the post-war nation, others feared how the law might change the 
everyday rules, practices, and expectations of American life. As they debated S. No. 60’s 
merits, congressmen consistently expressed fears of what the legislation might mean for 
the future—with respect to black people as well as white.45 The Bureau and its agenda 
were caught in the crosshairs of this tension, as its opponents argued for a return “to a 
state of absolute peace… within the limits of the Constitution.”46 
 Altogether, the congressmen framed their arguments with overarching concerns of 
about states’ rights, Northern and Southern resentment, and constitutional theory. The 
complex terrain of social, political, and economic discourse highlighted controversial 
dimensions of the Bureau’s agenda, but it also helped obscure many of the particulars of 
the agency’s everyday work with black people. In espousing these initial views, 
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Congressmen began to strategically reorient the debate about the Bureau’s future, 
deflecting critical attention away from freedmen and, instead, toward the freedom and 
fortunes of white Americans.  
The Debate: Arguments of Crisis, Time, and Racial Difference 
 
 The debates surrounding S. No. 60 were crucial in determining the Bureau’s fate 
and, by extension, former slaves’ futures. Without congressional and executive 
approval—and the financial resources that would come along with it—the agency would 
be forced to disband and cease its operations to aid freedmen. We can better understand 
how they negotiated social, economic, and political relationships between freedom, black 
people, and the state by closely analyzing the rhetoric of congressmen in both the Senate 
and the House. 
I propose that S. No. 60’s uncertain fate was, ultimately, a question of whether or 
not the state was ready and willing to validate former slaves’ recent entrance into society, 
and the social contract, with the state’s full support and attention. Some congressmen 
fought passionately in favor of the Bureau, arguing that freedmen needed to be supported 
in order to ensure free society’s eventual embrace of black people. Others, on the other 
hand, insisted that former slaves should be left to their own devices and suggested that 
the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment had fulfilled the 
government’s pledge of freedom. Congress seemed to be divided on the issue. However, 
closer attention to their rhetoric demonstrates the subtle ways in which advocates and 
opponents activated both natural rights and earned rights claims to advance arguments 
that cast freedmen aside in favor of attending to other post-war concerns.  
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As such, I proceed with a rhetorical analysis of congressional arguments in 
defense of and opposition to S. No. 60. I resist the tendency to read one set of arguments 
as a direct response to the other. Instead, I consider the debate as a whole, as the 
seemingly disparate positions worked together to rhetorically constitute a relationship 
between freedom, freedmen, and the state.47 I argue that the congressmen strategically 
invoked notions of both natural and earned rights as they defined crisis, negotiated time, 
and delineated racial differences to deprioritize black people’s participation in social, 
economic, and political life. Thus, they utilized freedom’s paradox to abandon the 
government’s responsibility to former slaves and their freedom. They demonstrated the 
limits of legal inclusion and affirmed the ways in which freedom rhetoric could be used 
to discount, rather than ensure, the state’s concern for black people.  
Defining crisis 
 
 At the culmination of the Civil War, roughly four million former slaves were 
emancipated without access to safe shelter, sustenance, or income. Many of them were 
malnourished, illiterate, and still residing in the former Confederate South, where their 
former masters were returning home to reassert claims on their property—in the forms of 
both land and the living. During the Bureau’s first year, agents made active efforts to 
tackle these threats and procure land, labor contracts, education, relief, and judicial 
representation for freedmen. However, with S. No. 60 under consideration in Washington, 
the future of government aid remained uncertain. As the conversation unfolded, Congress 
debated whether freedmen deserved help in the first place.   
Their arguments underscore how discourse determines if and how a situation is 
perceived, understood, and judged as a significant or legitimate exigence.48 The ways in 
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which rhetors strategically identify and define various situations as crises can determine 
how audiences respond—or fail to respond—to them. In this case, government officials’ 
interpretation of the post-war landscape played an integral role in their approach to the 
Bureau, as well as the question of continued support for former slaves. To varying 
degrees, both supporters and opponents erased freedmen from their categorization of the 
crises at hand as they toggled back and forth between natural rights and earned rights 
approaches to freedom.  
As a rule, congressmen deployed language that framed emancipation and freedom 
as an indisputable fact. For example, as Senator William Stewart (R-NV) spoke in 
support of the Bureau, he referred to former slaves’ freedom as a “verdict” that had been 
properly “carried out” and “decided by a higher tribunal than Congress—the highest 
tribunal to which man can resort—arms.”49 Similarly, Senator Wilson lauded the 
Bureau’s work as a “positive good” while also describing the former slave as already a 
“free man, as free as [the old master]… as a man having equal rights with him.”50 
Meanwhile, those who opposed the Bureau adopted similar language. They, too, declared 
freedom to be finished work. Senator Cowan announced, “We have made the negro free. 
Was not that a great thing?”51 Senator Guthrie echoed his sentiments, insisting that 
Kentucky’s freedmen were “now free” and had been granted “the same rights of person 
and property as white persons.”52 The opposition was decidedly in agreement that the war 
had been fought, “the constitutional amendment ha[d] been adopted, [and] the slaves 
ha[d] been made free.”53 Together, supporters and opponents alike defined freedom as, 
simply, the absence of legal enslavement. By framing their arguments in ways that 
declared former slaves’ freedom as fact, they subtly invoked the natural rights approach 
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to freedom. Freedmen’s new civil status was merely a formality—a recognition of the 
rights they had always inherently possessed. Thus, congressional arguments shifted 
toward other issues deemed more important.    
With the crisis of emancipation and black freedom at least partly behind them, 
congressmen were more concerned with the fear and shame of abandoning a national 
responsibility. Though those who advocated for the bill’s passage subtly appealed to an 
earned rights approach to freedom when they implored their colleagues to grasp the 
“destitute and helpless condition” of freedmen. They framed their support in terms of the 
government’s duty to fulfill a promise, pledged in a time of open conflict.54 The 
Emancipation Proclamation had all but ensured the Union’s victory in the Civil War.55 
According to Senator Stewart, it had simultaneously wedded the war’s outcome to former 
slaves’ fate, such that “the nation’s honor was pledged, that we would maintain for the 
negro his freedom.”56 Stewart went on to explain that the pledge changed the agendas of 
both the war and the nation as a whole; the Union government, upon its victory, would 
necessarily be implicated in the execution of President Lincoln’s promise. Failure to see 
the pledge through would betray the terms of the “contest,” in which “the country [had] 
been made a free country and slavery [had] perished forever.”57 Simply put, many 
congressmen’s support of the Bureau was predicated not upon the moral or ethical 
imperative of securing freedom for black people. Instead, their arguments defended the 
Bureau’s work and advocated for “the civil rights necessary to the enjoyment [of] 
freedom” as a matter of course determined by the Union’s strategic promise, made in the 
heat of war.58 Senator Stewart said, simply, “I am in favor of this because we are pledged 
to do it.”59 With these words, he alluded to the Bureau’s earned rights agenda. He 
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confirmed that President Lincoln’s historic proclamation had ensured only a partial or 
conditional freedom, at best, and would need to be bolstered by further government 
support. Without it, black people might not be able to achieve the earned rights that 
emancipation had promised them, and the pledge would go unfulfilled.  
It is important to note, however, that advocates’ recognition of the earned rights 
approach did not necessarily sustain the argument that the state was eager to facilitate 
black people’s access to and compliance with freedom’s preconditions. The bill’s 
supporters perceived the passage of S. No. 60 as a crucial step forward in the national 
agenda, steered by the Union’s recent triumph over the South. While they recognized the 
vulnerable status of the freedmen, their arguments defended government support in terms 
of duty and obligation. Even Senator Trumbull described the Bureau’s agenda—and, by 
extension, congressional support of its work—as an uninvited burden. In his view, the 
agency’s goal was “to look after a large class of people who, as the results of the war, had 
been thrown upon the hands of the government.”60 Other congressmen clarified that the 
Bureau’s existence was, in fact, the fault of the South, who had “initiated [war]… and if 
the result is disastrous and continues to be oppressive, so far as necessary measures are 
concerned, they have themselves to thank for it.”61 Senator Fessenden challenged the 
bill’s opponents—and, in particular, those from the former Confederate states—saying, 
“Sir, you did this thing… you are responsible for it, not we; you have placed the necessity 
upon us; we have not placed it upon ourselves.”62 He further clarified, “Your measures 
and your sympathies brought it [the Bureau] upon the country… the dominant party in 
the Congress of the United States are simply trying to do the best they can with the result 
of your wickedness.”63 Thus, Senator Fessenden and others diminished the government’s 
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obligation to freedmen. They framed the sudden inclusion of black people within 
American society, as well as the Bureau’s efforts to facilitate their transition, as an 
unfortunate consequence of the South’s betrayal.  
These sentiments argued for state support of the Bureau’s work on the basis of 
duty, rather than justice, humanity, or black people’s inherent value as human beings. 
The emancipation and freedom of former slaves was cast as “a necessity arising out of 
the contest” between North and South, and the passage of S. No. 60 was imperative 
because the state was “bound to take care of [freedmen]”—not because they chose to, but 
because it was the unavoidable consequence of the war and Lincoln’s strategic 
maneuver.64 The Bureau was vital because, according to Representative Donnelly, it 
served as “one of those great and necessary measures growing inevitably out of the 
rebellion.”65 The imperiled status of freedmen, whose efforts to fulfill the expectations 
and preconditions imposed upon them by the Bureau and others, was not the primary 
crisis under consideration. Instead, congressmen were often more concerned with the 
North’s reputation and government responsibility writ large. For the “victors in the 
mighty struggle” and proclaimed “superiors of the South,” S. No. 60 represented a crucial 
opportunity to demonstrate the Union’s integrity and fulfill its promise to secure a free 
nation.66 
Meanwhile, opponents of the bill relied solely on the natural rights approach and 
insisted that a crisis no longer existed. As many of them had argued that the war itself had 
decisively affirmed the natural freedom of black people, it followed that the freedmen’s 
wellbeing was no longer a concern. Senator Guthrie conceded, “I am one of those who 
believed that while the war was going on… something should be done for these people.” 
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However, as he quickly clarified, “it was done, and this bureau was created to look after 
their interests during the war. But I supposed that as soon as the war was over, there 
would be no occasion for continuing it.”67 Senator Guthrie’s argument bound the 
government’s responsibility to freedmen to the timeline of war; when the military battles 
ended, so too did his support of the Bureau’s work. In his view, there was no crisis that 
the war had left unresolved, and “no other security required than we had gained in the 
battles which suppressed the rebellion.”68 State support for and protection of freedmen, 
especially at the federal level, was not considered a crisis at all. 
Among the opposition, the threats facing freedmen were simply not worthy of 
consideration or national policy. Instead, congressmen were focused on the war and its 
effects on the country as the only relevant crisis. Senator Willard Saulsbury (D-DE) 
questioned Congress’s authority to prolong the Bureau’s operations, saying, “Peace is 
within all our borders. You foes have been subdued, have submitted, and calmly 
acquiesce in the will of the victor.”69 Senator Hendricks further explained, “labor is 
returning to its channels, [and] peace is prevailing… when the war is over, when the 
states are returning to their places in the Union, when the citizens are returning to their 
allegiance… is the Senate now… willing to make this a permanent bureau and 
department of the government?”70 Hendricks went on to assess the era only in positive 
terms, saying, “we are in a state of peace; these [rebellious] states are within the Union; 
their civil governments have been restored.”71 His assessment of the post-war moment 
reinforced a co-dependent relationship between the federal government and its individual 
states, but it wholly excised former slaves. By ignoring the complications of 
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emancipation and the plight of freedmen struggling to survive the dangers of free life, 
congressmen were able to dismiss the Bureau’s work as completely unnecessary.  
Beyond dismissing the hardships facing black people in the wake of emancipation, 
opponents often dismissed the dangers of antebellum America, as well. By adopting 
language of “restoration,” many congressmen suggested that the brutal violence of 
slavery had not constituted a crisis, either. Senator Hendricks, for example, lamented the 
Bureau as an obstacle in America’s ability to “prosper as before.”72 Representative John 
Dawson (D-PA) also argued for a return to the “normal condition from which we were so 
rudely jostled by late occurrences.”73 Without any regard for the abuses committed 
against slaves and free black people in antebellum America, Dawson continued, “We 
must see to it that the grand features of our political system… be preserved in their purity 
and vigor, without any taint of feebleness or stain upon their luster.”74 Like others, 
Dawson invoked a concern for “state-rights doctrines” in order to argue against the 
Bureau and, in doing so, set the particular circumstances facing freedmen aside.75  
Altogether, both extremes of the Bureau debate clarified their positions by turning 
their focus away from former slaves and, instead, toward other concerns. The hurdles 
freedmen faced in their struggles to attain pre-determined markers of freedom did not 
constitute the primary crisis demanding government attention or support. Though many 
advocates of the bill validated the troubling conditions that greeted freedmen in post-
bellum America, they were decidedly more worried about abandoning the wartime 
promise that had secured the Union’s victory over the South. The Bureau’s opponents 
reasoned that the war itself had been the only crisis; upon its end, peace had commenced 
and would be secured only by a return to pre-war conditions and the cessation of federal 
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intervention in everyday life. These arguments reframed the debate over S. No. 60 and 
jumpstarted a significant shift in the conversation. Though advocates alluded to 
freedom’s preconditions, congressmen on both sides of the debate relied on a natural 
rights perspective in order to absolve the government of further responsibility to former 
slaves. They generally considered that the Thirteenth Amendment, together with the 
Union’s victory, had reinstated and officially recognized former slaves’ natural right to 
freedom. The urgency of the bill was defined not by the precarious future of freedmen, 
but in terms of states’ rights, military strategy, and the tenuous relationship between the 
North and former Confederate south. Whether in defense of or in opposition to the 
Bureau, congressmen began to imply that black people, though legally free and members 
of the American community, did not warrant their primary attention.  
Negotiating time 
 
 As the debate over S. No. 60 continued, Congress remained eager to leave behind 
the carnage of war and look ahead, instead, toward the nation’s future. Perhaps no other 
issue had marked the turn of the tide more clearly than the issue of emancipation; an 
entire economic system had been dismantled, prompting questions of belonging and 
citizenship for millions of people. With an eye toward reunification and reconstruction, 
Congress had already begun to respond with legislative reform; S. No. 60 was no 
exception. All the while, however, the specter of the war loomed ever present, and 
congressional debate was textured by explicit and implicit concerns about what could, 
should, and would come next.   
Congressmen perceived of themselves as witnesses to a pivotal moment, standing 
at a crossroads that would determine the future of their nation and “affect the welfare of 
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this government in all future time.”76 Their arguments thus negotiated time. They utilized 
notions of futurity, momentum, and sequence to bridge present sacrifices and injustices 
with hypothetical risks and rewards. The bill’s supporters and opponents both appraised 
the Bureau based on presumptions of American growth and progress. As they assessed 
how the agency’s work would serve or hinder future ends, they moved the conversation 
away from freedmen and their struggles for freedom.   
Advocates of the bill first argued that supporting the Bureau would promise future 
rewards, particularly for freedmen who were perceived to be facing perilous conditions. 
Once more, they implied their recognition of freedom’s prerequisites, as they identified 
the Bureau as the only means through which black people were receiving the resources 
deemed necessary for free life, like education. According to Senator Trumbull, “over 
seventy thousand black children [were] being taught in the schools” established by the 
Bureau in the South, and such education was “the cheapest way” to “save this race from 
starvation and destruction.”77 Similar arguments were made in the House, where 
Representative Donnelly insisted that “the negro will relapse into oppression” without the 
Bureau’s attention.78 In addition to ensuring the survival of black people, the agency’s 
support was also required to “improve, enlighten and Christianize the negro; to make him 
an independent man; [and] to teach him to think and to reason.”79 Many congressmen 
backed the Bureau so that the agency, in turn, could “loo[k] after the interests” of black 
people so that they could “become self-sustaining” in the future.80 In other words, they 
maintained the importance of the Bureau as a mechanism through which freedmen might 
become acquainted with the preconditions of freedom and, eventually, earn their 
admittance into the social contract.  
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However, the wellbeing of freedmen was additionally framed as serving more 
important future ends: the overall health, prosperity, and “safety of the nation forever.”81 
Senator Wilson, for instance, argued that the government’s investment in the Bureau was 
a necessary safeguard for everyone, not just freedmen. Describing “the great end to be 
attained,” he said, “this measure is for the security of all, the harm of none; the benefit of 
all, the injury of none.”82 Senator Wilson insisted that the freedmen’s safety would foster 
harmony throughout the nation; conversely, failure to provide for former slaves would 
“degrade” a significant portion of the population… leaving heart-burnings and difficulties 
that will endanger the peace of the future.”83 His arguments drew upon palpable fears of 
another civil war. Speaking on behalf of “the sentiment of the country,” Senator Samuel 
Pomeroy (R-KS) similarly argued that the Bureau’s work would play a vital role in 
“provid[ing] such securities for the future,” so that “another rebellion will be impossible 
in [a] thousand years.”84 Taking another tack, Representative Donnelly appealed to 
economic interests, saying, “No outlay is too great which is necessary to the safety of the 
people, since in that is involved all the wealth of the country. It is a madman’s economy 
to save money by rendering the people unfit for self-government and then lose all in the 
misgovernment which is sure to follow.”85 Simply put, congressmen argued on behalf of 
the Bureau by strategically framing the agency’s purpose in terms of national interests, 
not just the welfare of former slaves. The Bureau was positioned as the vehicle through 
which “the future peace and glory” of the entire country would be delivered.86 
Notions of time were further embedded in advocates’ arguments as they appealed 
to concerns of legacy and reputation. As Senator Wilson explained, “Whoever writes the 
history of this era must record that the only statesmen in America were the anti-slavery 
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men… no people did more, sacrificed more, poured out more blood [or] expended more 
treasure.”87 In Wilson’s view, supporting the Bureau and the bill would place 
congressmen on the right side of history and “send their names down the ages forever.”88 
The prospect of being positively judged by future Americans motivated other 
congressmen’s votes as well. These positions illustrate the extent to which imagined 
futures were used to justify the congressmen’s support for the Bureau. In casting their 
votes for the bill, they moved beyond concerns for freedmen’s earned rights and argued, 
instead, from a concern for themselves, their reputations, and the nation’s eventual 
judgment.  
Meanwhile, opponents of the bill were confident that the inevitable passage of 
time would justify their challenges to the Bureau.89 They first allocated a significant 
portion of their speaking time to tabulating the costs associated with the Bureau’s 
operations. For example, Senators Hendricks reported the specific expenditures from the 
agency’s first year in operation, while Senator Saulsbury predicted the funds that would 
be spent on a daily basis in years to come. As they did so, both compared the costs with 
the perceived benefits. Senator Hendricks, who calculated that the Bureau had cost the 
government nearly twelve million dollars already, determined that the agency was not 
worth the “extraordinary expense to the people in a time when the public debt is a great 
burden to them.”90 Later, Senator Saulsbury called it “folly” and sheer “madness” for the 
government to shoulder the financial costs associated with caring for freedmen.91 Along 
with others who opposed the bill, these congressmen did not balk at merely the costs, but 
at their magnitude relative to the risks they believed would inevitably accompany the 
Bureau’s work.    
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Opponents argued that the Bureau’s work would threaten the wellbeing of the 
nation in the long run. They reasoned that the agents’ presence in the former Confederate 
states would sow seeds of resentment and bitterness, eventually threatening national unity. 
Senator Guthrie, referring to the “irritation… going on between the agents of the bureau 
and the citizens” of the South, warned his fellow congressmen of the “festering sore that 
will enlarge and grow with time.”92 He argued that prolonging the Bureau’s work would 
brand the South with a “lasting mark of degradation,” inspiring future conflicts. As 
Senator Guthrie argued, maligned people are “generally ready to seize a promising 
opportunity to rebel.”93 These congressmen insisted that any benefit to former slaves 
would pale in comparison to the threat of offending American southerners. The Bureau 
was cast as an adversary acting against the best “interest[s] of the nation… for 
generations to come.”94  
Opponents also envisioned another long-term risk: the advancement of black 
people. Unsurprisingly, some congressmen believed that the Bureau’s support would 
permanently debilitate former slaves by fostering government dependence.95 Others, 
however, were more concerned about what futures would be possible if freedmen were 
given greater support, along with more rights and privileges. Senator Cowan, for example, 
considered the bill inseparable from the larger sociopolitical landscape within which the 
future of former slaves was actively debated and determined. He suggested that S. No. 60 
would have a worrisome domino effect, saying, “But what next? After the negro is free 
we are told that he cannot protect himself; we must do something for him. Well, what 
more must we do? We must give him a vote. What good will that do him?”96 Senator 
Cowan predicted that supporting black people—and, in particular, black men—would 
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only prove harmful to them. Giving a former slave the resources to thrive and the right to 
engage politically would “only multiply the chances of his having his head broken at the 
polls… It is crowning with flowers the victim for the sacrifice.”97 Fearful of momentum, 
opponents wondered, “where this is going to end—this insane crusade to try to do 
something which it is not in the nature of things to do?”98 Congressmen voted against the 
bill to prevent future possibilities of black progress and political power. In doing so, 
opponents notably disregarded the earned rights approach and certainly denied any 
government obligation to facilitate freedmen’s access to practical markers of freedom. In 
their view, nothing more should be done to help former slaves demonstrate their 
compliance with the social contract, as doing so would only facilitate their inclusion in 
threatening and dangerous ways.  
Overall, congressmen sidestepped the ways in which the agency was addressing 
freedmen’s needs in the present moment. Whether arguing for or against the Bureau, they 
dabbled with time to refocus the government’s attention on other concerns. The bill’s 
advocates reasoned that the agency’s work would ultimately return valuable rewards: the 
nation’s lasting reputation and the favorable legacies of the statesmen who supported the 
Bureau’s work. The bill’s opponents, on the other hand, argued that the financial costs 
were compounded by extreme risks: prolonged discord between the North and South, 
future national conflict, and the possibility of black political participation. For them, any 
“great ideas” of progress and “revolutionary measures” for freedmen should be put off 
until a more opportune time.99 At both ends of the debate, imagined futures were used to 
justify congressmen’s votes, but also to diminish the importance of the Bureau’s present 
work with former slaves.  
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Delineating racial differences 
 
 As they debated the Bureau’s future, many congressmen’s arguments were 
framed in terms of reconciliation and national unity. Representative Donnelly proclaimed, 
“We must cultivate an enlarged national spirit. We are and must always be one people. 
We cannot advance the nation by despoiling any part of it. We cannot strengthen liberty 
hereby inaugurating oppression elsewhere.”100 Though Representative Donnelly’s call 
was tinged with a tone of hopefulness, other congressmen spoke with a biting bitterness 
in the wake of war. Though many of them affirmed the need to “hasten that day when we 
will be… one people,” they clung to social, political, and economic agendas that 
represented their respective states’ interests.101   
In doing so, both senators and representatives alike made clear that post-bellum 
harmony would not come at the expense of order. Their paths toward reunification were 
dependent upon a shared commitment to commonly held natural rights, marked by 
notions of difference. Their arguments drew stark distinctions between groups of people 
and, by extension, their value as Americans. Whether advocating for or against the bill, 
congressmen insisted that white citizens, black freedmen, and the state had particular 
roles to play in their ideal visions of national growth and progress. They affirmed that the 
government was imbued with the authority to control its people by allocating resources to 
different groups. Moreover, they reaffirmed antebellum discourse that questioned the 
humanity of black people; former slaves were described in ways that set them apart from 
the wider American community. Senators and representatives suggested that, despite their 
now-legal inclusion, they were not yet in a position to contribute meaningfully to 
American society.   
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First and foremost, congressmen distinguished the state from the general public. 
They utilized language that differentiated the government from those whose futures they 
governed. In most cases, the state was cast in the role of overseer or supervisor. For 
example, Senator Hendricks voiced his concerns regarding the government’s role in 
procuring land contracts for former slaves. He worried that the “Government to the 
United States is to become a landlord to this large class of people.”102 Such a close 
relationship between state and citizen was unacceptable to him; instead, Senator 
Hendricks advocated a more distant arrangement: simply “set[ting] apart three million 
acres of the public lands” for black people’s use and benefit.103 Of this alternative, he said, 
“I am willing to do that.”104 Senator Hendricks not only perceived of himself as distinct 
from black people, but he also aligned himself with the state’s power to arbitrate and 
govern Americans’ lives. In a similar vein, Senator Stewart’s approach to S. No. 60 
suggested that Congress must choose one race—white or black—to support. He said, 
“We have got to trust somebody. I say that we have got to trust the white people of the 
South. We cannot organize a government solely upon the negro population.”105 His 
advice implied three distinct, yet related groups: the government, white Southerners, and 
black people. Senator Stewart identified himself as belonging to the first, distinct from 
“the whites” and “the blacks.”106 He further advocated a post-war order in which white 
Southerners would remain superior to, and in control of, former slaves. These examples 
illustrate a significant feature of the congressmen’s rhetoric. They cast themselves in the 
role of arbiters, invested with the power to determine how the government assessed, 
valued, and associated with the distinct groups of people it governed.  
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The Bureau’s advocates affirmed the state’s role as benevolent overseers as they 
repeatedly characterized freedmen as helpless and dejected. They justified their support 
for the agency by appealing to negative stereotypes of black people—stereotypes that had 
long anchored pro-slavery arguments as well.107 Senator Wilson, for example, conceded, 
“there are many negroes who have hearts quite as good… I know some of them with 
brains quite as capacious and quite as well-trained.”108 For him, these particular black 
people were the exception; as a rule, freedmen comprised “a poor, oppressed race.”109 
Senator Wilson argued that former slaves would remain “ignorant, degraded, and 
dependent” members of a “weak and struggling race” without the help of the Bureau.110 
In the House, Representative Donnelly also invoked notions of black inferiority to 
advance his arguments in favor of the S. No. 60. He granted that the freedman might be 
still “unfitted for freedom” and would “remain a brute” if the government continued to 
withhold the opportunities that “will make him a man.”111 Even as Representative 
Donnelly argued on behalf of the Bureau, he described black people as “morally and 
intellectually degraded” and employed language that cast them as animals, rather than 
human beings.112 Without the Bureau, he threatened, former slaves would be consigned 
to an “amphibious condition” between slavery and freedom and might “prove” 
themselves to be “unworthy savage[s] and brutal wretch[es].”113 
These comments demonstrate the conservative message that undercut advocates’ 
seemingly progressive arguments. Like the Bureau’s own agents, congressmen 
articulated some recognition of former slaves’ natural right to freedom while 
simultaneously casting doubt on whether or not they were fully human in the first place. 
They grounded their support in presumptions of black people as fundamentally inferior to 
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“the superior race”—as “helpless, ignorant, and unprotected,” and in dire need of the 
Bureau’s command and supervision.114  
Unsurprisingly, those who opposed the Bureau likewise identified freedmen as 
inherently deficient in appearance as well as character. Many congressmen presumed that 
essential differences between white and black people were immediately obvious, noting 
“distinctions that are so plainly marked upon the whole face of the man, his color, his 
form, his disposition, his everything.”115 Senator Cowan, for instance, said, “he who 
comes to me and undertakes to tell me…that his hair is straight, and that his legs and feet 
are as well made… I do not believe a word of it.”116 Building upon these physical 
differences, other congressmen asserted indelible contrasts in black people’s behaviors 
and values. Senator Davis, for example, claimed to “know the negro nature better than all 
the Yankees… that live upon this continent.”117 He professed, “I know that if he can live 
without work, he will not work. If he can live by begging, he will not work. If he can live 
by stealing, he will not work… He will bask, with his wife and children in squalid rags 
and poverty, in the sunshine.”118  
These contrasts were cited as evidence of substantive differences in degrees of 
white and black humanity. Representative Dawson boldly declared that “the negro is to 
this day… a savage and a cannibal.”119 In a more muted tone, Senator Cowan plainly 
stated that a black man could not possibly be “the same kind of man that I am.”120 Instead, 
he perceived former slaves to be “helpless, feeble, as nature made [them],” in contrast to 
their white counterparts, whom he praised as the “strongest, most rapacious, hardest-
bargaining race on the earth.”121 These alleged differences animated Senator Cowan’s 
opposition to S. No. 60, the Bureau, and other legislation intended to uplift and support 
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former slaves. Regarding the possibility of political representation for black people, he 
asked, “What good would an office do to a negro in our society and in our country? An 
office is valuable to a man; an office is sought after because it confers social distinction, 
high social privileges, and power and authority among men. Would office confer that 
upon the negro?”122 
These comments underscored the significance of the distinctions congressmen 
drew among the American people. By presuming that black people were less than 
human—or, at least, inferior to other humans—they insisted on an essential difference 
between white “freemen” and black “freedmen.”123 They implied a basic recognition of a 
natural right to freedom, commonly shared among all humans, but insisted upon a racial 
difference between white and black people. Thus, black people’s entrance into American 
society was predicated on the notion that they were, and would remain, subordinate to 
whites. The congressmen’s arguments further suggested that an earned rights approach 
was moot, insofar as they considered freedmen generally incapable of full compliance 
with the American social contract. They suggested that black inclusion, while legal, was 
in many ways illegitimate. Yet, they countered advocates’ claims that black inferiority 
warranted federal intervention and, instead, insisted that black people’s deficiencies 
proved that they did not deserve “the especial favors of the community.”124 Opponents 
dismissed the Bureau as irrelevant by arguing that free life necessarily would, and likely 
should, be markedly different for black people.  
Having established the difference between races, opponents endeavored to pit 
them against one another. They took issue with the bill’s focus on providing aid to former 
slaves and reasoned that the Bureau’s efforts would disadvantage whites, threatening 
 
 174 
their lives, profits, and prosperity. For instance, Representative Dawson insisted that 
whites would be harmed by black progress and inclusion, because “the result must be a 
disgusting and deteriorating admixture of races.”125 He maintained that “the 
indiscriminate amalgamation of superior with greatly inferior races” would “force down 
the Anglo-Saxon to the negro level, and result inevitably in… deterioration of our [white] 
race.”126 Taking a different tack, Senator Guthrie confronted the specific powers that S. 
No. 60 bestowed upon the Bureau. He took issue with the bill’s provisions for judicial 
protections and condemned the apparent lack of support for “cases where the blacks do 
wrong to the whites.”127 Others piled on, arguing that the Bureau would always “be on 
the side of the negro,” with agents “deciding against the white man… and to the prejudice 
of the white citizen.”128 According to Senator Hendricks, the “four million [black] people 
mingling and living among the white people” should be regarded as a threat, because “the 
action of this bureau is not to affect alone the colored people, but it is to affect the white 
people so far as they have intercourse with the colored people.”129 He cautioned that the 
Bureau would continue to “take sides for the colored man against the white man” if 
permitted to continue its work.130 Senator McDougall also warned that the agency’s 
efforts were “inviting them [black people] to think that they are not only quite as good as, 
but a little better than, we with whom they have commingled.”131 He argued that any 
progress toward “making an inferior race a governing power” within the United States 
would “depriv[e] us of the very element out of which we all grow, the soil out of which 
we are able to produce advised persons, informed men, citizens of a Republic.”132 Simply 
put, the bill’s opponents affirmed not merely a difference but an opposition between 
black and white and declared, “If [we] have to take sides, it will be with the men of my 
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own color and my own race.”133 They indicated that a vote for the Bureau was a vote 
against white people, aimed at “mak[ing] the negro in some respects their superior.”134 
Overall, congressmen at both ends of the debate delineated racial differences to 
cast freedmen as inherently inferior. In doing so, they affirmed that black people’s new 
legal status did not translate into full and equal membership in the American community; 
though they may have had their natural rights restored, they were still a separate, distinct 
group marked by notably lesser human qualities. Those who supported S. No. 60 argued 
that the agency’s careful oversight offered the greatest chance of uplifting black people 
from their abject condition of destitution, degradation, and helplessness. They likened 
freedmen to abject animals who had been rendered less than human by the terrors and 
violence of slavery. According to Representative Donnelly, black people may remain 
“savages, but never again slaves” with the Bureau’s support.135 Meanwhile, opponents 
affirmed the subservience of black people and insisted that the alleged differences 
between races must be preserved. As Senator Cowan asserted, “This world… after all is 
said and done, is pretty well arranged… and always has been.”136 His comments 
suggested that the racist beliefs—which he termed “imaginary evils”137—that had 
undergird slavery and structured the American racial order for generations should 
persevere, undisrupted by emancipation and abolition. By casting the Bureau as the 
enemy of racial separation and white supremacy, opponents reframed the debate over the 
bill in terms of white progress and prosperity, condemning S. No. 60 as “dangerous 
legislation.”138 These efforts to distinguish between white and black people revived the 
antebellum social order that dehumanized black people, thereby casting doubt on the 
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force and relevance of natural rights and definitively segregating former slaves from the 
wider American public. 
Abandoning the freedmen 
 
The preceding analysis has examined how congressmen assessed whether or not 
the state was ready and willing to validate former slaves’ recent entrance into society, and 
the social contract, with the government’s full support and attention. The paradox of 
freedom inflected senators’ and representatives’ arguments, as they tacked back and forth 
between notions of natural rights and earned rights. Both sides declared a basic 
recognition of the former, though they generally disagreed regarding the latter. Advocates 
supported the Bureau’s efforts to help freedmen attain practical markers of freedom, 
whereas opponents objected to the necessity or desirability of additional rights and 
privileges for freedmen. However, the overall prospect of freedom for black people was 
relegated to a subordinate position on congressmen’s list of post-war priorities. They 
relied upon strategic definitions of crisis, negotiations of time, and delineations of racial 
difference to curtail the government’s responsibility to former slaves and reorient their 
focus instead toward supporting white Americans. Thus, the debate suggested that, 
regardless of whether black people possessed natural rights or were encouraged toward 
earned rights, their inclusion within the American social contract was marginal at best.   
Congressmen’s definitions of post-war crises relied heavily on a natural rights 
approach to freedom. They positioned freedom as a pre-established fact and thus 
deprioritized the plight of former slaves. They declared decisive victory on freedmen’s 
behalf, conceptualized freedom as the mere absence of slavery, and argued that the 
“amendment abolishing the status or condition of slavery, which is nothing but a status… 
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which subjects one man to the control of another” had rendered black people liberated 
from the “badges of servitude” and “free as far as the law can pronounce them free.”139 
The congressional debate implied that the abolition of slavery, accompanied by the 
“destruction of the incidents to slavery,” was synonymous with the deliverance of 
freedom itself.140 Statesmen argued that war and legislation had restored former slaves’ 
status as Americans “just like other people”141—albeit the “lowliest and poorest,” among 
the “the insane, the blind and all who are dependent”142—rather than the victims of a 
massive, legal, economic industry that had systematically abducted, brutalized, and 
subjugated millions of black people for profit. Far from being inclusive, this discursive 
move provided an opportunity for strategic erasure and dismissal of the government’s 
further obligation to former slaves. It allowed senators and representatives to engage in 
debate without grappling with the profound and lasting consequences of enslavement for 
black people, or the state’s role in sanctioning slavery. Instead, congressmen shifted the 
debate toward other crises deemed more urgent for the broader public. They worried 
instead about the Union’s integrity in upholding a wartime promise; the North’s 
punishment of the rebellious South; peacetime recovery; and the restoration of American 
traditions and governing principles. The problems facing freedmen—problems that 
resulted directly from years of lawful oppression and bondage—were considered only 
secondary to the issues perceived to be affecting the nation as a whole.143 In other words, 
Congress used the natural rights argument to privilege its commitment to the general 
public, to whom it had long been contractually bound to serve and protect, and write off 
its responsibilities to former slaves.  
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Congress’s assessment of future risks and rewards was largely based on whether 
or not viable avenues toward earned rights would benefit or harm the wider American 
community. The freedmen were virtually left out of the equation. While the two extremes 
of the debate envisioned different long-term impacts of their voting decisions, the 
conversation revolved around probable consequences for communities other than former 
slaves. Advocates predicted that the Bureau’s emphasis on land, labor, education, relief, 
and justice would encourage respect and loyalty toward American government and, 
eventually, favorable legacies for the statesmen who supported it. Opponents, on the 
other hand, argued that the Bureau’s support for such attainments should not be financed 
by American taxpayers, especially when considered alongside the potential risks: black 
advancement and festering conflict between North and South. Despite their clashing 
visions, both sides justified their positions on earned rights by appealing to the 
hypothetical risks and rewards to non-black populations. They cast votes in hopes of 
advancing futures in which they would be revered, government would be strengthened, or 
white people would remain supremely powerful.   
Both natural and earned rights arguments animated congressmen’s insistence 
upon an essential difference between white and black people, which sustained antebellum 
commitments to black inferiority and dismissed black people’s inherent worth and human 
value. Advocates and opponents alike conceded that former slaves were human to some 
degree, and therefore imbued with basic natural rights. However, those natural rights 
were not enough to welcome black people as contributing members of American society; 
they instead entered into the social contract under the presumption of unequal and 
subordinate status. Though congressmen quarreled over the extent to which former slaves’ 
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deficiencies could be remedied, they largely agreed that freedmen were fundamentally 
inferior in character, skill, and capacity. They worked to distinguish white from black 
people, sometimes framing the perceived contrasts as hostile opposition and encouraging 
racial separation. Their critiques of black humanity complemented the Bureau’s earned 
rights approach by implying that black people must—but likely could not—satisfy certain 
prerequisites before being embraced by free American society. Congressmen affirmed 
that freedmen’s failings rendered them “our wards,”144 whether temporarily or 
permanently, rather than citizens sharing equally in the mutual accord that bound the 
American people together, and to their government. Upon the basis of difference, some 
congressmen explicitly excluded black people from society, claiming that “the Anglo-
Saxon race can govern this country… because it is the only race that has ever founded 
such institutions as ours… we have a peculiar situation, peculiar education, peculiar 
qualifications which are not common to other sections or other races.”145 This white 
superiority, according to Senator Stewart, naturalized black inferiority and inequality, 
rendering black political participation both irrelevant and undesirable. He said, “I do not 
believe that it is necessary for the white man that the negro should vote… we can carry 
on the government without him.”146 In another exchange, Senator McDougall agreed that 
state power “should be in the hands of the best and the wisest.”147 He asked, “Who that 
calls himself of the old Norse ancestry would dare bow himself before those who come 
up out of central Africa, and acknowledge them as having to do with government?”148 
These sentiments affirmed that freedom, whether in terms of natural rights or earned 
rights, did not correspond with full and proper inclusion.  
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As a whole, congressmen’s arguments marshaled freedom’s legacies of both 
natural and earned rights to abandon black people in favor of promoting the advancement 
of white Americans. Governments theoretically exist to serve and safeguard the interests 
of the “whole community,”149 bound together by one social contract, but Elizabeth 
Povinelli has argued that state discourse routinely justifies the belonging of some humans, 
encouraging them onward and upward, while it simultaneously dismisses others. 
Especially in times of conflict or crisis, human worth is evaluated in terms of value, 
rewards, risks, costs, and benefits in order to help the government determine which 
citizens to bolster and which citizens to forsake. Humans considered valuable to society 
are embraced and supported as citizens; others in turn are abandoned and relegated to the 
margins. There, they are subject to “crushing, if at times imperceptible harms” and left to 
suffer without civil protection or government support.150 This analysis of the 1866 
congressional debate provides an example of such discourses in action.  
“Masters of the Situation” and the Social Contract 
 
The present study has considered the 1866 congressional debates surrounding S. 
No. 60, during which Senator Henry Wilson praised the triumph of government and the 
Union’s recent victories on the battlefield. He cited the emancipation as evidence that the 
nation had “buried deeper than plummet ever sounded the idea and policy of the past.”151 
He regarded anti-slavery advocates and statesmen as the trumpeters of freedom, whose 
efforts heralded the beginning of a new era of equality and progress. Yet, in many ways, 
the congressional debate implied that black people’s freedom—whether considered from 




In their debates about the agency’s future, congressmen centered their own 
agendas rather than the lives and experiences of black people. Whether in defense of or 
opposition to the Bureau, senators and representatives defined crisis, negotiated time, and 
delineated racial differences in order to diminish or outright deny the government’s 
responsibility to afford former slaves the protections and privileges of the social contract. 
They leveraged notions of both natural and earned rights to strategically transform the 
debate into exchanges about war, party politics, states’ rights, constitutional power, 
national security, and white supremacy. Throughout their deliberations, congressmen 
considered the value, costs, risks, and rewards of supporting black people and ultimately 
abandoned freedmen in favor of backing other groups. 
To conclude this chapter, I will briefly consider the lasting consequences of 
Congress’s rhetoric. Their debate helps us better understand how the state constructed its 
relationship with former slaves within the tempestuous landscape of emancipation-era 
politics. As they debated the Bureau’s fate, they arguably sought simplification—or, what 
James Scott calls “bureaucratic legibility.” Scott argues that state actors often turn to pre-
existing schemas of “administrative ordering” in order to “brin[g] into sharp focus certain 
limited aspects of an otherwise far more complex and unwieldy reality.”152 Unfortunately 
for freedmen, congressmen’s return to familiar tenets such as states’ rights, constitutional 
authority, black inferiority, and white supremacy yielded problematic implications. Even 
the most progressive congressmen, “animated by a genuine desire to improve the human 
condition,” leveraged freedom’s paradoxical underpinnings to mitigate and clarify the 
government’s responsibility to freedmen.153 They claimed that the Civil War had 
“effected a revolution… in the industrial and social systems of all the southern States,” 
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one in which “the South and North will be braced to fresher health and inspired to higher 
life by freedom.”154 However, even as some congressmen advocated in favor of “the 
slave becom[ing] freedman, and the freedman man, and the man citizen,”155 their ultimate 
abandonment of former slaves enforced the state’s power to police belonging, the 
injustices of freedom rhetoric, the dehumanization of black people, and the merits of 
racial separation.  
 First, congressmen reinforced the state’s authority in policing the boundaries of 
social, political, and economic belonging. Their rhetoric affirmed that the government 
ultimately decided whose problems would be addressed, whose experiences would be 
considered, and whose futures would be secured by the state. Though they often 
disagreed about the Bureau’s future—and about former slaves—they repeatedly 
reiterated the role of government in shaping American community. “The Constitution and 
the laws” were exalted for abolishing slavery. Former slaves might have “felt they were 
free,” but it was not until the legal passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, “proving that 
they were free,” that masters were forced “deal with his former slave as a man having 
equal rights with himself before the law of the country.”156 The state’s legal authority was 
credited for validating black people’s natural rights to freedom, while, at the same time, 
maintaining different punishments for crimes committed by them.157 Many congressmen 
also awaited the fate of forthcoming legislation to settle the question of black citizenship, 
as they continued to debate and wonder “if the negroes are citizens” or not.158 This 
emphasis on legal codification of freedom and citizenship confirmed the state’s ultimate 
authority to determine which people were to be welcomed as full-fledged, deserving 
members of American society—as well as when and under what terms.159   
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Second, the congressional debate demonstrated the potential injustices facilitated 
by freedom rhetoric—especially the erasure of black histories and experiences. For 
instance, the state’s rhetoric repeatedly minimized the significance and sustained the 
violence of slavery. As previously discussed, they positioned slavery as a conquered 
crisis, decidedly in the past, and reoriented their arguments toward a seemingly race-
neutral future.160 Simultaneously, they seized opportunities to strategically assert the civil 
(albeit not social, political, or economic) equality of white and black people. Many of the 
bill’s supporters advocated for the Bureau by asserting former slaves’ newfound status as 
free people, sharing equal rights and privileges “before the law.”161 The bill’s opponents, 
too, identified freedmen as simply “four millions of the people of the United States.”162 
While seemingly inclusive in tone, these remarks ignored the abhorrent circumstances 
that former slaves had endured for generations and, instead, proposed a false equivalence 
between impoverished Americans and former slaves. Freedmen were considered only in 
sum, as a total number of bodies, rather than as a dynamic, heterogeneous population 
facing an overwhelming set of challenges—challenges brought on not by personal failure 
or shortcoming, but by state-sanctioned, racist assaults against black bodies, families, 
histories, and wealth. By asserting former slaves’ natural freedom, congressmen 
attempted to relegate slavery’s lasting impact to the past and deny black people the 
unconditional support they needed and deserved.  
Congressmen also worked to remove black people from the narrative of American 
freedom, privileging instead the voices of whites—especially statesmen. On the House 
and Senate floors, they asserted the final authority to identify and address crises, shape 
the nation’s future, and assess the worth of their fellow human beings. In doing so, 
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congressmen spoke for black people, whose testimonies and stories were read and 
interpreted only by white voices claiming to have superior “knowledge of the negroes 
and of negro character.”163 By deploying former slaves’ experiences in service of white 
arguments, congressmen reiterated their presumptions of black inferiority and engaged in 
outright erasure of slaves’ history. In one example, Representative John Dawson 
proclaimed, “The African is without a history… the past is silent of any negro people 
who possessed military and civil organization, who cultivated the arts at home, or 
conducted a regular commerce with their neighbors… They have had no builder of cities; 
they have no representatives in the arts, in science, or in literature.”164 These remarks 
demonstrated overall dismissal of black expression and experience, as well as a particular 
disregard for black voices that shaped inventive, powerful rhetorics of abolition and 
resistance.165 Ignoring the many free and enslaved black people who had fought bravely 
for an end to slavery, congressmen claimed freedom and victory for their own. Invoking 
troubling antebellum vocabularies, they declared themselves “masters of the situation.”166 
They praised themselves for their work, “which has saved a country and emancipated a 
race,” and lauded “the toiling men of the country” who have “put down the rebellion… 
[and] put down slavery.”167 They proclaimed that “it was our public men” who “stood by 
this policy of destroying slavery after slavery had raised its bloody hand against our 
country, we who broke it down wherever we could reach it, [and] contributed as far as 
legislation could go.”168 Even those who had resisted abolition and emancipation claimed 
credit for former slaves’ freedom, citing the “hundreds of thousands of white men [that 
had] fallen to vindicate the issue… a sacrifice such as no one race ever made for another 
before.”169 At every turn, congressional debate exalted the role of white men in the 
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struggle against slavery. Their rhetoric dismissed the creative and courageous resistance 
of black people—both free and enslaved—and instead worked to commemorate and 
glorify white voices as those that had gone “as far as the public voice could go, to weaken 
the rebellion and strengthen the country.”170  
Third, these congressional deliberations illustrate the extent to which state 
abandonment is grounded in the devaluation of human life. Explicitly, congressmen 
described black people as inherently inferior in character, skill, and capacity. 
Additionally, however, their arguments invoked traditions of slavery’s grounding rhetoric 
by implicitly treating black people as less than human. Freedmen’s humanity was 
reduced to their struggles as former slaves, strategically discussed and debated as 
incidental to larger, more prominent concerns. In antebellum America, slaves were 
commodified, bought, sold, used, discarded, and murdered at the whims of their masters. 
During the Civil War… black men were used—just like horses, as Senator Stewart 
noted—“as a war power,” and they were welcomed into the Union army only in an effort 
to “strike a blow” at the South’s strength.171 In the wake of emancipation, congressmen 
again deployed freedmen as pawns, carefully and tactically leveraged to advance their 
own respective political agendas, which were ultimately focused on non-black groups. 
Many of them justified this use and abuse of black people by citing an allegedly pre-
determined fate; as Representative Dawson argued, “doom of the negro is written... in 
rapid and sure extinction; and when the future historian shall inquire into the cause of his 
decay, [he] shall find it in the misguided efforts of his friends.”172 Once more, black 
futures were debated, decided, and abandoned by white men, who considered former 
slaves as a subservient class of beings. Though they were free, they were still condemned 
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as less than human and, therefore, certainly less important in considerations of the state’s 
support and resources. 
Finally, the congressmen’s arguments laid the rhetorical groundwork for state-
sanctioned policies of racial separation and legislative segregation. Their claims of racial 
difference, in particular, set the stage for prohibitions of racial mixing in various spheres 
of social and civic life. Whether they argued in terms of temporary or permanent black 
deficiencies, Congress implied a need to separate white and black people. Representative 
Dawson, in particular, warned that the Bureau’s work would promote the insidious 
“phantom of negro equality,” and transform America into a place where “negroes… 
should be admitted to the same tables at hotels, should be permitted to occupy the same 
seats in railroad cars and the same pews in churches; that they should be allowed to hold 
offices, to sit on juries, to vote… [and] their children are to attend the same schools with 
white children, and to sit side by side with them.”173 Thus, the congressional debate 
surrounding the Bureau anticipated the “harsh strictures of segregation and 
disfranchisement” of the Reconstruction period that would soon follow.174 Senators’ and 
representatives’ arguments against the “wild ravings and frightful dreams” of racial 
integration laid the rhetorical groundwork for later efforts toward segregation, which Kirt 
Wilson has argued relied heavily on strategic notions of place.175 The present study 
suggests that such discourse was preceded by the 1866 congressional debates, as 
congressmen began to crystallize their views regarding the marginalization and 
separation of black people in the emancipation era.  
Though congressional debate about the Bureau inevitably came to an end, the 
lasting significance of these arguments cannot be underestimated. The Senate passed S. 
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No. 60 on January 25, 1866, after nearly three full weeks of debate. Upon its approval by 
the House of Representatives, the bill was sent to President Andrew Johnson’s desk on 
February 13. Less than one week later, on February 19, President Johnson returned the 
bill with his infamous veto message.176 In it, he activated many of the same rhetorical 
strategies as his fellow statesman, speaking in terms of crisis, time, and difference to 
reject further support for the Bureau and its activities. He lauded the deliverance of 
freedom, which “ha[d] already been effectually and finally abrogated throughout the 
whole country,” and suggested that the Bureau’s work was no longer needed in the 
absence of “actual continuation of hostilities and of African servitude.” He also 
expressed his concerns about the Bureau’s future costs—financial and otherwise—and 
determined that there was “no immediate necessity for the proposed measures” being 
pursued on behalf of former slaves, especially as they would “not be consistent with the 
public welfare” of “the whole people” of the United States.177 And, he insisted that black 
people, though still deficient in nature, had already been set on a level playing field with 
whites and therefore did not deserve special advantages. President Johnson’s argument 
reaffirmed many of the claims offered by senators and representatives, and the Senate 
failed to override his veto the following day. It was not until several months later, when a 
more moderate bill was proposed in the House, that the Bureau’s operations were 
secured—albeit temporarily. President Johnson’s veto struck a major blow to the 
Bureau’s authority in the former Confederate South, where the state’s rhetoric 
emboldened southerners to “begrudgingly and reluctantly recognize[e] blacks’ freedom” 
while granting them only “few legal rights of social privileges” and “keep[ing] blacks in 
a status as similar to slavery as possible.”178  
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 President Johnson’s veto may have weakened the Bureau’s presence and power as 
an administrative agency, but it generally upheld the problematic implications of the 
state’s discourse. Whether in defense or opposition to the Bureau, congressmen wielded 
freedom’s paradoxical legacy to diminish or deny the government’s responsibility to 
former slaves, and to cast doubt on the legitimacy of their inclusion within the American 
community. Their “narrowing of vision” ultimately relegated former slaves to the 
margins of social, political, and economic belonging, as black people were declared free 
but without the genuine support, resources, or backing of the American government.179 
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178 John David Smith, We Ask Only for Even-Handed Justice: Black Voices from Reconstruction, 
1865-1877 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2014), 4. In addition to his veto, 
President Johnson ordered an investigation of the Bureau’s administration at this time. A report 
indicated that the agency “had sometimes been dishonestly and injudiciously administered.” 
Coupled with the President’s public denial of support for the Bureau, these findings dealt a major 
blow to the public’s confidence in the organization. W.E.B. DuBois, Black Reconstruction in 
America, 1860-1880 (New York: Free Press, 1998), 276. 





“NEW IDEAS WANT NEW MEN”: FREEDOM AND BLACK RESISTANCE IN 
THE NEW ORLEANS TRIBUNE, 1864-1866 
 
 It was half past seven o’clock on March 17, 1865, when “one of the most largely 
attended assemblies ever held” was convened at Economy Hall, in New Orleans. The 
“friends of liberty” met to “discus[s] the momentous question of the day: shall we go 
backward or forward?” Thomas W. Conway, the Superintendent of the Bureau of Free 
Labor in Louisiana sat in attendance as members of the city’s born-free and emancipated 
black community offered their views on the government’s treatment of former slaves.1 
By the end of the meeting, the assembly had produced a set of resolutions, the second to 
last of which was recorded as follows: “Resolved, that new ideas want new men; that the 
past has shown that we cannot expect any decided progress in the conduct of labor so 
long as Superintendent Thomas W. Conway remains at the head of the Bureau of Free 
Labor in Louisiana.” The full list of resolutions, which had been read aloud in both 
English and French, were printed the next morning in the New Orleans Tribune.2 
 Black people openly rejected Conway’s leadership in New Orleans that night at 
Economy Hall. Confronting him directly, the assembly demanded his removal from a 
position of authority and sought, instead, to offer their own views on the practices and 
policies that would deliver “complete freedom” for their communities.3 They insisted that 
old systems of governance were affirming, if not strengthening, the unjust practices of 
slavery. Thus, they demanded the appointment of new leaders—preferably black ones—
who would advocate justly on freedmen’s behalf. Unfortunately, Conway retained his 
position. Then, when the Freedmen’s Bureau arrived in Louisiana, he assumed the role of 
Assistant Commissioner. In that capacity, he continued to attract scrutiny and criticism 
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from the black people of New Orleans, who refused to remain passive observers of the 
post-war era.  
 In this chapter, I focus on the voices of born free and former enslaved black 
people in an effort to understand how they responded to the state’s attempts to control the 
emancipation era conversation about freedom. My analysis is derived from close reading 
of numerous articles and editorials published in the New Orleans Tribune. I ultimately 
argue that the Tribune’s rhetoric intervened in the prevailing discourse surrounding the 
Bureau by actively countering notions of black inferiority, exclusion, and dehumanization 
in ways that restored the potential of a natural rights approach to freedom and 
simultaneously disrupted the preconditions that questioned black people’s compliance 
with the American social contract. In service of this thesis, this chapter proceeds in four 
parts. First, I introduce the New Orleans Tribune, situating the black press within a brief 
history of African American rhetorical protest and invention. Second, I examine the 
Tribune’s coverage of black life, teasing out the ways in which writers and editors 
showcased black people’s commitments to land, labor, education, justice, and suffrage 
both before and after the Bureau’s arrival in Louisiana. Their discourse undermined the 
agency’s earned rights approach and defied, more broadly, the prevailing assumption that 
black people needed to be taught to value the expectations and privileges of freedom. 
Then, I analyze how the Tribune rejected white supremacist policies and arguments, 
advocated for unity on the basis of natural rights, and asserted the full range of black 
humanity in ways that countered the state’s efforts to question former slaves’ fitness for 
social, political, and economic participation. I close with recognition of the Tribune’s 
position within the ongoing legacy of black resistance.  
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Black Resistance in Antebellum America 
 
 Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both free and enslaved 
African Americans argued relentlessly for freedom. Eloquent writing and speaking from 
such notable figures as Phillis Wheatley, Jupiter Hammon, and Richard Allen showcased 
black people’s capacity for rhetorical invention and strategy.4 Others soon followed in 
their footsteps. Acclaimed speeches by prominent African Americans like Frederick 
Douglass, Sojourner Truth, and Henry Highland Garnet shaped the abolition movement 
and, later, calls for citizenship and civil rights.5 Rhetorical scholars have studied their 
strategies and arguments, often highlighting the innovative ways in which black people 
argued on behalf of themselves and their communities. While these speakers enjoyed a 
measure of elevated status, then and in the historical record, their leadership helped to 
craft a tradition of black protest and identity formation that both engaged and challenged 
the American ideological landscape.6 
The spirit of protest permeated everyday black life, throughout which both free 
and enslaved black people relied heavily on orality as a mode of subversive resistance. 
Innovative speech practices created space for them to build community and critique 
dominant groups. For example, slaves used songs to reappropriate the slavemaster’s tools. 
Spirituals, in particular, transformed religious suppression and Christian scripture into 
“secret codes,” expressing alternative and counter-dominant readings that could not have 
been conceived of, let alone recognized, by slavemasters.7 Catherine Knight Steele makes 
the case that slaves were able to build resurgent communities, “foster revolt, signal 
rebellion, and voice dissent” by “utiliz[ing] motifs of the Old Testament to create… 
double meanings.”8 In song, slaves were able to “express out loud the anguish and peril 
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of slavery,” while also asserting a collective “hope of freedom” in the very language that 
was often used to enforce their bondage.9 Other forms of subversive oral practice, like 
storytelling and signifying, further challenged slavery’s and slavemasters’ attempts to 
wield absolute control over black people.10  
In addition to oral practices, everyday acts of resistance among black people 
issued direct challenges to oppression and violence. Free black people engaged in protest, 
helped found societies and associations dedicated to abolitionist agitation, and established 
“underground” networks to assist fugitive slaves.11 Meanwhile, enslaved African 
Americans risked their lives to defy not only their masters, but also slavery as an 
institution.12 According to historians John Hope Franklin and Loren Schweninger, 
runaway slaves’ relentless pursuits of temporary and permanent freedom “strained slave 
owners, the South, and the nation,” contributing significantly to the “mounting stress” 
and instability that marked the buildup to the Civil War.13 Enslaved black people engaged 
in more covert modes of resistance as well. Acts of truancy, documentation, and even 
frolicking expressed slaves’ claims to privacy, agency, and bodily freedom in subtle, yet 
meaningful ways.14 
The press emerged as a “vanguard of the struggle” against slavery, particularly in 
the antebellum North, because it provided a unique opportunity for black people to 
express themselves openly on their own terms.15 Freedom’s Journal, founded in 1827 as 
the nation’s first black owned and operated newspaper, boldly declared in its opening 
editorial: “We wish to plead our cause. Too long have others spoken for us.”16 Its 
objective resonated loudly among black audiences, and Freedom’s Journal was soon 
followed by others, such as The Colored American and The North Star.17 In a detailed 
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history of the beginnings of the black press, Charles A. Simmons argued that newspapers 
were “essential to the survival of black people,”18 as they served as vital vehicles through 
which counterarguments and subversive strategies could be shared, circulated, and 
fostered. Newspaper editors and writers alike bravely faced tremendous threats as they 
aimed to “let white editors and citizens know that black citizens were humans that were 
being treated unjustly.”19 Thus, northern newspapers played a prominent role in 
encouraging abolitionist views and disrupting the nation’s complacency regarding 
slavery.20  
Meanwhile, black people in the South were not permitted to establish their own 
presses until after the start of the Civil War. The 1862 founding of L’Union in New 
Orleans, Louisiana, marked a “watershed [moment] in the development of black 
journalism.”21 On its first page, L’Union declared itself the standard-bearer in “a new era 
in the destiny of the South,” one in which its readers would “line up here to march, all 
friends of Progress.”22 In both language and purpose, L’Union sought to reflect the 
interests of its largely French-speaking, Creole community. Many free black people, 
descended from French settlers, had enjoyed a measure of privilege and opportunity in 
New Orleans23; however, in the wake of the Civil War and emancipation, “all blacks 
found their lot cast together,” as free people of color were often mistaken for former 
slaves.24 Thus, L’Union “came forth with a cry echoing the grievances and aspirations of 
black freemen, freedmen, and slaves,” in fierce opposition to “slaveocracy and racism… 
[as] the common enemy.”25 Soon, many other newspapers followed in its wake, as 
countless black journalists and editors—alongside their white allies—advanced 
arguments for political, social, and economic change.26 Henry Louis Suggs has described 
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the southern black press as “a fighting press; it is an advocate, crusader, and mirror… [it] 
has never lost sight of the issues of importance for black survival and black awareness.”27  
 Among these many papers, the New Orleans Tribune emerged as a bold voice. 
Having inherited the offices, subscription lists, and even key staff from L’Union, the 
Tribune likewise took up many of its predecessor’s themes and principles.28 In its 
inaugural issue, on July 21, 1864, the newspaper declared itself the heir to L’Union’s 
mission, which had been to be the “organ of an oppressed class.”29 Several months later, 
the Tribune decisively asserted ownership of that charge and affirmed, “This journal is 
the organ of the oppressed, whether black, yellow or white.”30 The newspaper’s 
leadership reflected this position. Editor Jean-Charles Houzeau, a white Belgian, was 
joined by two black men: co-editor Paul Trévigne and founder Louis Charles Roudanez. 
In both word and practice, the Tribune argued in favor of interracial cooperation among 
all allies, in order to present the strongest argument for freedom and defense against anti-
black racism and subjugation. In his memoir, Houzeau reflected on his editorial aims: 
“Rather than speaking in the name and interest of a small group, the Tribune, I thought, 
should defend the masses of the proscribed race and unite this oppressed population 
completely around its standard.”31 As editor, he relied heavily on his black peers for 
guidance, whom he trusted to be men of intelligence, righteousness, and morality. He 
believed they could be “called upon to form the highest group of representatives” of 
black people’s interests and would “spare no means… to render the Tribune worthy of 
public confidence and respect” in the era of emancipation.32   
In order to make the most of its “militant crusade,” the Tribune sought to reach 
audiences beyond the local New Orleans region.33 Houzeau was determined “to transform 
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a local newspaper into a newspaper of national importance.”34 Roudanez also believed 
that the Tribune’s message would be most effective in advancing change if it were 
distributed widely. So, he famously sent copies of each issue to the U.S. Congress, so that 
each representative and senator would have the opportunity to read black perspectives 
about the post-war conditions in not only Louisiana, but also throughout the nation.35 
Roudanez’s strategy was, at the very least, partially effective; politicians read the 
newspaper but often utilized its content in service of their own agendas. According to 
John R. Ficklen, the Tribune’s columns “supplied the radical orators with the thunder” 
they needed to advance arguments for Southern reconstruction and federal intervention.36 
Still, the Tribune’s arguments in favor of black people’s interests were able to circulate 
far beyond local audiences.  
Such widespread circulation was imperative given the newspaper’s ultimate aim 
in the years immediately following the Civil War. As editor, Houzeau hoped that the 
Tribune would provide guidance and support for former slaves in the wake of the 
emancipation. In a city marked by a sizable Creole population, and with two born-free 
black men among the newspaper’s leadership, Houzeau was confident that the Tribune 
could shed light on freedom, its meanings, and its implications. Reflecting on his time as 
editor, he wrote, “At a time when thousands of freedmen would be thrown onto the 
street… where and when they would have to come to grips with their new situation and 
make their way in the world, would they not look to their elders in their search for guides, 
to those of their race who had preceded them?”37 In other words, Houzeau believed that 
former slaves would need support in learning the ways of free life, but he also presumed 
that such support must come from within black communities.  
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Houzeau further argued that black communities should likewise be considered a 
trusted, valuable source of information and insight in the development of new policies 
and legislation. He wondered, perhaps optimistically, “to whom would the liberal party, 
the Congress, and the government turn in order to learn the needs, the ideas, and the 
dangers of the [black] population… in the new order of things if not to these natural 
representatives, to these enlightened spokesmen for the black and colored population?”38 
Thus, the Tribune’s editors felt it was their “great responsibility” to record, publish, and 
disseminate black perspectives, in an effort to “do the most [they could] for the union 
[and] free and true republican progress.”39 Though they had no assurances about how 
their message would be received, the Tribune’s writers and editors worked tirelessly to 
advocate for black people. They sought to actively influence the dynamics of the new 
social, political, and economic order, and advance a national conversation about freedom 
for former slaves.  
The present study thus proceeds with an understanding of the Tribune as a 
prominent participant in not only the nineteenth century effort to define freedom, but also 
the enduring tradition of black and African American protest. Using a serial newspaper as 
its medium, born-free black men and their allies attempted to intervene in dominant 
discourses to shape, if not alter, the rhetoric about freedom, former slaves, and citizenship. 
The Tribune was unrelenting in its effort to, first, affirm black people’s understanding of 
freedom and, second, challenge the American people to return freedom to its roots in 
inherent, unassailable human rights.  




Founded in 1864, in the wake of the historic Emancipation Proclamation, the 
Tribune often struck a triumphant tone. It frequently reported on the proceedings of local 
meetings, during which a local reverend declared, “thanks be unto God… slavery, the 
curse of the nation is dead and buried.”40 Others joined in his celebration, rejoicing for 
having “passed through blood” to stand “upon free soil.”41 At the same time, however, 
the Tribune was realistic about the struggle yet to come. The Civil War was still claiming 
the lives of thousands of black men, enticed to join the Union’s armies in defiance of 
their former masters, and the freedom promised to former slaves was still, in many ways, 
treated with a measure of skepticism.42 In an article published in its inaugural issue, the 
Tribune cautioned, “The rebellion shall be a great blessing or a great curse as we will 
it.”43 Ever mindful of history, the newspaper additionally warned its readers, “Our 
population have too often trusted in the good faith of others and been deceived.”44 
Despite some apparent victories, “the cause of real Freedom [was] not yet secure from 
peril at the hands of those who assume to guide the course, and shape the destinies” of 
former slaves.45 Peace and prosperity for black people was hardly guaranteed.   
Thus, immediately upon its founding, the Tribune’s writers and editors worked to 
advance black people’s claims to freedom. As they did so, they invoked many familiar 
contours of freedom’s rhetorical legacy. Numerous editorials and articles spanning 1864-
1866 argued passionately that freedom should be accompanied by certain opportunities 
and attainments—namely land, labor, education, justice, and suffrage. The Tribune did 
not argue that former slaves already fulfilled these markers. Instead, it centralized these 
familiar tenets in ways that affirmed that black people already understood, as well as 




The Tribune considered the acquisition, possession, and cultivation of land to be a 
chief concern. An article entitled “Division of Property” reflected on the outbreak of war, 
reminding readers that “the territory of the State was owned by quite a small number of 
white men” at the time. These few men “owned all the soil outside of the limits of the 
cities and their environs,” but “disappeared, as if by magic” to fight in the Confederate 
armies. With the war nearing its end, the Tribune insisted that the federal government 
intervene to prevent the plantation masters’ return not simply because they were “the 
chief instrument in bringing on [the] war,” but because they had perpetuated an economic 
system that defied Northern principles of free labor. The plantation masters had withheld 
others’ rights to own and cultivate property and, instead, “carried on a large agricultural 
business in raising cotton, sugar, and rice by means of slave labor.” Thus, the Tribune 
argued, “the moment they had departed, the Government should have taken possession of 
the lands, divided them out into five-acre lots, and distributed them among those persons 
who had… created all the wealth of the South.”46 This position reflected the Tribune’s 
respect for free labor principles, “that true and praiseworthy ‘Yankee’ idea, ‘that every 
man should own the land he tills,’” as well as reap the profits of its bounty.47 
The Tribune reiterated its message several months later, when it proposed the 
formation of farming associations that would distribute land and wealth among black 
communities. It invited readers to band together, under the leadership of “two or three 
persons who understand the business contract for a quantity of land,” and insisted that 
“five or ten families [who] would associate for this purpose… could not fail to make a 
good living for themselves and their children.”48 The Tribune argued that such 
associations would be a significant step toward destroying the remnants of the slave 
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economy and abolishing, once and for all, the “oligarchy of slaveholders [and] property 
holders.”49 The proposal was merely the start of their calls for “a radical reconstruction of 
property relations,”50 and it demonstrated the ways in which black people understood the 
importance of land and land ownership—even if they were not yet in the financial 
position to acquire property. 
Labor 
 
The newspaper argued that labor, too, “must now be put on a democratic 
footing.”51 In the immediate aftermath of emancipation, the Tribune deemed the state of 
Southern labor unacceptable. A September 1864 article claimed that “iron-collars, the 
chain and lash were in some instances continued in operation,” and eager Northern 
investors “whose sole desire was to exploit the services of the freedmen” had begun to 
lease abandoned plantations.52 Once again demonstrating a commitment to free labor 
principles, the newspaper railed against the ways in which former slaves “were made 
serfs and chained to the soil,” unable to work for themselves, benefit from their own toils, 
or even “select their own employers… such was the boasted freedom acquired by the 
colored man at the hands of the ‘Yankees.’”53  
According to the Tribune, the persistence of these conditions was an affront to the 
promises of the Emancipation Proclamation. In a piece entitled “Plantation Labor,” the 
editors wrote, “The mode of labor on the plantations and the practical liberty of the 
freedmen are so intimately connected together, that each question must be considered in 
its bearing upon the other.”54 They further explained, “So long as the freedmen will 
remain under the control of the former planters and overseers… there will be no means of 
extending to the laborers the benefit of a true and practical liberty.”55 Simply put, 
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freedom would remain out of reach if emancipated slaves were made to work, once more, 
in service of someone else’s pleasure and profit. In the age of emancipation, the Tribune 
insisted, there could be no use for “a tyrannical master and a despotic ruler, on each and 
every plantation. The laborers [had] been proclaimed freemen” and must be elevated “to 
the condition of men who are really free.”56 These arguments affirmed that black people, 
in being opposed to slavery, were also committed to “the success of free labor” as an 
integral part of freedom.57 
More importantly, however, the Tribune argued that black people were eager to 
embrace working for themselves. Noting that “it was hastily and erroneously assumed 
that cultivators would not work but on compulsion,” the newspaper took great pains to 
affirm that “there are in our community a great many men who feel disposed… and are 
perfectly competent.”58 Former slaves were not merely ready to be laborers, but also 
serve as their own managers and supervisors. Recurring announcements reported: 
“several associations have already been formed by freedmen, to work certain 
plantations—one of 70, one of 100 and one of 130 persons.”59 Within those associations, 
“the freedmen… have elected a first, second, and third managers, and are now working 
harmoniously together.”60 The Tribune reiterated, “No single ‘Superintendent of Negro 
Labor’ is needed. Give the men of color an equal chance; and this is all they ask… our 
word for it, they will, more quickly than their fellow white man, find a happy issue out of 
all their sufferings.”61 These arguments countered prevailing assumptions that black 
people were lazy and incapable of working without the oversight or command of whites. 
Moreover, they emphasized the value former slaves placed on labor, and their eagerness 





The Tribune also devoted a significant measure of attention to affirming black 
people’s desire and propensity for education. The newspaper itself showcased the 
excellence of black literacy, as it was published in both English and French, regularly 
advertised the sale of books and other printed material, and featured reviews of public 
lectures and readings.63 In its commentary of the era, the Tribune also recognized a vital 
relationship between education and citizenship. For instance, in an article describing the 
successes and potential of black troops in the Union army, one writer wrote, “To make 
first rate soldiers they need discipline and instruction. To make good citizens they need 
education. They are receiving it. They have begun, and will go on.”64 These various 
pieces, published alongside one another on the newspaper’s pages, worked together to 
reinforce black people’s ability and desire to learn. They also affirmed an expectation that 
former slaves, upon being freed, would be given the opportunity and resources to “drin[k] 
from the cup of knowledge.”65 
The newspaper’s focus on education was most prominently on display, however, 
in its response to local legislation. According to Kristi Richard Melancon and Petra 
Munro Hendry, it was “the singular text in the public South at its time to staunchly 
advocate for public, integrated education.”66 This campaign began immediately upon the 
proposal of a plan to segregate schools based on race. The Tribune reprinted the words of 
a fellow newspaper editor: “a bill is proposed in the State Legislature, one provision of 
which ‘separates the races in the process of education, and obliges each race to bear its 
own burdens, so that prejudices shall not clash, nor injustice be inflicted on any class.’ 
Can this thing be?”67 In its own editorials, the Tribune explained its opposition to the bill 
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and affirmed the need for integration. It argued that such policies “dra[w] a line between 
the two elements of one and the same people, from the cradle itself up to the time of 
manhood and throughout life.”68 Integrated education, on the other hand, would play an 
active role in dismantling the legacies of slavery and advancing the inclusion of freedmen 
within American society. “Nothing,” according to the Tribune, would be “more 
conducive to the obliteration of the old lines which divide the people.”69 The editors’ 
attention to the matter of segregated schools demonstrated not only black people’s 
appreciation for education, but also the integral role education would play in shaping 
former slaves’ lives as free people.70 
Justice 
 
The Tribune’s positions regarding land, labor, and education were often framed in 
terms of justice, as the newspaper trumpeted the importance of legal protections for black 
people’s rights and privileges. As early as its inaugural issue, the Tribune offered a 
nuanced understanding of civil law: “the law must under all instance be respected,” even 
when a “statute has fallen into disuse” or has been cast into doubt by a “change in public 
opinion.”71 This deference to legal authority further bolstered the Tribune’s frequent calls 
for unjust laws—like the “bloody and barbarous” Black Codes—to be officially repealed 
in favor of legislation that might better reflect the “authority of public sentiment.”72 
The newspaper also took advantage of opportunities to expose the numerous 
instances in which black people were being treated differently before the law. For 
example, in discussion of a Louisiana statute that condemned a black person to death for 
striking a white person, the Tribune wrote: “Does any sane person living in New Orleans 
today believe that such a law would, could, or should be enforced by any civil power…? 
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Yet there it stands… a judge in one of our courts would be derelict in his duty not to 
pronounce the sentence of death.”73 The newspaper also reminded its readers that black 
people and their white allies might find themselves in violation of existing laws on a 
regular basis, as two statutes—both carrying sentences of death—condemned those who 
incited discontent or insubordination among free black people or slaves. Recognizing the 
risks taken especially by the most outspoken advocates, the Tribune added, “there is not 
in this city a loyal paper… whose editor is not liable to ‘death.’”74 The point underscored 
how existing laws failed to extend justice to black people, such that even those who were 
willing to speak out on their behalf were vulnerable to severe punishment. The Tribune 
thus suggested that former slaves’ freedom would remain under threat in the absence of 
“good and lasting statutes… based on sound judgment and common sense.”75  
Suffrage 
 
 The Tribune’s calls for justice were closely linked to its unyielding support for 
suffrage rights, as it proclaimed, “Freedom without equality before the law and at the 
ballot box is impossible.”76 The newspaper was committed to advocating on behalf of 
voting rights for both born-free and emancipated black people, as demonstrated by its 
response to a bill proposed in the Louisiana Senate. The law, referred to as the “quadroon 
bill,” would have extended the franchise only to Creole men of color, while continuing to 
exclude former slaves from political participation. After objecting to the legislation for 
weeks, the Tribune reflected upon the bill’s defeat: “The quadroon bill having been killed 
in the State Senate, we may be permitted to pay a short tribute to its memory… The 
principle was preposterous, or rather the bill had no principle at all.”77 The editorial 
expressed fears about the extent to which the government might use the suffrage issue as 
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a means of dividing the black community, and create innumerable race-based distinctions 
in the wake of emancipation.78 The Tribune asked its readers, “If a quadroon has a right 
to vote, why not a mulatto? Where shall be the limit?” The editorial maintained that 
suffrage was the right of all black people, regardless of shade, tone, or ancestry. Just 
several days later, the Tribune rebuked those who insisted “that time is needed, not only 
to give a practical effect to the extension of the right of suffrage, but even to mediate on 
that extension itself.”79 The editors also chastised those who held black people to 
different standards of education, morality, religion, and temperance than white voters. 
Though “the [e]ra is slow and cautious, and wants to rest and pause at every step in the 
ways of social progress,” the Tribune insisted that no “mediation was necessary to 
recognize such a just right” for free black people.80 
Even after the bill’s defeat, the newspaper remained relentless in its advocacy for 
voting rights and often published essays and editorials on the subject.81 For instance, a 
January 1865 issue ran a letter penned by a Tribune reader, entitled “Freedom and 
Franchise Inseparable.” The letter identified suffrage as an inherent right and exercise of 
citizenship, and one that should be extended to former slaves. Moreover, it accused 
enemies of “the great cause of freedom” for withholding suffrage from freedmen in a 
strategic attempt to “induc[e] them to migrate elsewhere.”82 These views reinforced not 
only the newspaper’s stance that suffrage was a vital component of free life. At the same 
time, they also affirmed the significance black people attributed to voting rights, such that 




By the spring of 1865, the Tribune had established its reputation as an 
unapologetic mouthpiece advocating black people’s rights as free people. Its editors and 
writers had not shied away from confronting new legislation and specific reforms head-
on, as they “called for fundamental changes in Southern society.”84 On March 5, the 
editors published a piece, entitled “Our Platform,” that summed up the newspaper’s 
priorities as the war drew to a close and the fate of freedmen seemed more uncertain than 
ever. Among a series of short, blunt declarations, the Tribune declared allegiance to: fair 
earnings and unmolested travel for all laborers; full and integrated education for black 
children; the right of suffrage for all black male citizens; equal regard for black women as 
is afforded to white women; and “justice—full justice—for all.”85 These attainments, the 
editors suggested, would secure “entire freedom” for freedmen, as well as born-free black 
people.86 Thus, throughout its first year of publication, the Tribune’s rhetoric anticipated 
the struggle yet to come. The Freedmen’s Bureau had just received Congressional 
approval and was about to take charge in Louisiana.   
The arrival of the Freedmen’s Bureau 
 
 The Tribune’s coverage of the Freedmen’s Bureau began in March 1865.  
Reporting that Congress had begun to consider “the organizations of a Freedmen’s 
Bureau,” the newspaper referred to the matter as “the eternal question of tutorage, 
presented in its most complete and comprehensive form.”87 The Tribune’s initial 
impression was that a centrally organized, federal agency would exacerbate the existing 
abuses in Louisiana—particularly those concerning labor.88 The newspaper’s editors 
expressed concerns that such institutions “will always… seek aggrandizement of power 
and influence,” rather than genuinely dedicate their efforts to the needs of former slaves, 
 
 217 
and would ultimately “disguise slavery under another form of bondage.”89 To emphasize 
its arguments, the Tribune printed an excerpt from Rhode Island Senator William 
Sprague’s comments on the Senate floor: 
 The Freedmen’s Department… will illustrate history in the style that the Indiana 
Bureau  illustrates the beginning and end of the Indian… Those who advocate this 
bill upon  humane principles should insist upon giving to this race the rights of free 
men and should  never—no, never—accept anything less… the interest of both the 
colored and white men  will be prejudiced by its [the Bureau’s] influence.90 
 
The Tribune backed Senator Sprague’s scathing criticism and further insisted that a 
federal Freedmen’s Bureau would signal “growing interference with the rights and 
privileges of freedmen” and amount to nothing more than a “final effort to domination.”91 
Thus, before the Freedmen’s Bureau had even formed, the Tribune had already warned 
its readers that the agency would likely inspire more problems rather than solutions.  
 Having made their initial views clear, the Tribune’s writers and editors paid 
relatively scant attention to the Bureau. A two-line blurb, buried within a list of news 
items, announced that “Maj. Gen. Howard has been appointed the head of the Freedmen’s 
Bureau” on May 20, 1865.92 After that, the Tribune routinely published the Bureau’s 
circular announcements, often without any accompanying commentary or editorial 
remarks.93 On several occasions, however, the Tribune did respond to the agency’s 
policies or positions. For example, in July 1865, the town of Opelousas issued a set of 
“black codes” which, among other egregious restrictions, forbid black people from 
renting or owning property, congregating in groups, selling or bartering any goods or 
merchandise, or even entering town limits after the hour of 3 o’clock p.m. on Sundays.94 
The day after the Tribune circulated the ordinance, it printed the Bureau’s response, 
which sought to nullify the new law, arguing that there was “no other authority [with] the 
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right to take charge of questions relating to Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned 
Lands.”95 Accompanying the Bureau’s response was only brief commendation from the 
Tribune: “We see with pleasure that after the publication of the Opelousas Ordinance… 
the Assistant Commissioner of the Department comes out with [a] Circular, which it sent 
to us for publication.”96 In another instance, the Tribune responded directly to the 
Bureau’s plans for labor reform. In a piece entitled “Land for the Freedmen,” the 
Tribune’s editors summarized the Bureau’s policy, saying, “It is said… that the Freedmen 
are at liberty to choose their employers—and, in fact, without that liberty they could not 
be called free… But at the same time, they will be given to understand that a life of 
idleness will not be encouraged or allowed.”97 The editorial deemed the policy 
“inconsistent,” because idleness would “be constructed in many different ways” and used 
to punish former slaves who could not find sustainable work due to plantation owners’ 
vengeance or mistreatment.98 The Tribune warned its readers that the Bureau’s policy, 
therefore, would “provide for the subordinate officers a matter of great difficulty, and for 
the freedmen a source of great injustice.”99 In both of these cases, the newspaper’s lack of 
expansive commentary suggests a general indifference toward the Freedmen’s Bureau—
not because the agency was deemed unimportant, but unremarkable.  
 As early as December 1865, the Tribune had determined that the Bureau did not 
yield enough force to be truly effective, regardless of its policies. One essay explained, 
 The agents of the Freedmen’s Bureau are very few. In most of the parishes there 
are  none. And where there are any, they feel very isolated, and nearly without power 
to  enforce the regulations and obtain redress and justice. In the midst of a hostile 
population,  they have to act cautiously. Their acquaintances are among the whites, and 
they cannot  easily combat the influence of the false impressions and 




These remarks demonstrate noticeably less opposition to the Bureau, when compared to 
the Tribune’s initial position in the spring of 1865. They suggest that the agency may be 
well intentioned but ultimately hindered by overwhelmingly difficult circumstances. The 
same essay, however, also noted freedmen’s negative interactions with the agency, as 
“many just claims have been treated with contempt by the subordinate agents.”101 
Ultimately, the Tribune declared that “the confidence of the people of color in that 
institution [the Freedmen’s Bureau] has been terribly shaken.”102 
 Overall, the Tribune provided its readers with coverage and commentary of the 
agency’s activities that suggested the Bureau was not unlike any other organization 
supposedly formed, yet failing, to support black people. The relative lack of attention to 
the agency could perhaps be explained by the writers’ and editors’ skepticism toward not 
only the Bureau, but also more generally toward government organizations and self-
professed white allies. A July 1865 article read, in part, “Unfortunately there are United 
States officers who do not comprehend their noble mission. They do not come as 
liberators of the oppressed; the love of liberty does not dwell in their hearts; and instead 
of proclaiming liberty to the inhabitants of the land they come to foster an undisguised 
servitude.”103 These comments suggest that the Bureau’s actions were likely met with 
hesitation, at best, and outright dismissal, at worst, as black people feared being deceived 
by insincere or corrupt government agents.  
 Therefore, the Tribune’s focus remained on advocating former slaves’ freedom on 
their own terms. As the Bureau began and sustained its operations in Louisiana, the 
newspaper’s writer and editors continued to devote attention to land and labor reform. 
Regarding land, the newspaper never wavered in its insistence that former slaves 
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deserved to own the property that they had been forced to cultivate, without 
compensation, for generations. The Tribune also reiterated that land would provide the 
most sustainable means of survival. One article asked, “how will laborers make their 
living? The government… will use rations sparingly… It is land that is required. Land 
should be immediately provided for every family.”104 Labor, of course, remained a 
frequent topic of debate and discussion, as well. The Tribune was relentless in its 
condemnation of free labor principles, which it frequently argued were merely a pretense 
for “slavery No. 2,” used to render “the boon of freedom a lie, intended to deceive the 
world.”105 The editors demanded that black laborers be left entirely alone, without 
restriction or regulation, or otherwise be presented with “a new reform before republican 
freedom takes the place of monarchical servitude.”106 Together, the newspaper’s critiques 
of both land and labor policies cast doubt on the ways in which free labor principles 
could translate to the Southern economy. 
 The Tribune also continued to insist on the importance of education, justice, and 
suffrage. Its ongoing support for integrated schooling emphasized the role of education in 
supporting individual as well as community growth. One article proclaimed, “There is, in 
fact, nothing more important, more conducive to the general welfare and the national 
progress and grandeur than the imparting of a solid education and sound principles to the 
rising generation.”107 Suffrage remained a priority and was identified as “another weapon 
put in [black people’s] hands to fight the same battle… the fight for individual freedom 
and social progress.”108 Anticipating the centrality of suffrage in the forthcoming 
“Reconstruction programme,” the Tribune argued, “there is yet something left for 
abolition capital in the negro agitation… as slavery is abolished [and] the African race 
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have powerfully assisted us in putting down the rebellion and in saving the life of the 
nation, they should have a share in the political right of the ballot-box.”109 The newspaper 
remained insistent that the American people must “get rid of the delusion or mistaken 
idea that the elective franchise is simply a privilege and not an absolute right.”110 With 
regard to rights, the Tribune also continued to call readers’ attention to violations of black 
people’s rights, as those that often occurred in disputes between former slaves and 
plantation owners. One editorial asked, “How could [a freedman] compel the planter to 
settle [his wages] with him? No lawyer will take charge of his case, without exacting 
exorbitant fees… no friend of the blacks would dare to intervene… no speedy and full 
justice may be expected.”111 Thus, the Tribune continued to call for legislative action, 
contending that “the strong arm of the law” would be the only remedy for prejudicial and 
abusive treatment toward black people.112 Committed to these positions, the Tribune 
remained vigilant in its efforts to promote black freedom from a variety of different 
approaches. 
 At first glance, the Tribune’s unflagging efforts to focus on its own proposed 
policies might suggest the newspaper did not engage with the Bureau. However, in 
refusing to be derailed from its radical commitments in the areas of land, labor, education, 
justice, and suffrage, the Tribune did, in fact, respond to a foundational claim embedded 
deeply in the agency’s rhetoric: the notion that former slaves were yet unable to 
understand the expectations and responsibilities of freedom. The Tribune anticipated this 
stereotype as early as March 18, 1865—barely two weeks after the Bureau received 
Congressional approval—when it reported on a local meeting. The newspaper offered a 
full account, including the testimony of a black man, who said: “From Red River to the 
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Gulf, we are told… that we are subject to special rules and regulations in our affairs; we 
are told that we are not ready to assume the responsibility of citizens of the United 
States.”113 In response to these presumptions, the meeting report affirmed, “No system of 
gradual elevation is needed to make us men… The defenders of such a system are not the 
friends we intend to have.”114 This passionate defense of black people’s capacity to thrive 
as free people, and as citizens, anticipated the struggle former slaves would face 
throughout the Bureau’s tenure, as they would repeatedly be asked to prove that they 
understood freedom’s meanings. Thus, the Tribune’s unwavering commitment to familiar 
tenets of land, labor, education, justice, and suffrage can be understood as a strategic 
effort to dispel nagging notions that black people—especially former slaves—did not 
understand freedom’s legacy in America. As the editors wrote, “Is it surprising that we 
bring into the debate some persistency and warmth? It is our sacred duty to fight for our 
liberties… Were we not bold enough to defend them, we would not be worthy of 
enjoying them.”115  
 Both before and after the establishment of the Bureau, the Tribune painstakingly 
demonstrated that black people were well versed in the tenets of American freedom. 
Simply put, the writers and editors proved that former slaves understood the boundaries 
and prerequisites of the social contract. Through numerous editorials, essays, and letters, 
the newspaper suggested that black people did not need to be taught to value land, labor, 
education, justice, and suffrage but, rather, already held these markers in inestimably high 
regard. Moreover, the Tribune’s immediate and sustained demands for post-bellum 
change confirmed that such attainments ought not to be delayed or deliberated. Overall, 
the newspaper’s editors issued no caveats or conditions about black people’s fitness for 
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freedom. Instead, they seized every opportunity to advocate on behalf of freedmen by 
demonstrating the myriad ways in which emancipated slaves, alongside their born-free 
brethren, were already prepared to embrace the expectations of American life. 
A Defense of Natural Rights 
 
 By launching a sustained campaign for the rights of freedmen, the Tribune 
countered the dominant misconception that black people did not understand freedom or 
the expectations of the American social contract. Additionally, however, the newspaper’s 
rhetoric worked to undercut other racist claims that pervaded much of the discourse 
within and about the Freedmen’s Bureau. Even when not engaging the agency directly, 
the Tribune’s demands for social, political, and economic rights disputed notions of black 
inferiority, exclusion, and dehumanization. The newspaper boldly identified exercises of 
white supremacy and hypocrisy, while shining a spotlight on black achievement; 
advocated for unity among black people and the wider American public, by claiming an 
equal share in the natural rights affirmed by the nation’s founding documents; and 
asserted black humanity in unquestionable terms, by showcasing the everyday range of 
black life. In advancing these arguments, the Tribune did more than lobby for policy 
reforms and counter prevailing stereotypes about black people and former slaves. Its 
writers and editors worked to redefine the social contract by challenging readers to return 
the idea of freedom to its ideal roots in natural rights, rather than earned rights, for all 
human beings.  
Disrupting white supremacy 
 
 The Tribune was determined to be a vocal and provocative mouthpiece for radical 
progress. The newspaper earned its reputation, at least in part, by refusing to accept the 
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white supremacist agendas, actions, and arguments of its adversaries and supposed allies. 
A quick glance at any issue of the Tribune confirms that its writers and editors did not 
shy away from confrontation. Essays and editorials addressed directly to prominent 
political figures (some of whom were receiving daily copies directly at the U.S. 
Congress) were routinely peppered throughout its pages. The Tribune’s critiques exposed 
the racist underpinnings of various policymakers’ reform efforts, condemned the 
hypocrisy of governmental policies, and trumpeted the resilience of black achievement. 
Together, these strategies worked to make white supremacy visible, as well as dispute 
persistent notions of black inferiority. Thus, the Tribune sought to challenge the 
restructuring of an antebellum order in which whites would continue to subjugate and 
control black people.  
 In terms of targets, the Tribune’s confrontational style knew no limits. Its writers 
and editors openly questioned, especially, the logic and integrity of political figures at the 
local and federal levels. For example, a Louisiana state senator named Charles Smith was 
lambasted for introducing the so-called “quadroon bill,” which would have formally 
recategorized any person with less than one-quarter black blood as white. A Tribune 
correspondent first wondered, “by what method, process, or calculation the tribe of Smith 
ascertain, or propose to gauge, the one-fourth of negro blood, not one drop more.”116 
Then, they pointed out that black troops had not been tested for their measure of black 
blood before being asked to risk their lives in defense of the Union. According to the 
correspondent, the bill was an attempt to affirm 
 that the whites are heavenly-gifted with the prerogative to dominate and domineer 
over  all other races, and that they may, as a matter of grace and favour, admit a section 
 approximating to their own blood to a share in their privileges, at the same time 




In no uncertain terms, the correspondent identified the proposed legislation as an overt 
attempt to codify white supremacy in the post-bellum era. At the federal level, the 
newspaper confronted Representative James S. Rollins (U-MO), who had proposed a 
resolution on the House floor. The resolution encouraged the government to encourage a 
swift end to the Civil War by returning its focus to peace, unity, and the “good order of 
society.”118 In its response, entitled “Mr. Rollins on Reconstruction,” the Tribune pointed 
out, “Mr. Rollins did not consider his pacificatory panacea as finished until he had 
rounded it, in an explanatory speech, with a stale sneer at Black Men. ‘Some have gone 
so far,’ quoth Mr. Rollins, ‘as to seek to elevate the negro to the level of the white race in 
the scale of being. I can regard such persons only as madmen.’”119 The Tribune argued 
that Representative Rollins’s inclusion of such remarks betrayed his racist motives in 
calling for an end to the war, and confirmed that he cared more about peace and harmony 
among white men than he did for the welfare of black people. Moreover, the newspaper 
called readers’ attention to Rollins’s implicit claim that the ongoing violence was the 
fault of those who dared to argue for black progress and advancement. These direct 
confrontations with prominent political figures provided opportunities for the Tribune to 
identify and question the logic of white supremacy espoused by legislators in the wake of 
emancipation.120 
 While the Tribune frequently identified specific offenders, it also consistently 
sought to address exercises of white supremacy and hypocrisy more generally. The 
newspaper’s ongoing fight with education reform in Louisiana provides an example. As 
previously mentioned, the Tribune advocated strongly in favor of integrated education. 
When confronted with the reality of segregated schooling, however, the newspaper took 
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issue with the hypocrisy of taxation. One writer remarked, “I care less about the idea of 
division in the schools than I do in that of taxation for their support. The colored 
people… will support their own schools, and the whites, theirs. This is, in a degree, worse 
than formerly.”121 In addition to pointing out the lack of black wealth available to support 
such programs, the article noted that, “in the dismal days of slavery,” taxes levied against 
free black people were used to support public schools attended by white students. The 
Tribune asked its readers, “Why is it less desirable now to make a common tax for public 
learning than it was formerly?”122 Thus, the post-bellum effort to segregate school 
systems, as well as their sources of funding, was identified as an effort not only to 
separate the races, but also to widen the gap in quality of education received by white and 
black children. In another example that invoked both education and suffrage, one 
editorial drew a scathing connection between presumptions of black ignorance and the 
outcomes of white political participation. The writer challenged their opponents to “tell 
us what worse consequences to the State could possibly result from the voting of half-
million of benighted Africans than have already resulted from the voting of a million of 
benighted Caucasians.”123 The editorial further clarified, “If greater calamities can come 
on a State than the ‘superior race’ brought on the South, we do not know what they are.” 
This tongue-in-cheek comment underlined the hypocrisy of voting restrictions, as well as 
the follies of white supremacy that upheld slavery and inspired war. In these instances, 
and many others, the newspaper shone a harsh light upon laws and policies that treated 
black people differently than their white counterparts, to disastrous results.  
 In condemning white supremacy, the Tribune was careful to identify it as a 
present, active, and powerful force. It reminded readers that, just several years prior, “a 
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few thousands of deluded, ambitious, and wicked men thought so little of the strength of 
their country and the spirit of the age, as to plot the perpetual enslavement of a whole 
race.”124 The newspaper encouraged readers to remain “wide-awake to the sense of 
danger,” signaled by the subtle “character of the argument[s]” presented to them.125 With 
careful attention, the Tribune suggested, one might notice that “the same arguments 
which were used by pro-slavery men, under the most flourishing period of slavery,” were 
once again being deployed to justify new reforms.126 Those arguments might claim 
“solicitude for the welfare of the black [people],” but ultimately served white supremacist 
ends—namely, profit, control, and subjugation. The Tribune warned its readers to beware 
the “best friend… who takes charge of our pocket, saying where we have to go and where 
we have not to go, presuming upon himself to do everything in our place.”127 It defied 
more optimistic views that “the South did not care for slavery” and was willing to 
“sacrifice their ‘peculiar institution’ for the sake of gaining their independence.”128 
Instead, the Tribune operated under the general principle that the “domineering and 
despotic spirit of the planters” would survive the emancipation era, saying, “We know 
[them] too well… to imagine that these men could ever forego their ambitious scheme 
and submit themselves to the exigences of the time. They wanted to have the laws all for 
themselves, and to take them in their own hands.”129 Thus, the newspaper treated each 
apparent move toward progress with skepticism, fearing that “the United States was not 
in earnest on the abolition question, and did not intend to treat the negro better.”130 
Numerous articles and essays encouraged constant vigilance among black people, ever 
wary of white people’s historic power to oppress and punish. Simply put, the Tribune was 
relentless in its condemnation of white supremacy as a real threat, engineered and 
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maintained by people committed to maintaining systems of racial hierarchy and 
subjugation.  
 The Tribune also moved beyond condemning white supremacy and warning 
readers of its enduring consequences. It engaged in an active effort to dispel the myth that 
black people, especially former slaves, were “indolent by nature, and too stupid” to 
survive and thrive without white control.131 In some instances, the newspaper reversed 
common stereotypes, like those that justified restrictive labor regulation with stereotypes 
of black idleness. With a subtle invocation of free labor principles, the Tribune identified 
planters and former slavemasters as “a set of lazy men, who deprecate and hate labor.”132 
As opposed to former slaves, who had toiled and tilled the earth for generations, the slave 
aristocracy “never put their hands to anything.”133 Thus, the newspaper mocked the 
planters and encouraged “no pity for these rich men, who want to live in idleness upon 
the sweat of our brethren’s brow.”134 In another instance, an 1864 report offered an 
account of “armed men on their way to the [battle] front—the front which is nearer to us 
now than never has been since the war began.”135 The scene was described as “inspiring 
and full of encouragement,” because “the regiment was composed entirely of colored 
men.”136 The report chided the white men who watched the black troops pass them by, 
saying, “Will they permit themselves… to be out done by the sable sons of the country...? 
White men! You who were looking on… go and do likewise.”137 With these comments, 
the Tribune taunted white supremacists’ claims of black inferiority. They exalted black 
people as examples to be emulated.   
 Moreover, the Tribune celebrated the bravery and sacrifice of black troops as a 
means of showcasing black achievement. The newspaper seized every opportunity, such 
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as when it reprinted a brief commendation from a New York newspaper: “the 7th U.S. 
Colored regiment displayed a great deal of courage and skill in the fight for the 
possession of the Weldon Railroad.”138 The Tribune also published a letter to the editor 
that confirmed, “So much is now being said about the fighting qualities of the black men 
in the army… Of their fighting qualities, you need only ask their commanders and 
officers.”139 Such reports were vital, as they recognized the contributions of black people 
in atypical ways; though the military often claimed to “recognize[e] all men as men,” one 
observer noted that “justice is withheld from [black men] when their merits and gallant 
behavior are to be recognized. Such honors are for white men only.”140 Thus, the 
Tribune’s routine efforts to affirm the achievements of black soldiers disrupted the 
dominant narrative that white men were the only ones with the bravery, skill, and moral 
fortitude to defend their country.  
 The Tribune’s celebration of black achievement can also be read in the style and 
sophistication of its news coverage. Its essays and editorials made frequent use of 
historical allusions to bolster its arguments. For instance, in arguing against separate 
legislation to govern white and black people, writers turned to examples from the “history 
of Europe…when the Franks invaded Gaul [and] found in that country an old population, 
governed by Roman law,” as well as the tumult that resulted in Italy when “there existed 
the strange spectacle of two sets of magistrates and two sets of courts of justice.”141 
Writers invoked Roman history again when they compared President Lincoln’s 
assassination to the warning issued by Lucretia’s rape, which also “struck the popular 
mind” and revealed “the baseness, the hatred, and madness” of the people.142 Other 
historical examples provided compelling evidence for the Tribune’s claims, as references 
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to “horrid practice of human sacrifices,” burning of widows in India, colonial witch-hunts, 
ship-building in China, and even Irish currency masterfully demonstrated the wide depth 
and breadth of black knowledge.143 In addition, the Tribune also frequently published 
reviews of public lectures and readings, including the following critique of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson’s delivery of “six lectures of American life” in Boston: 
 … there is often a want of apparent connection between one passage and the next, 
and  even one sentence and the succeeding… some sentences seem as if chopped off 
short of  their rightful complement both of sense and sound. Mr. Emerson has an 
excellent voice,  but a jerky delivery; not the least approach to graceful action, but a 
pendulum like  swaying of the body and a nervous motion of the hands and feet.144 
 
The review ultimately concluded such weaknesses “militate not the least from the 
listener’s enjoyment, and every one regrets when the inevitable termination of the hour 
has arrived and the Lecturer [Emerson] closes his manuscript.”145 The correspondent 
demonstrated a nuanced appreciation for Emerson’s work, while also asserting the 
expertise and confidence to critique the esteemed writer. The review was one of many 
that appeared on the Tribune’s pages, as its writers and editors refused to abide by 
stereotypes that dismissed black people as illiterate, unsophisticated, and ignorant. By 
showcasing, on a daily basis, the literary and rhetorical prowess of its writers, the Tribune 
continued to undercut notions of white supremacy—and its counterpart, black inferiority.  
 From several different approaches, the Tribune sustained an ongoing effort to 
expose, condemn, and disrupt white supremacy. Its staff anticipated that both the 
Northern victory and the emancipation would enrage the antebellum Southern aristocracy, 
as well as inflame the resentment of supposed allies and anti-slavery advocates who 
continued to harbor anti-black prejudices.146 Consequently, the newspaper frequently 
targeted political figures and policies that disregarded black people’s welfare; called 
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attention to the hypocrisies of proposed reforms; encouraged vigilance in the face of 
white supremacist power and aggression; and exalted black achievement in defiance of 
black inferiority stereotypes. By doing so, the Tribune resisted attempts to reconstruct the 
antebellum social, political, and economic order. The newspaper challenged the 
presumption that whites should continue to control black people, especially under the 
guise of benevolently helping or supporting their development. Thus, the Tribune issued 
an implicit challenge to the control of whites over the social contract and interrogated the 
racist walls that had long excluded—and threatened to continue excluding—black people.  
Advocating for unity 
 
 Building on its critique of white supremacy, the Tribune simultaneously 
advocated for racial equality. Describing black troops, one writer clarified, “I would not 
wish to have it understood that I think a negro better than a white man…. They are man, 
and are showing their manhood, just as thousands of soldiers from New England and the 
whole North are doing.”147 This clarification underscored the Tribune’s effort to resist, 
rather than merely reverse, antebellum racial hierarchies. The newspaper’s advocacy of 
rights for black people relied heavily on arguments for unity—among black people, first 
and foremost, but also among the wider American public. However, such unity was 
predicated not on a simple desire for peace and order, but on genuinely inclusive notions 
of sameness and essential qualities shared among all human beings. The Tribune insisted 
that black people could and should claim equal ownership of America’s founding 
documents and principles and, therefore, be able to enjoy in the same rights and 
privileges without caveat or condition. 
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 The Tribune’s commitment to unity and human sameness began with its rallying 
cry to black people. In response to critiques that the newspaper only “allegedly” stood for 
the interests of black communities, an editorial affirmed, “”The Tribune fully represents 
the colored population in spite of all the efforts that some white men have made to divide 
them.”148 The editors’ indignation underlined not necessarily the reality, but the goal—to 
unite black people against overwhelming forces hoping to delay, if not deny outright, 
their freedom.149 From the Tribune’s perspective, opponents were eager to divide black 
communities to weaken their resolve and power. Therefore, the newspaper encouraged 
both born-free and emancipated black people to join together in “one and the same 
interest.”150 It asked them “to hold together, and to help each other in each and every care, 
[then] every effort of their enemies to divide them will be useless.”151 Moreover, the 
Tribune suggested that the plight facing former slaves was a threat to the entire race, 
since the era’s debates were often characterized by broad, sweeping claims about the 
capacities, character, and condition of black people. In their view, “be the man a Creole, a 
freedmen, or the son of a manumitted slave, the question is one and the same for all.”152 
The freedom of all black people had been rendered vulnerable, especially given the ease 
with which born-free black people could be mistaken for a emancipated slave, and all 
would be “actually deprived of their rights as long as [they are] not free to use them.”153 
Facing tremendous odds, the only option was to join together and rely on one another in 
the fight for freedom. 
 Unity among black people was identified as a crucial component of post-bellum 
progress, but strong connections with white allies were also a priority. The Tribune noted 
the myriad ways in which others were seeking to codify a distinction and separation 
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between the races in the wake of slavery’s collapse. As one editorial lamented, “The true 
policy of the Government of the United States in this crisis was, and is still, plain to our 
minds. Not only planters… but all other intermediaries and third persons should be 
strictly inhibited from any relations with the people of color.”154 Such sentiments were in 
danger of being enforced by post-war reforms, which sought to create “two separate 
legislations. They intend to have a statute book for the whites and another one for the 
blacks.”155 Alluding to the infamous black codes, the Tribune asserted that “two laws in 
one and the same country” would be disastrous for all and “no less than a reminiscence of 
slavery.”156 The Tribune predicted that racial separation would ensure that the nation 
remained “broken into fragments like a house divided against itself,” and national 
strength would be impossible so long as “the interests of one race [are] not the interests of 
the other.”157 Drawing on the palpable fears and fragility of the Civil War era, the 
Tribune noted that “there is no word in our language that signifies so much to the 
American people as the little word ‘Union.’”158 Once used as a “talisman to conjure up 
efforts to an impossible end,” it had become a slogan that “rallied millions to deeds of 
noble daring.”159 In the wake of emancipation, the Tribune hoped that “union” could once 
more be a “magic word”—together with “its symbolic sister, ‘Freedom’”—that might 
finally “he[w] out of existence the rebellious slaveholders’ Government” and ensure 
America’s “present and future welfare.”160 As such, the newspaper called upon all readers 
to “combat and crash” any “attempt at erecting a new and part colored aristocracy of the 
skin,” and join together, “no matter what their shades of complexion.”161 By advocating 
for union among black and white people, the Tribune called into question the social, 
political, and economic lines that had separated the races for generations.  
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 According to the Tribune, union would only be possible if the American people 
were willing to “forego all personal preferences” and focus on the fundamental principles, 
inherent rights, and common sentiments shared by all human beings.162 Numerous essays 
and editorials argued that the exclusion of black people from the American citizenry had 
egregiously violated the nation’s commitment to equality and justice, as it rejected those 
who were driven by the same impulses and passions as others. For example, one editorial 
disputed claims that black political participation would comprise the integrity of 
American government by emphasizing that black people’s motives at the ballot box 
would be no different than whites’ motives. The writer explained, “Not only self-
preservation, but self-promotion also, are the instincts of our nature. We are seeking the 
best result through the best means… we instinctively feel a repulsion for present wrong 
and oppression.”163 The writer thus assured readers that black people’s votes were not 
vulnerable to stratagem or deceit; like white voters, they would vote with their conscience. 
In another example, an essay insisted that all Americans—black and white alike—were 
touched by the mantra: “united, we will stand, divided we must fall.”164 The writer boldly 
declared that black people, too, harbored fierce loyalty to their country and were moved 
by the same language that inevitably “thrills through the soul of the Patriot.”165 To affirm 
its position, the Tribune routinely applauded arguments for black rights that were 
grounded “not merely on… expediency or political necessity, but on the broader platform 
of equity and equality of men.”166 This broader platform was further explained in an 1865 
editorial, which clarified, “On this free and blessed soil of the United States, we all use 
one and the same language, we have one interest, one common feeling; the same ideas, 
same manners, and same patriotism... Shall we make two peoples with one people, two 
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nations with one nation?”167 In short, the Tribune was forceful in its efforts to join white 
and black people together, as emancipation had abolished the most prominent legal 
distinction amongst them. The newspaper’s coverage stressed the ways in which all 
human beings were the same, sharing certain impulses and sentiments in common and 
deserving equal rights and privileges, regardless of race. 
 To advance its claims, the Tribune marshaled America’s founding documents as 
evidence. The newspaper’s writers frequently cited the Declaration of Independence as 
the final arbiter in debates regarding former slaves’ rights. One article identified “the 
equality of men” as the “cornerstone of the Republic, the freest, truest, and best 
government on earth… by virtue of that inspired document called the Declaration of 
Independence.”168 According to the correspondent, the Declaration had freed America not 
only from “the bondage of Great Britain, but [also] from the educational prejudices and 
ignorance of the whites.”169 In another example, the Tribune reprinted the views of 
another newspaper editor, who wrote, 
 The Declaration of our Independence… announce[d] the true philosophy of 
human  government… that all just government is based upon the consent of the governed. 
It  regards the community as a unit, as a whole, made up of equal parts, not of 
unequal parts  or classes. It knows no such thing as classes of men, as governing classes 
and governed  classes. All human government, to be just, derives its authority from the 
consent f the  whole community, because the whole community is governed.170 
 
With these words, the writer insisted that the Declaration of Independence theoretically 
belonged to black people as much as it belonged to whites. They argued that the 
Declaration had offered a vision for how the nation should be—and now, with 
considerable effort and freedom for all black people, it could be. In addition, the Tribune 
also invoked the U.S. Constitution, despite its infamous Three-Fifths Clause.171 One 
editorial praised the document as a “liberal instrument” that was “exclusively based upon 
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principles of equity and justice.”172 It went on to assert that the Constitution “set aside 
every distinction of an aristocratic nature: nobility, privileges, classes, [and] honorific 
distinctions.”173 Thus, in the wake of war, those loyal to the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution had an obligation and duty to uphold its tenets. The “great work of 
national regeneration and reform… must follow where justice leads,” and fulfill “absolute 
equality before the law” in both spirit and practice.174 The Tribune claimed for black 
people an equal stake in the nation’s founding documents, as well as its democratic 
principles, without caveat or condition.175 
 In short, the Tribune’s advocacy for black people’s rights relied heavily on 
notions of sameness, which were used to rally born-free and freed black communities 
together and bridge the historic gaps between white and black people. By invoking 
notions of justice and equality, the Tribune critiqued the generations-long traditions of 
racial separation and black exclusion. In their stead, the newspaper proposed an 
understanding of union that fully embraced all people, sharing the same impulses, 
sentiments, and values—elements of the same, mutual social contract. Through numerous 
essays and editorials, the Tribune claimed ownership of the nation’s founding documents 
to imagine an American community in which freedom, along with its accompanying 
rights and privileges, was for everyone—black and white alike—from the start.176 In 
other words, the Tribune challenged readers to return to an understanding of freedom in 
terms of natural rights, rather than earned rights.  
Asserting black humanity 
 
 Finally, but perhaps most importantly, the Tribune reinforced its demands for 
inclusion and freedom by asserting black humanity in unquestionable terms. An editorial 
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clarified that, for many, black people were not considered human beings until United 
States authorities, acting as “agents and sentiments of liberty,” removed “the chain of 
bondage… from the limbs of the slave.”177 Only then was “the down-trodden servant… 
made a man” in the eyes of many Americans.178 Yet, the Tribune was also realistic about 
the pervasive thrust of racial bigotry. As one 1865 editorial explained, 
 The doom of slavery is an accomplished fact… Since Congress has passed the 
 Constitutional Amendment, all the States…seem to have turned out abolitionists. 
We  hear nothing but…blessings and thanks to God for the fall of the infamous 
pretense that  men, women, and children might be property and chattel. But, if we have 
done with  slavery, not so with the aristocracy of color. The negroes are set free, say 
the pro-slavery  men of old… [yet] free and freed persons of color are not, for that 
party, real and  complete men… They are held as a kind of bastard race, half-way 
between man and ape,  a race that the law has to protect in some form…179 
 
This passage called readers’ attention to the prevailing prejudices that continued to 
threaten black people in the post-war era. It reaffirmed that freedom alone would not 
ensure that former slaves would be perceived as fully human. Many whites, especially 
those loyal to the principles and practices of slavery, would continue to devalue black 
people. However, the Tribune’s writers and editors also feared that supposed allies who 
supported abolition—whether before or after the fact—would also continue to see former 
slaves as less than human and “look upon [them] with disdain.”180 Therefore, the Tribune 
advanced the argument that so few others were willing to passionately offer: the full and 
unapologetic humanity of black people.  
 The Tribune’s assertion of black humanity did not start and end, as so many 
others’ did, with the mere statement of the fact. Instead, the Tribune explicitly 
highlighted and celebrated black people’s human features. Numerous articles affirmed 
black people’s experience of emotions, from joy and celebration to sorrow and 
disappointment. For instance, in reporting on a performance at a local concert hall, the 
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Tribune described black people’s attachment to benevolence, as well as the effects of 
“peculiar and dreadful sufferings.”181 Simply put, the black people in attendance were 
reportedly enjoying the full range of emotion. Such arousal of the “sensibilit[ies] of the 
human heart” was identified as a “part of human feeling, a part of human nature.”182 An 
essay published in July 1864 provides another example. The piece reflected on the 
hardships of war, and the inevitable despair and pessimism that accompanied it. However, 
the writer reminded black readers of their hope, residing in “the human breast,” that 
“there always comes a day after the night, and after sorrow rejoicing.”183 The essay made 
undeniably clear that black people, like all humans, are affected by pain but capable of 
emotional resilience and strength. Beyond emotions, the Tribune also affirmed other 
human characteristics. In describing the fortitude and integrity of black people, one writer 
wrote, “Virtue and intelligence are not at the command of officers or masters. No law can 
prescribe about them; no human interference can entirely break them down; they live in 
the heart and head of the individual who fostered them.”184 With these words, the Tribune 
reminded its readers that black people not only possessed their own morals and values, 
but were also able to guard them in the face of overwhelming abuse and violence. Even 
during the height of slavery, and certainly after its fall, black people were undeniably 
human, with capacities “beyond the control of legislators [and] beyond the reach of 
prejudices.”185 Whether their enemies and supposed allies were willing to accept them or 
not, the Tribune offered numerous arguments that confirmed black people’s human 
emotions, morality, and integrity.  
 Such varied affirmations of black humanity were vital, because they dispelled 
prevailing narratives of black people as abject and dejected. Many well intentioned 
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advocates—some agents of the Freedmen’s Bureau among them—had argued for black 
rights by appealing to people’s sympathies, painting a picture of former slaves as helpless 
and broken by the effects of slavery. While these arguments did call due attention to the 
brutalities of bondage, they also contributed to stereotypes of black inferiority and 
dehumanization. The Tribune’s arguments, on the other hand, moved beyond human 
suffering and called attention to the ways in which black people felt, celebrated, prayed, 
praised, and lived.  
 This range of human experience was further emphasized by the newspaper’s 
mixed content. Like other black newspapers, the Tribune “printed information on such 
subjects as farming, business practices, household hints, and meetings of local interest” 
alongside political commentary and legislative reports.186 A quick glance at any of the 
newspaper’s issues confirms that black people’s lives were not wholly consumed by the 
decisions and debates of white men; they were living their lives as human beings, with 
other concerns, priorities, and activities on their agendas. For instance, a notice from the 
Board of Education made no mention of the segregated schooling debate when it 
reminded parents that “pupils of the Colored Public Schools [would] visit the ‘European 
Circus’ on Friday.”187 Another announcement invited “benevolent persons and friends of 
progress” to a fair, and solicited their donations at fellow neighbors’ homes.188 These 
news items were signs of an active black community, not merely waiting passively and 
helplessly for government support, but rather developing its own rhythm and 
relationships. The Tribune also provided coverage of other local events that underscored 
black people’s enjoyment of life. For example, the report of a local exhibition showcased 
“the enterprising spirit of our young ladies and young men,” revealing “not only much 
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taste and talent” but “also a great knowledge of theatrical art.”189 The Tribune further 
praised the artists’ “remarkable degree of ability,” as well as the “enthusiastic applause” 
with which the audience rewarded them.190 Another post announced a “grand fancy dress 
ball” to be held “every Saturday night, at the corner of Orleans and Claiborne,” charging 
an admissions price of 75 cents and 50 cents for men and women, respectively.191 
Juxtaposed alongside reflections on the supposedly reformed plantation system and 
editorials regarding former masters’ resistance to black freedom, these examples affirmed 
that black people’s engagement with the world was not limited to lamenting their post-
war circumstances. Their lives were not consumed by unending misery and desolation. In 
fact, black people were engaging with the exigences of the sociopolitical moment while 
also experiencing the full spectrum of human activity.  
 Simply put, the Tribune advanced a radical argument in novel ways. Beyond 
merely asserting the fact of black humanity, the newspaper provided coverage and 
commentary that showcased the full range of black life. Unlike other advocates, who 
often focused on the brutal consequences of slavery for former slaves, the Tribune’s 
writers and editors provided an undeniable glimpse of black people’s human emotions, 
morals, and integrity.192 Additionally, the newspaper juxtaposed political commentary 
with news of a vibrant black community, depicting black people as living dynamic lives 
that were invested in, but not consumed by, the era’s problems. 
 Thus, the Tribune masterfully undermined a set of racist stereotypes that 
threatened to reconstruct the antebellum social, political, and economic order in the 
emancipation era. Its writers and editors did not shy away from confronting specific 
policymakers and proposed reforms, exposing the white supremacist attitudes and 
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hypocrisies that motivated them. The Tribune responded to these efforts to reassign black 
people to a subjugated position with examples of black achievement and excellence, 
undercutting persistent claims of black inferiority. Uplifting black people, however, was 
not an effort to reverse the racial hierarchy, but to correct it. The Tribune built upon its 
critiques of white supremacy with arguments of essential sameness, launching an assault 
against the rhetorical barriers that had long excluded black people from American 
citizenship. The newspaper called upon black people to unite as a community, and then 
join with genuine white allies on the basis of shared sentiments, impulses, and values. 
Moreover, numerous articles encouraged black people to claim ownership of the nation’s 
founding documents, which bound all Americans to a social contract grounded in 
unconditional equality and justice for all. Finally, the Tribune affirmed that such a 
contract must embrace black people, because they are as fully human as their white 
counterparts. The newspaper’s comprehensive coverage of black life defied adversaries 
and supposed allies who continued to perpetuate the dehumanization and devaluation of 
black people. 
 Together, these arguments proposed a shift in the rhetoric of freedom, from 
popular notions of earned rights to natural rights. At every turn, the newspaper sought to 
dismantle the racist presumptions that held black people to different standards than 
whites. Unlike many white allies, the Tribune simultaneously confronted white 
supremacy, identified the essential sameness shared by all people, and declared the full 
and vibrant humanity of black life. These claims worked in concert to demand the full 
and unconditional fulfillment of former slaves’ freedom, as well as the rights and 
privileges that were promised to all other free Americans.  
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A Legacy of Black Protest 
 
 The present study has analyzed the ways in which the New Orleans Tribune 
resisted, both explicitly and implicitly, the dominant discourses of the emancipation era. 
Despite limited direct engagement with the Freedmen’s Bureau, especially, the Tribune’s 
numerous essays and editorials undermined the racist presumptions that pervaded much 
of the rhetoric within and about the agency. First, the Tribune’s coverage both before and 
after the Bureau’s formation demonstrated sustained commitments to land, labor, 
education, justice, and suffrage, thus defying widespread claims that black people needed 
to be taught to value the expectations and privileges of freedom. Second, the Tribune 
engaged numerous rhetorical strategies to counter notions of black inferiority, exclusion, 
and dehumanization, further disrupting barriers erected by white supremacy to bar black 
people from entry into the American social contract. Ultimately, the Tribune’s discursive 
practices demonstrated careful attention not necessarily to their enemies’ and supposed 
allies’ overt claims, but the subtle ways in which “men betray themselves by their 
language.”193 Honing in on the racist underpinnings that animated the Bureau’s discourse, 
the Tribune proposed a significant shift in the rhetoric of freedom. Its writers and editors 
retained familiar tenets of freedom’s legacy while simultaneously challenging readers to 
reorient themselves away from a focus on earned rights and, instead, toward 
unconditional natural rights for all human beings, black and white alike.  
 It is important to note that the Tribune did not foresee an end to its mission. 
Though its writers and editors frequently expressed hope, they did not suffer any 
delusions about the pace of progress. In reflecting on the potential of suffrage, for 
example, one writer predicted that the right would eventually be granted, “sooner or later,” 
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but not before its advocates overcame fierce and persistent opposition.194 In the meantime, 
in pursuit of the franchise and other “fundamental rights of a free government,” black 
people would continue to defend themselves against those who wished to block their 
advancement.195 The Tribune warned, “Do not say that we are going too fast or too far. 
We ask of any candid man: Is freedom complete? [Are black people] in the full 
enjoyment of all [they have] a right to obtain? If not, why should we stop in our efforts to 
have justice done…?”196  
 The Tribune’s radical messaging, as analyzed in the preceding sections, 
corroborates some conclusions drawn about the black press, more broadly. As Martin 
Dann has argued, “two currents in black intellectual history… converge repeatedly” in 
the black press: “a response to white racism and an assertion of self-determination.”197 As 
evidenced by this present study, the Tribune’s writers and editors used the newspaper as a 
medium through which they could critique and disrupt exercises of white supremacy, and 
build a case for black people as independent, free-thinking, and productive members of 
American society. In addition, in an exploration of black newspapers through the end of 
the Civil War era, Patrick Scott Washburn found that black newspapers routinely featured 
“uplifting and positive messages” about black people, in the hopes of upending “the 
stigma of inferiority under which they were forced to live.”198 However, the Tribune’s 
coverage, as discussed above, also defied Washburn’s observations that black newspapers 
avoided “challenging white leaders on significant issues,” in fear of violent retribution. 
The Tribune’s penchant for directly criticizing its opposition signaled, perhaps, a 
courageous turn in response to the uncertainties mounting in the age of emancipation. 
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 The Tribune’s boldness and bravery also underlines the tenacity of the black 
protest tradition. The newspaper positioned itself as a mouthpiece of the oppressed, 
anticipating an ongoing racial struggle, as “men of progress have always been victims to 
tyranny.”199 The Tribune resolved to remain committed to its mission and ensured its 
readers that it would not cease its resistance so long as “we shall have the power, and 
without being controlled by any white man. We are controlled only by our own 
conception of what is just and what is wrong.”200 Following in the footsteps of their 
predecessors, these advocates employed novel rhetorical strategies to undermine racism 
and injustice. Their challenges to dominant discourses of freedom launched “challenges 
to racial inequality that appealed to cherished American values rather than stepped 
outside the bounds of the American ideological landscape.”201 Working within the 
“existing language and systems of explanation,” like the historical legacy of freedom, the 
Tribune engaged in a “complex process of appropriation, refashioning, and reconstruction 
of ideas” to advocate on behalf of former slaves and all black people.202 As Patrick Rael 
points out, such strategies did not signal black people’s submission to an “ideologically 
hegemonic process whereby they assimilated the hostile values of a world bent on their 
oppression… because the thought they built originally belonged no more to whites than it 
did to blacks.”203 The Tribune masterfully affirmed that black people had claims to 
freedom—socially, politically, economically, and rhetorically—and possessed the power, 
skill, and determination to challenge Americans to fulfill its promises, once and for all. 
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 When the Emancipation Proclamation was issued on January 1, 1863, President 
Lincoln offered Americans a reason to hope that slaves might “forever free” from that 
day onward. It seemed that a “long-awaited day of ‘jubilo,’ the term that slaves used for 
‘jubilee,’ had arrived.”1 However, their celebrations, and those of their abolitionist allies, 
were soon called into question by the uncertainties that lingered in the wake of 
emancipation. As Eric Foner has argued, “the pivot on which social conflict turned was 
the new status of the former slave.”2 Slavery’s demise “threw open the most fundamental 
questions of economy, society, and polity”3 and marked the beginning of a tumultuous 
era marked by both problems and promise. The breaking and rebuilding of the nation 
presented an opportunity to both realize unfulfilled agreements between the state and its 
people, and pursue radical changes in systems of governance and citizenship.  
 Notions of freedom were central to the discourse of this historic era. Presuming 
that ideas are rhetorically constituted in situated moments and circulate to further “attain 
history,” I have focused on studying the “language of persons, rights, and liberties” that 
negotiated freedom before and after the emancipation of four million slaves.4 My efforts 
began with a critical understanding of the ways in which eighteenth and nineteenth 
century discourse defined freedom, moving from foundations of natural rights to 
paradoxical clarifications of earned rights in ways that evinced the public negotiation of a 
social contract. Both white and black rhetors identified republican citizenship, education 
and literacy, free labor principles, and legal citizenship as mutually agreed upon rights 
and privileges that theoretically joined the American people together. However, 
considered within the context of antebellum racial politics, those markers can be 
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understood as prerequisites used to assess black people’s perceived capacity—or lack 
thereof—for free life. In short, freedom rhetoric provided a vocabulary by which 
Americans could justify the exclusion of black people from social, political, and 
economic belonging. Freedom’s legacy was that of an exclusionary, rather than 
inclusionary, idea. 
 This legacy was tested with the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, which 
banned slavery and granted former slaves a new status. They were no longer classified as 
three-fifths of a person, but rather, they were recognized as free and full-fledged 
members of American society.5 The legal change, however, was accompanied by a 
concerted effort to mitigate the consequences of extending freedom to former slaves. 
Congress established the Freedmen’s Bureau in 1865, and it charged the new agency with 
facilitating the transition of former slaves from bondage to freedom. General Oliver Otis 
Howard assumed leadership of the Bureau and, soon after, came to the realization that the 
agency’s mission was rhetorical; he undertook an aggressive campaign to define and 
defend freedom.  
 The Bureau’s task could not be divorced from freedom’s rhetorical history, and its 
paradoxical underpinnings threatened to sustain antebellum racial injustices in the 
emancipation era. On the basis of both natural rights and earned rights, Americans could 
deny black people’s compliance with the social contract and thereby refuse to embrace 
them as free and equal members of society, regardless of their new legal status. Thus, this 
project has asked two questions. First, how did the Bureau define freedom? Second, how 
did discourse by and about the Bureau deepen or disrupt freedom’s legacy? I engaged in 
rhetorical analysis of four distinct collections of texts in order to answer them. 
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 In the first chapter, I examined the founding rhetoric of the Bureau, as outlined by 
Head Commissioner Howard and other Bureau officials in memos, letters, circular 
announcements, and a major speech from the agency’s first year of operations. I found 
that the Bureau defined freedom in terms of prized attainments—land, labor, education, 
relief, and justice—that suggested temporary, if not permanent, barriers to black inclusion. 
The Bureau’s emphasis on earned rights contradicted its progressive agenda and 
suggested that former slaves’ fitness for freedom would be assessed in terms of non-
negotiable social, economic, and political preconditions. 
 In the second chapter, I investigated the implementation of this vision at the local 
level in the Bureau’s records of Freedmen’s Village, Virginia. I analyzed the extensive 
collection of letters, memos, special orders, announcements, and receipts to argue that the 
Bureau’s earned rights approach provided the direction by which local agents interacted 
with freedmen, and that the rules and regulations governing Freedmen’s Village revived 
dehumanizing practices of classification, confinement, and control. Under the Bureau’s 
command, the Village was transformed into a site of examination, where the state’s 
power over freedmen mimicked the slave-master relationship that had been characteristic 
of antebellum America. 
 In the third chapter, I studied the controversy surrounding the Bureau in order to 
interrogate how the agency’s work inspired broader consideration of the relationship 
between the state and former slaves. I focused on the contentious 1866 congressional 
debates about S. No. 60, a bill proposed to extend the agency’s operations beyond its first 
year, and found that notions of natural rights and earned rights pervaded congressmen’s 
arguments. Whether in defense of or opposition to the bill, senators and representatives 
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strategically leveraged both approaches as they defined crisis, negotiated time, and 
delineated racial differences to devalue and abandon black people in the allocation of 
state support and protection. They activated freedom’s paradox to diminish the 
government’s responsibility to freedmen, demonstrating the limits of legal inclusion and 
affirming the ways in which freedom rhetoric could be leveraged to discount, rather than 
ensure, the state’s concern for black people.  
 In the fourth and final chapter, I turned my attention to black people’s 
contributions to the post-war conversation about freedom, freedmen, and the government. 
I analyzed the arguments of born-free and formerly enslaved black people, published in 
the historic New Orleans Tribune. I argue that the newspaper’s coverage of black life 
showcased black people’s commitments to land, labor, education, justice, suffrage in 
ways that undermined the Bureau’s earned rights approach and defied, more broadly, the 
racist assumption that black people needed to be taught to value the expectations and 
privileges of freedom. In addition, the Tribune engaged numerous rhetorical strategies to 
actively counter notions of black inferiority, exclusion, and dehumanization, thereby 
restoring the potential of a natural rights approach and simultaneously disrupting the 
barriers that questioned black people’s compliance with the American social contract. 
 Considered together, these arguments affirm that freedom’s paradox significantly 
shaped post-war discourse about freedmen, and their relationships with both the state and 
the wider American public. Abolition and emancipation had extended an offer of 
inclusion, but the terms of the new social order were subject to intense debate. The 
Freedmen’s Bureau emerged as a key player in this controversial period. In discourse 
within and about the agency, commitments to both natural rights and earned rights 
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complicated rhetors’ definitions of freedom. On the one hand, Bureau agents and their 
contemporaries asserted that legal emancipation had recognized freedmen’s natural rights 
as humans. On the other hand, they clarified that those natural rights were subject to an 
extensive set of social, political, and economic preconditions that could continue to 
distinguish black people as a subordinate class of persons subject to either state control or 
abandonment. This study ultimately contends that arguments by and about the Bureau 
advanced the reconstruction of a post-bellum racial order that affirmed the racist 
underpinnings of the social contract, further contributed to the dehumanization of former 
slaves, and prompted black people to resist the ongoing assault on their freedom.  
 In closing, I briefly summarize the major contributions of this project. I begin by 
highlighting how this study underscores the importance of ideational analysis. Then, I 
explain the ways in which a rhetorical approach has enriched and extended existing 
scholarship about the Bureau. Finally, I end with a call for further appreciation and 
critical investigation of black resistance, which has continually challenged the injustices 
of freedom for us all.  
The study of ideas 
 
 This project has explicated a compelling case that confirms the importance of 
rhetorical analysis and, especially, the careful study of ideas. As Kirt Wilson has noted, 
relatively few rhetorical scholars have focused their critical attention on public discourse 
in the emancipation and early Reconstruction era. However, closer examination of this 
period can highlight “the incongruities in America’s attitudes and discursive norms that 
would shape future judgments and race relationships into the next century” and beyond.6 
In other words, the present study provides an important entry point into critical 
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investigations of freedom, but it is certainly not the final word on the richness of this idea. 
Other studies are needed to deepen our critical understanding of the ways in which 
freedom’s legacy animated civil rights discourse in the mid-twentieth century, for 
example, or continues to inspire contemporary black artists like Jermaine Lamarr Cole to 
sing, “All we want to do is break the chains off. All we want to do is be free.”7 As 
scholars, we must insist upon critical engagement with the “configurations of language” 
that constitute freedom in complex ways, fraught with contradictions and laden with 
lasting ideological implications.8  
 My findings regarding rhetors’ strategic use of freedom rhetoric in the post-war 
context prompt me to invite other scholars to similarly explore the rhetorical depth and 
density of other ideas, as well. As this project has clearly demonstrated, the various 
contours or nodes of an idea may persist across space and time, but they are activated 
differently by different groups. In this case, both Bureau agents and New Orleans Tribune 
writers expressed shared commitments to land, labor, education, and justice; however, 
they advanced different arguments about emancipation era policies and black freedom. 
Similarly, both Bureau agents and U.S. congressmen relied on natural rights and earned 
rights perspectives, but they ultimately presented varying views on the extent to which 
the state should or would supervise freedmen’s transition from bondage to freedom. This 
project has therefore affirmed that ideational analysis must attend not only to an idea’s 
“nuances of meaning,” but also to how such nuances are connected and arranged through 
argument.9 By examining ideas in this way, we can uncover how even progressive 
agendas and ideals can be used to justify exercises of power and domination. If we ignore 
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them, we resign ourselves to the ever-present threat that “liberation from the top down 
[will] go only so far as the interests of the dominant groups permi[t].”10  
The legacy of the Freedmen’s Bureau 
 
 This project has also made a significant contribution to existing literature about 
the Freedmen’s Bureau. According to Barry A. Crouch and Larry Madaras, historians 
have generally approached the agency from two perspectives. Earlier studies often 
indicted the Bureau as a mere instrument of radical Republicans, eager to punish the 
South and extend Northern power in the wake of the Civil War. Recent work has looked 
upon the agency more kindly, praising its revolutionary efforts and emphasizing the 
unavoidable political constraints that limited the Bureau’s ability to meet its goals.11 The 
agency has been referred to as former slaves’ “first friend… helping to move [them] from 
slavery to citizenship” and providing them with an “an equal chance [to] begin their lives 
as freedmen and –women.”12 By redefining the Bureau’s work as a rhetorical mission, 
rather than an administrative one, I have disrupted this binary. I propose, instead, that we 
consider the Bureau with greater nuance and appreciate the rhetorical complexities of its 
task. In its time, the Bureau certainly pursued a radical agenda, as it sought to facilitate 
the transition of former slaves from bondage to freedom—and, by extension, from 
exclusion to inclusion in American society. However, the Bureau undermined its own 
agenda by espousing a rhetoric of freedom that helped its agents, as well as other 
Americans, revert to familiar, antebellum practices and principles that had subjugated 
black people for generations. By dabbling with both natural rights and earned rights 
perspectives, their work invoked both progressive and conservative commitments that 
ultimately discounted the legitimacy of black people’s freedom despite the legal 
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emancipation afforded by President Lincoln’s proclamation and the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  
 This project further extends existing literature about the Bureau by highlighting 
the agency’s historic role in perpetuating unjust practices that continue today in various 
forms. Chapter 2, in particular, identified three specific ways in which the agency 
asserted the state’s power over black people. The Bureau’s efforts to classify, confine, 
and control freedmen cannot be divorced from the contemporary experiences of black 
and African Americans in the United States.  
 With regards to the enduring impact of classification, The Freedmen’s Village 
records are merely one collection among many that catalog black people as objects, 
diminishing—if not dismissing outright—their full humanity in the institutional archive.13 
The Bureau’s papers corroborate Saidiya Hartman’s argument that blackness is most 
often documented in “a realm of experience which is situated between two zones of… 
social and corporeal death,” where “precarious lives… are visible only in the moment of 
their disappearance.”14 In such records, “the stories that exist are not about them, but 
rather about the violence, excess, mendacity, and reason that seized hold of their lives, 
transformed them into commodities and corpses.”15 The lists and ledgers of former slaves’ 
names amount to “little more than a register of [their] encounter with power,” providing 
only “meager sketch[es] of [their] existence.”16 Thus, institutional archives are often “a 
death sentence, a tomb, a display of the violated body, an inventory of property” for black 
people, who are identified as merely “an asterisk in the grand narrative of history.”17 
Even if we read “against” the archive in search of “traces” of black humanity and 
resistance, we glean little from them beyond “what can be extrapolated from an analysis 
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of the ledger or borrowed from the world of [slaves’] captors and masters and applied to 
[them].”18 These historical documents continue to exercise oppressive power, as they put 
forth narratives in which black people are perpetually destitute, dying, or already dead.19 
They continually invite archivists, historians, scholars, and students to imagine and 
accept worlds that expunge black people’s experiences at the behest of white power.20  
 The legacy of black confinement, born in slavery and reified upon emancipation, 
also persists today in various forms. The Bureau detained thousands of former slaves 
within Freedmen’s Village, delaying their entrance into American society and reviving 
antebellum commitments to black subordination. Contemporary segregation efforts, like 
gentrification and school privatization, similarly aim to monitor and constrain black 
people’s movements within society.21 The most insidious and aggressive among these 
initiatives, however, is the mass incarceration of black people in the American carceral 
state. Douglas A. Blackmon has examined aggressive efforts to arrest and detain black 
people almost immediately after the emancipation era began, while Michelle Alexander 
has written extensively about the ways in which the criminal justice system has continued 
to target black people for institutional confinement and forced prison labor.22 Both 
scholars maintain that slavery practices, like those practiced in Freedmen’s Village, 
evolved in order to restrict black people’s access to employment, housing, education, and 
democratic participation while simultaneously professing an allegiance to principles of 
equality and justice. The state’s proclivity for confinement continues to inhibit black 
people—once slaves, then “freedmen,” and now “criminals”—from exercising their 
“basic freedom[s],” especially the “right to vote for those who will make the rules and 
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laws that govern one’s life.”23 Once apprehended by the government, black people are 
once more subject to “all the practices we supposedly left behind.”24  
 Finally, the layers of control and surveillance that permeated the Bureau’s 
everyday operations, especially evident in Freedmen’s Village, arguably constituted an 
early form of racialized surveillance, theorized by Simone Browne as “enactments of 
surveillance [that] reify boundaries along racial lines,” often resulting in “discriminatory 
and violent treatment.”25 The Bureau’s records underline Browne’s assertion that 
surveillance is not a practice “inaugurated by new technologies,” but rather, a centuries-
old mechanism by which the state fixes upon blackness and black people as object, rather 
than human.26 The agents’ watchful gaze was vital to the Bureau’s effort to (re)define 
racial norms of social and economic behavior in the post-war era, as well as to “define 
what [was] in or out of place” in American society.27 Such efforts continue today in new 
forms, including automated facial recognition, dashboard and body cameras, drone 
technology, big data surveillance, and closed circuit monitoring. Though all citizens are 
subject to multiple layers of surveillance in modern America, John Fiske has argued that 
these practices remain racialized, such that “today’s seeing eye is white.”28  
 These examples demonstrate the complex legacy of the Bureau’s discourse and 
policies in contemporary race relations. The ways in which the agency and its 
contemporaries sought to control, dehumanize, and subjugate black people to white 
power and domination are necessarily linked to modern day injustices. We cannot 
understand these practices and how they work if we do not grapple with the long history 
of arguments that has justified, and continues to justify, their existence. In order to 
dismantle them, we must recognize how these modes of racial injustice are upheld by our 
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own, and others’, seemingly progressive discourse and work towards activism that 
constructs ideas just as carefully as we may come to critique them. 
Freedom and black resistance  
 
 This study has affirmed the perseverance of black resistance in the face of 
overwhelmingly persistent oppression. The first three chapters of this project focused on 
voices of institutional power, underscoring the sheer force with which the state can harm 
its people under the guise of protecting and supporting them. As such, we can better 
appreciate the strategies of black resistance and refusal that are showcased in the final 
chapter. As so many of their kin had done before, born-free and formerly enslaved black 
people confronted the racist underpinnings of discourse by and about the Bureau head-on. 
As Steven Hahn has reminded us, African Americans have always exhibited the courage 
and capacity to defy those who seek their destruction. They have “continually made and 
remade their politics and political history in complex relation to shifting events; they did 
not have their politics and political history made for them.”29 As such, any history of the 
emancipation era—and of freedom—must appreciate the ways in which black people 
intervened in dominant discourses to resist and reshape power. The present study 
suggests that black people, perhaps more so than any others, were willing to take on the 
rhetorical task presented by emancipation. While Bureau agents and U.S. congressmen 
fell back upon familiar practices and principles, the New Orleans Tribune actively 
challenged the pervasive notions of black inferiority, exclusion, and dehumanization that 
sustained freedom rhetoric.  
 This study, and many others, can still do a better job of appreciating black 
people’s unwavering pursuit of justice and freedom. Numerous scholars have demanded 
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more critical attention to inventive methods of black resistance, particularly in historical 
contexts of marked by excessive state control. For instance, Tina Campt’s recent work 
considered “the radical interpretive possibilities of images and stage archives we are most 
often inclined to overlook,” arguing that even photos “produced predominantly for the 
regulatory needs of the state or the classificatory imperatives of colonialism” can capture 
black defiance and refusal.30 Moreover, with regards to environments that continue to 
value blackness and black people in terms of labor output, Simone Browne reminded us 
that “microresistances to managerial control” can take on unexpected forms, including 
“expressing boredom… arriving late, and sometimes not arriving at work at all. Rather 
than being thought of as unproductive”—or, in the Bureau’s view, idleness—“such acts 
must be understood as disalienating, as they are strategic means of contesting 
surveillance in the workplace.”31 Following additional scholars like Anjali Arondekar, 
Avery F. Gordon, and Cheryl Jorgensen-Earp, we must seek opportunities to read 
“against the archive[s]” that have often sought to silence or exclude black people.32 
Whether in overt expressions of refusal, like in the Tribune’s numerous editorials and 
articles, or in mere “traces,” black resistance persists.  
 By aspiring to more critical scholarship, we can support those whose lives 
continue to be aversely affected by freedom’s unjust legacy. According to Charles W. 
Mills, nonwhites have “always known that the racial contract needs to be resisted,” and 
black people, in particular, have consistently reminded us of the need to reflect on “”our 
democracy’s deep historical problems” with the full participation of its people.33 If we are 
reaching for freedom, we must altogether join in this effort to question our relationship to 
our own government, to one another, and to the ideas we uphold. We cannot take ideas of 
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progress for granted, but rather, work to create liberation, justice, and equality in our 
everyday lives and arguments. We must remember that “a free state” must be imagined 
“not as the time before captivity or slavery, but rather as the anticipated future.”34 
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